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The Repugnant Conclusion
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5031-505X
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2016 (English)In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In Derek Parfit's original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is characterized as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics. The last three decades have witnessed an increasing philosophical interest in questions such as “Is it possible to make the world a better place by creating additional happy people?” and “Is there a moral obligation to have children?” The main problem has been to find an adequate theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory. As the name indicates, Parfit finds the Repugnant Conclusion unacceptable and many philosophers agree. However, it has been surprisingly difficult to find a theory that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other equally counterintuitive conclusions. Thus, the question as to how the Repugnant Conclusion should be dealt with and, more generally, what it shows about the nature of ethics has turned the conclusion into one of the cardinal challenges of modern ethics.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016.
Keyword [sv]
population ethics, the repugnant conclusion, impossibility theorems, population paradoxes
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-127240OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-127240DiVA: diva2:912096
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Note

Revised version.

Available from: 2016-03-15 Created: 2016-02-29 Last updated: 2017-02-27Bibliographically approved

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