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Intending to be misinterpreted
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2015 (English)In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, 5-18 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In his paper 'Two Notions of Utterance Meaning', Petr Kot'atko criticises Davidson's conception of the relation between meaning and intention. He ascribes the following view (D) to Davidson: If S makes an utterance in order to perform a certain speech act, he intends and expects that act to be assigned to the utterance in A's interpretation. Kot'atko's objection to (D) is that a speaker can intend to be misinterpreted. The present paper discusses this objection. It is argued that Kot'atko's main example of such an intention fails. It is also argued that although there can be cases that would be adequately described as examples of intending to be misinterpreted, they are not of the kind needed for an objection against (D).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 22, 5-18 p.
Keyword [en]
Intention, meaning, misinterpretation, utterance
National Category
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-115955ISI: 000350078300002OAI: diva2:801399
Available from: 2015-04-09 Created: 2015-04-08 Last updated: 2016-01-18Bibliographically approved

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