Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'
2013 (English)In: Thought, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 1, no 4, 292-300 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2013. Vol. 1, no 4, 292-300 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-98984DOI: 10.1002/tht3.43OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-98984DiVA: diva2:686040