Incentives from curriculum tracking
2013 (English)In: Economics of Education Review, ISSN 0272-7757, Vol. 32, no C, 140-150 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 32, no C, 140-150 p.
Incentives, Curriculum tracking, High-stakes testing, Student achievement
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-98336OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-98336DiVA: diva2:683449