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The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion
University of Sussex.
University of Oxford, UK.
2014 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 167, no 2, 251--271 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 167, no 2, 251--271 p.
Keyword [en]
The open future, Bivalence, Norms of assertion, Indeterminacy
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-99270DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0041-2OAI: diva2:686553
Available from: 2014-01-12 Created: 2014-01-12 Last updated: 2014-02-20Bibliographically approved

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Hattiangadi, Anandi
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