Can Reductive Individualists Allow Defence Against Political Aggression?
2015 (English)In: Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 1 / [ed] David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1Chapter in book (Refereed)
This chapter defends reductive individualism against the claim that it is unable to sanction wars of national defense that seek to protect non-vital interests, such as political goods. It does so by rebutting the two arguments: the Conditional Force Argument and the Proliferation Problem. The Conditional Force Argument holds that, by the reductivist’s own lights, wars that seek to defend only political goods are necessarily disproportionate and therefore always unjust. The Proliferation Problem holds that there is no morally significant difference between states and some other collectives. So, even if it can showed that it is proportionate for states to wage defensive wars against threats to non-vital interests, the grounds are lacking for restricting this permission to states.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1.
, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 1
war, self-defense, reductive individualism, bloodless invasion, aggregation, mediated harms, sovereignty, aggression, national defense
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-122205DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669530.003.0008ISBN: 9780191749377ISBN: 9780199669530OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-122205DiVA: diva2:865515
FunderKnut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, 1521101