Constancy in Variation: An Argument for Centering the Contents of Experience?
2016 (English)In: About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016Chapter in book (Refereed)
When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
shape constancy, perceptual experience, representational content, centered content, phenomenal intentionalism, variation constancy
Research subject Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-125552DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0003ISBN: 9780191781711OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-125552DiVA: diva2:893913