Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
Harvard University, USA.
2014 (English)In: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335, Vol. 81, no 323, 397-418 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 81, no 323, 397-418 p.
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-112490DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12060OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-112490DiVA: diva2:779271
Available from: 2015-01-12 Created: 2015-01-12 Last updated: 2017-12-05Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Cunningham, Tom
In the same journal
Economica
Economics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 19 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf