POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
Number of Authors: 3
2015 (English)In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 13, no 4, 631-668 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leadersa pool of candidates for top political officeand examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 13, no 4, 631-668 p.
Economics and Business
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-120072DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12124ISI: 000358687300003OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-120072DiVA: diva2:851834