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In Defense of My Favourite Theory
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2014 (English)In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 95, no 2, 159-174 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 95, no 2, 159-174 p.
Keyword [en]
moral uncertainty; intertheoretic comparisons of value; My Favourite Theory; moral conscientiousness
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-111878DOI: 10.1111/papq.12022OAI: diva2:776975
Available from: 2015-01-08 Created: 2015-01-08 Last updated: 2015-02-03Bibliographically approved

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Torpman, Olle
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