Intersubjective intentional identity
2014 (English)In: Empty representations: reference and non-existence / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Genoveva Martí, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1, 91-113 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Geach’s basic idea of intentional identity is reconsidered and the idea of a common focus is elaborated in possible-worlds terms. A distinction betweeen internalism and externalism about common focus is made; internalism is characterized by the idea that mental anaphora always succeeds in establishing common focus. It is then argued that internalism makes intersubjective intentional identity, as expressed in Geach sentences, impossible. Finally, a semantic account of Geach sentences is proposed, which can make them true on certain realist assumptions about possible worlds and possible objects.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1. 91-113 p.
intentional identity, Geach, internalism, externalism, modality, modal realism, common focus
Research subject Theoretical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-111616DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.003.0004ISBN: 978-0-19-964705-7OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-111616DiVA: diva2:775907