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Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
Number of Authors: 3
2015 (English)In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 134, 53-57 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We characterize the unique Poisson-Nash equilibrium of the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) when the number of bidders is uncertain and follows a Poisson distribution.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 134, 53-57 p.
Keyword [en]
Lowest unique bid auction, Least unmatched price auction, Minbid game, Poisson game, Congestion game, Mixed equilibrium
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-121664DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.009ISI: 000361257400014OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-121664DiVA: diva2:890119
Available from: 2015-12-30 Created: 2015-10-13 Last updated: 2015-12-30Bibliographically approved

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Östling, Robert
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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
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