Population Ethics and Imprecision
2016 (English)In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 82, no 2, 166-181 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing what he calls “imprecision” in value comparisons. He suggests that in a range of important cases, populations of different sizes are only imprecisely comparable. Parfit suggests that this feature of value comparisons opens up a way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other counterintuitive conclusions, and thus solves one of the major challenges in ethics. In this paper, I shall try to clarify Parfit’s proposal and evaluate whether it will help us with the paradoxes in population ethics.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 82, no 2, 166-181 p.
population ethics, imprecision, Different-Number-Based Imprecision, Repugnant Conclusion, impossibility theorems, population paradoxes, Derek Parfit
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-127239DOI: 10.1111/theo.12094ISI: 000374572100006OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-127239DiVA: diva2:912098
FunderSwedish Research Council