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The Affirmative Answer to the Existential Question and the Person Affecting Restriction
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institutet för framtidsstudier.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5031-505X
2015 (English)In: Weighing and reasoning: themes from the philosophy of John Broome / [ed] I. Hirose and A. Reisner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The person affecting restriction states that one outcome can only be better than another if it is better for someone. The existential question concerns whether existence can be better or worse for a person than non-existence, the personal value of existence. According to the affirmative answer, existence can be better or worse than non-existence for a person. This chapter discusses the implications of the restriction and the affirmative answer to the existential question for population ethics, the value of future generations, and especially for the possibility of avoiding the so-called repugnant conclusion, an undesirable implication of classical utilitarianism.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Keyword [en]
person affecting restriction, value of existence, population ethics, future generations, repugnant conclusion, utilitarianism
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Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-103552DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0009ISBN: 9780199684908OAI: diva2:718665
Available from: 2014-05-21 Created: 2014-05-21 Last updated: 2015-06-12Bibliographically approved

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Arrhenius, Gustaf
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