Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Explaining Deductive Inference
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2015 (English)In: Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning / [ed] Heinrich Wansing, Cham: Springer, 2015, 65-100 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

We naturally take for granted that by performing inferences we can obtain evidence or grounds for assertions that we make. But logic should explain how this comes about. Why do some inferences give us grounds for their conclusions? Not all inferences have that power. My first aim here is to draw attention to this fundamental but quite neglected question. It seems not to be easily answered without reconsidering or reconstructing the main concepts involved, that is, the concepts of ground and inference. Secondly, I suggest such a reconstruction, the main idea of which is that to make an inference is not only to assert a conclusion claiming that it is supported by a number of premisses, but is also to operate on the grounds that one assumes or takes oneself to have for the premisses. An inference is thus individuated not only by its premisses and conclusion but also by a particular operation. A valid inference can then be defined as one where the involved operation results in a ground for the conclusion when applied to grounds for the premisses. It then becomes a conceptual truth that a valid inference does give a ground for the conclusion provided that one has grounds for the premisses.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cham: Springer, 2015. 65-100 p.
Series
Outstanding Contributions to Logic, ISSN 2211-2758 ; 7
Keyword [en]
Inference, Deduction, Proof, Ground, Meaning, Logical validity Inferentialism, Intuitionism, Proof-theoretic semantics
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-125733DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-11041-7_3ISI: 000386617500005ISBN: 978-3-319-11040-0 (print)ISBN: 978-3-319-11041-7 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-125733DiVA: diva2:894917
Available from: 2016-01-17 Created: 2016-01-17 Last updated: 2016-12-12Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Prawitz, Dag
By organisation
Department of Philosophy
Philosophy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

Altmetric score

Total: 27 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf