Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Rescuing Doxastic Normativism
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2012 (English)In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 78, no 4, 293-308 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between those true propositions we are obliged to believe (ordinary non-tricky propositions) and those we are not (tricky propositions). I develop a norm which I argue does exactly this, and further argue that it can be used to salvage the idea that belief is constitutively normative.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2012. Vol. 78, no 4, 293-308 p.
Keyword [en]
belief, normativity, doxastic normativism
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-89884DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01144.xISI: 000317141200003OAI: diva2:621205


Available from: 2013-05-14 Created: 2013-05-14 Last updated: 2013-05-14Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text
By organisation
Department of Philosophy
In the same journal

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 68 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link