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On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory: Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen
Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
2016 (English)In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 4, 461-473 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 13, no 4, 461-473 p.
Keyword [en]
contextualism, irreducible normativity, Mackie, moral error theory, queerness, supervenience
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Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-132315DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01304005ISI: 000378815700005OAI: diva2:951222
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, 1432305
Available from: 2016-08-08 Created: 2016-08-08 Last updated: 2016-08-08Bibliographically approved

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