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Population Ethics and Imprecision
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5031-505X
2016 (English)In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 82, no 2, 166-181 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing what he calls “imprecision” in value comparisons.  He suggests that in a range of important cases, populations of different sizes are only imprecisely comparable. Parfit suggests that this feature of value comparisons opens up a way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other counterintuitive conclusions, and thus solves one of the major challenges in ethics. In this paper, I shall try to clarify Parfit’s proposal and evaluate whether it will help us with the paradoxes in population ethics.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 82, no 2, 166-181 p.
Keyword [en]
population ethics, imprecision, Different-Number-Based Imprecision, Repugnant Conclusion, impossibility theorems, population paradoxes, Derek Parfit
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Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-127239DOI: 10.1111/theo.12094ISI: 000374572100006OAI: diva2:912098
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2016-03-15 Created: 2016-02-29 Last updated: 2016-06-07Bibliographically approved

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Arrhenius, Gustaf
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