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Should unemployment insurance be asset tested?
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CESifo, Munich, Germany.
Number of Authors: 2
2015 (English)In: Review of economic dynamics (Print), ISSN 1094-2025, E-ISSN 1096-6099, Vol. 18, no 3, 575-592 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We study asset-tested unemployment insurance in an incomplete markets model with moral hazard during job search. Optimal asset testing is weak and yields negligible welfare gains. The optimal replacement rate of an unemployed worker with zero liquidity is 9 percentage points higher than that of the median worker. Welfare rises by 0.03 percent in consumption equivalent terms. We develop a general welfare decomposition for heterogeneous agent models with transitional dynamics. Asset testing creates welfare gains due to redistribution and additional consumption during the transition phase, and welfare losses due to reduced consumption smoothing, lower consumption, and higher effort levels.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 18, no 3, 575-592 p.
Keyword [en]
Unemployment insurance, Asset testing, Incomplete markets, Welfare decomposition
National Category
Economics and Business
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-120714DOI: 10.1016/ 000359501700007OAI: diva2:854309
Available from: 2015-09-16 Created: 2015-09-15 Last updated: 2015-09-16Bibliographically approved

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Koehne, Sebastian
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