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Du signifiant à l’inconscient comme béance. Lacan contre le structuralisme, vers Merleau-Ponty
Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
Number of Authors: 1
2016 (French)In: Revue roumaine de philosophie, ISSN 1220-5400, Vol. 60, no 1, 39-53 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

When reading Lacan's text on Merleau-Ponty from 1961, commentators generally conclude that Lacan's critique makes clear the abyss that separates the two thinkers, which is fully supported by Lacan's absence of retractation. However, if one reads this text together with Merleau-Ponty's work, one can't but notice that Lacan's critique actually displays a qui pro quo on the notion of the signifier and its relation to the real. Lacan's reading of Le Visible et 1 'invisible in 1964 contrasts with this first critique in that it expresses a shift that affects his understanding of the relation between the signifier and the real. This results in a new elaboration of the concept of repetition that relies on the idea that the unconscious works as a gap (beance). Through this shift, Lacan steps away from structuralism and gets closer to Merleau-Ponty. This double move away from Levi-Strauss and towards Merleau-Ponty allows Lacan to get back to the investigation of the dynamic of structure, which goes along with a new reading of the Freudian notion of Spaltung.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 60, no 1, 39-53 p.
Keyword [en]
unconscious, gap, signifier, Spaltung, repetition, structuralism, ontology of the flesh, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Levi-Strauss
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
URN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-132624ISI: 000378099200003OAI: diva2:954643
Available from: 2016-08-23 Created: 2016-08-17 Last updated: 2016-08-23Bibliographically approved

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Letellier, Isabelle
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