Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2014 (English)In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 82, no 2, 705-730 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm. Second, workers' wages rise with seniority, where seniority is defined as a worker's tenure relative to the tenure of his colleagues. Controlling for tenure, the probability of a worker leaving the firm decreases with seniority. The increase in expected seniority with tenure explains a large part of the negative duration dependence of the separation hazard. Conditional on ten years of tenure, the wage differential between the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the seniority distribution is 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark and 2.3-3.4 in Portugal.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 82, no 2, 705-730 p.
Keyword [en]
Wage dynamics, tenure, seniority, last-in-first-out
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-103307DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8688ISI: 000333678400007OAI: diva2:717581


Available from: 2014-05-15 Created: 2014-05-12 Last updated: 2014-05-15Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Buhai, I. Sebastian
By organisation
Department of Economics
In the same journal

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 47 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link