Against Belief Normativity
2013 (English)In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 80-99 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 80-99 p.
aim of belief, norm, normativity, rationality, rule-guidance, truth
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-98985DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.003.0005ISBN: 978-0-19-967213-4OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-98985DiVA: diva2:686060