Judgements, Expertise, and Counterfactuals
Number of Authors: 1
2015 (English)In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 58, no 7-8, 741-754 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Tim Williamson has offered a sophisticated account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology. More recently, he has also engaged in a variant of the so-called expertise defence' of traditional philosophical methodology. In this paper I argue that if Williamson's account of thought experiments and of modal epistemology is right, this seriously undermines his version of the expertise defence.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 58, no 7-8, 741-754 p.
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-125805DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2015.1083470ISI: 000366669500004OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-125805DiVA: diva2:896561