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Incentives from curriculum tracking
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
2013 (English)In: Economics of Education Review, ISSN 0272-7757, Vol. 32, no C, 140-150 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 32, no C, 140-150 p.
Keyword [en]
Incentives, Curriculum tracking, High-stakes testing, Student achievement
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URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-98336OAI: diva2:683449
Available from: 2014-01-03 Created: 2014-01-03 Last updated: 2014-02-11Bibliographically approved

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Koerselman, Kristian
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The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI)
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