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Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
Number of Authors: 1
2015 (English)In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 58, no 7-8, 741-754 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Tim Williamson has offered a sophisticated account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology. More recently, he has also engaged in a variant of the so-called expertise defence' of traditional philosophical methodology. In this paper I argue that if Williamson's account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology is right, this seriously undermines his version of the expertise defence.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 58, no 7-8, 741-754 p.
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-125805DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2015.1083470ISI: 000366669500004OAI: diva2:896561
Available from: 2016-01-21 Created: 2016-01-18 Last updated: 2016-01-21Bibliographically approved

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Häggqvist, Sören
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