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Networks games under incomplete information
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden; CEPR, United Kingdom.
2015 (English)In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, ISSN 0304-4068, E-ISSN 1873-1538, Vol. 61, 221-240 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 61, 221-240 p.
Keyword [en]
Social networks, Strategic complementarities, Bayesian games
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URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-124413DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.002ISI: 000366785800022OAI: diva2:885986
Available from: 2015-12-21 Created: 2015-12-21 Last updated: 2016-01-18Bibliographically approved

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Zenou, Yves
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Department of Economics
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