The limits of expressivism
2015 (English)In: Meaning without representation: essays on truth, expression, normativity, and naturalism / [ed] Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben, Michael Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 224-244 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that the concept of meaning is normative, and that his own brand of expressivism can be applied in the semantic and intentional domain. In this paper, I argue that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense self-undermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are semantic sentences, and if these are understood to express non-cognitive attitudes of some kind, the expressivist’s explanations are spurious.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 224-244 p.
Expressivism, meaning, metasemantics
Research subject Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-125606DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.003.0011ISBN: 9780191789045OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-125606DiVA: diva2:894356
ProjectsPro FuturaExpressivism Generalized