Problems with Norms of Assertion
Number of Authors: 1
2016 (English)In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 93, no 1, 178-207 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 93, no 1, 178-207 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:su:diva-133230DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12209ISI: 000380342500008OAI: oai:DiVA.org:su-133230DiVA: diva2:968773