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  • 1.
    Agell, Fredrik
    Stockholm University.
    Frågan efter livets mening: om kunskap och konst i Nietzsches tänkande2002Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 2. Ahlenius, Henrik
    et al.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Chinese and Westerners Respond Differently to the Trolley Dilemmas2012In: Journal of Cognition and Culture, ISSN 1567-7095, E-ISSN 1568-5373, Vol. 12, no 3-4, p. 195-201Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A set of moral problems known as The Trolley Dilemmas was presented to 3000 randomly selected inhabitants of the USA, Russia and China. It is shown that Chinese are significantly less prone to support utility-maximizing alternatives, as compared to the US and Russian respondents.

    A number of possible explanations, as well as methodological issues pertaining to the field of surveying moral judgment and moral disagreement, are discussed.

  • 3.
    Ahlgren, Per
    et al.
    School of Education and Communication in Engineering Sciences (ECE), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden..
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Persson, Olle
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Sociologiska institutionen..
    Svedberg, Maria
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bibliometric analysis of two subdomains in philosophy: free will and sorites2015In: Scientometrics, ISSN 0138-9130, E-ISSN 1588-2861, Vol. 103, no 1, p. 47-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this study we tested the fruitfulness of advanced bibliometric methods for mapping subdomains in philosophy. The development of the number of publications on free will and sorites, the two subdomains treated in the study, over time was studied. We applied the cocitation approach to map the most cited publications, authors and journals, and we mapped frequently occurring terms, using a term co-occurrence approach. Both subdomains show a strong increase of publications in Web of Science. When we decomposed the publications by faculty, we could see an increase of free will publications also in social sciences, medicine and natural sciences. The multidisciplinary character of free will research was reflected in the cocitation analysis and in the term co-occurrence analysis: we found clusters/groups of cocited publications, authors and journals, and of co-occurring terms, representing philosophy as well as non-philosophical fields, such as neuroscience and physics. The corresponding analyses of sorites publications displayed a structure consisting of research themes rather than fields. All in all, both philosophers involved in this study acknowledge the validity of the various networks presented. Bibliometric mapping appears to provide an interesting tool for describing the cognitive orientation of a research field, not only in the natural and life sciences but also in philosophy, which this study shows.

  • 4.
    Aili, Hans
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of French, Italian and Classical Languages. Latin.
    St. Birgitta and the Text of the Revelationes: A Survey of Some Influences Traceable to Translators and Editors1986In: The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages: Acts of the Conference Arranged by the Department of Classical Languages, University of Stockholm, 29-31 August 1984, 1986Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Ajagán-Lester, Luis
    Stockholm University, The Stockholm Institute of Education, Department of Curriculum Studies and Communication .
    Mot en pluritopisk hermeneutik2005In: Text och existens: hermeneutik möter samhällsvetenskap / [ed] Staffan Selander, Per-Johan Ödman, Göteborg: Daidalos, 2005, p. 143-160Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Luis Ajagán-Lester fokuserar i sin artikel `den andres hermeneutik` - mötet mellan medlemmar av olika kulturer och frågan hur hermeneutiken kan bidra med förståelse av den Andre. Både tolkningar som är baserad på avstånd i tid respektive rum aktualiserar frågan om hur man förstår sig själv genom bilden av den andre/det andra. Den bildade européns slutenhet i sin egen värld har bidragit till hermeneutikens `monotopika` karaktär. Begreppet `takt`framskrivs en central kategori mi mötet med den andre och i utvecklandet av en `pluritopisk`hermeneutik och `polyfon tolkningsprocess`.

  • 6.
    Alxatib, Sam
    et al.
    MIT, Dept Linguist & Philosophy, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sauerland, Uli
    Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissensch, D-10117 Berlin, Germany.
    Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.2013In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 619-634Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn't tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.

  • 7.
    Andersson, Anna-Karin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Libertarianism and Potential Agents: A Libertarian View of the Moral Rights of Foetuses and Children2007Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not.

  • 8.
    Angner, Erik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Det lätta och det rätta2018In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3, p. 3-10Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Angner, Erik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    We're All Behavioral Economists NowIn: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    AbstractBehavioral economics has long defined itself in opposition to neoclassical economics, but recent developments suggest a synthesis may be on the horizon. In particular, a number of economists have argued that behavioral factors can be incorporated into standard theory, and that the days of behavioral economics therefore are numbered. This paper explores the proposed synthesis and argues that it is distinctly behavioral in nature – not neoclassical. Far from indicating that behavioral economics as a stand-alone research program is over, the proposed synthesis represents the consummate conversion of neoclassical economists into behavioral ones.

  • 10.
    Angner, Erik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What Preferences Really Are2018In: Philosophy of science (East Lansing), ISSN 0031-8248, E-ISSN 1539-767X, Vol. 85, no 4, p. 660-681Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Daniel M. Hausman holds that preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations—subjective judgments to the effect that something is better than something else all things told—and that economists are right to employ this conception of preference. Here, I argue against both parts of Hausman’s thesis. The failure of Hausman’s account, I continue, reflects a deeper problem, that is, that preferences in economics do not need an explicit definition of the kind that he seeks. Nonetheless, Hausman’s labors were not in vain: his accomplishment is that he has articulated a useful model of the theory.

  • 11.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?2009In: Harming future persons: ethics, genetics and the nonidentity problem / [ed] Melinda A. Roberts, David T. Wasserman, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009, p. 289-316Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defining Democratic Decision Making2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] F. Svensson & R. Sliwinski, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 13.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Democracy for the 21th century: research challenges2016In: Sociology looks at the twenty-first century: from local universalism to global contextualism. / [ed] Elkana, Y., Randeria, S., & Wittrock, B., Brill Academic Publishers, 2016Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Desert as Fit: An Axiomatic Analysis2006In: The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman / [ed] Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley and Michael J. Zimmerman, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p. 3-17Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Egalitarian Concerns and Population Change2013In: Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics / [ed] Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, and Dan Wikler, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 74-92Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We usually examine our considered intuitions regarding inequality, including health inequality, by comparing populations of the same size. Likewise, the standard measures of inequality and its badness have been developed on the basis of only such comparisons. Real world policies to mitigate inequalities, however, will most often also affect the size of a population. For example, many health policies are very likely to prevent deaths and affect procreation decisions. Population control policies, such as China’s one-child policy, trivially affect population size. In addition, if we are interested in measuring the development of global inequality during the last thirty years or so, we have to take into account the great population expansion in countries such as India and China. Hence, we need to consider how to extend measures of inequality to different number cases, that is, how to take into account the complication that population numbers are often not equal between the compared alternatives. Moreover, examining different number case is a fruitful way of probing our ideas about egalitarian concerns and will reveal as yet unnoticed complexities and problems in our current conceptualization of the value of equality, or so I’ll argue. 

  • 16.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Egalitarianism and Population Change2009In: Intergenerational Justice / [ed] A. Gosseries & L. Meyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 325-348Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    En motvillig filosof2013In: Vägar till vetenskapen: Sveriges unga akademi om att bli och vara forskare / [ed] C. Nordlund, Santérus Förlag, 2013Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 18.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Etica delle popolazioni e metaetica2012In: Iride, ISSN 1122-7893, no 1, p. 35-44Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper focuses on the relations between population ethics and metaethics. Population ethics gives rise to well-known paradoxes, such as the paradox of mere addition. After presenting a version of this paradox, it is argued that a different way to dismantle it might be by considering it as a way to change our standard view of justification in moral theory. Two possible views are considered: a non-cognitivist approach to justification and to the explanation of inconsistency in morals; Parfit's suggestion that certain paradoxes might be «quarantined» without shaking our confidence in moral theories encapsulating them.

  • 19.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Feldman’s Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics2003In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 225-236Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Future Generations, Power, and Democracy2011In: Perspectives: Journal Réseau français des instituts d’études avancées, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    “Life Extension versus Replacement”2011In: Enhancing Human Capacities / [ed] Ruud ter Meulen, Julian Savulescu, Guy Kahane, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, p. 368-385Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. The chapter discusses two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea. The first is critical level utilitarianism (CLU) and the other is view comparativism. The chapter describes the pure case of life extension versus life replacement and then presents some different views about the value of life extension, indicating some of the arguments in favor and against life extension fail. Then, it turns to the implications of critical level utilitarianism and comparativism in regards to life extension versus replacement, the main topic of this chapter. A case is presented to explain that there is a conflict between intuitions regarding life extension and comparativism.

  • 22.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Life Extension versus Replacement2012In: Intergenerational Justice / [ed] L. H. Meyer, Ashgate, 2012, 2Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Life Extension versus Replacement2008In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, ISSN 0264-3758, E-ISSN 1468-5930, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 211-227Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea, or so it has been argued. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of well-being above which a life has to reach to have positive contributive value to a population, so-called Critical Level Utilitarianism. Secondly, the view that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been, a view I call Comparativism. I shall show that although these theories do capture some of our intuitions about the value of longevity, they contradict others, and they have a number of counterintuitive implications in other cases that we ultimately have to reject them.

  • 24.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Measuring and distributing influence2008In: CERSES News: La lettre du Centre de Recherche Sens, Ethique, Vol. 1, no 1Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 25.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Praktisk filosofi.
    Meritarian Axiologies and Distributive Justice2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard welfarist axiologies do not care who is given what share of the good. For example, giving Wlodek two apples and Ewa three is just as good as giving Wlodek three and Ewa two, or giving Wlodek five and Ewa zero. A common objection to such theories is that they are insensitive to matters of distributive justice. To meet this objection, one can adjust the axiology to take distributive concerns into account. One possibility is to turn to what I will call Meritarian axiologies. According to such theories, individuals can have a claim to, deserve, or merit, a certain level of wellbeing depending on their merit level, and the value of an outcome is determined not only by people’s wellbeing but also by their merit level.

  • 26.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    One More Axiological Impossibility Theorem2009In: Logic, ethics, and all that jazz: essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg and Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy , 2009, p. 23-37Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Politisk och ekonomisk demokrati2012In: Tillsammans: en fungerande ekonomisk demokrati / [ed] B. Rothstein, Stockholm: SNS förlag, 2012, p. 71-95Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Population Ethics and Imprecision2016In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 82, no 2, p. 166-181Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing what he calls “imprecision” in value comparisons.  He suggests that in a range of important cases, populations of different sizes are only imprecisely comparable. Parfit suggests that this feature of value comparisons opens up a way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other counterintuitive conclusions, and thus solves one of the major challenges in ethics. In this paper, I shall try to clarify Parfit’s proposal and evaluate whether it will help us with the paradoxes in population ethics.

  • 29.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Superiority in Value2005In: Recent Work on Intrinsic Value / [ed] Michael Zimmerman and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Springer-Verlag New York, 2005, p. 291-304Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 30.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Superiority in Value2005In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 127-114Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 31.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    The Affirmative Answer to the Existential Question and the Person Affecting Restriction2015In: Weighing and reasoning: themes from the philosophy of John Broome / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Andrew Reisner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The person affecting restriction states that one outcome can only be better than another if it is better for someone. The existential question concerns whether existence can be better or worse for a person than non-existence, the personal value of existence. According to the affirmative answer, existence can be better or worse than non-existence for a person. This chapter discusses the implications of the restriction and the affirmative answer to the existential question for population ethics, the value of future generations, and especially for the possibility of avoiding the so-called repugnant conclusion, an undesirable implication of classical utilitarianism.

  • 32.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory2005In: Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations I / [ed] Folke Tersman, Stockholm: Filosofiska inst, Stockholms universitet , 2005Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, Sweden; L'institut d'études avancées, Paris, France.
    The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics2011In: Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior / [ed] Dzhafarov, Ehtibar N. ; Perry, Lacey, Singapore: World Scientific, 2011, p. 1-26Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 34.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Paradoxes of Future Generations and Normative Theory2004In: The Repugnant Conclusion / [ed] Jesper Ryberg, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 201-218Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 35.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Person Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People2003In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, no 3-4, p. 185-195Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2013In: International Encyclopaedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 4560-4563Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Derek Parfit originally formulated the Repugnant Conclusion as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (1984: 388).

  • 37.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Very Repugnant Conclusion2003In: Logic, Law, Morality / [ed] Krister Segerberg, Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2003, p. 29-44Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 38.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vem bör ha rösträtt?: Det demokratiska avgränsningsproblemet2005In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 2, p. 47-63Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vår moral och framtida generationer2012Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 40.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds universitet.
    Better to Be than not to Be?2010In: The Benefit of Broad Horizons: intellectual and institutional preconditions for a global social science : festschrift for Björn Wittrock on the occasion of his 65th birthday / [ed] Hans Joas and Barbro Klein, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010, p. 399-414Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 41.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Better to be than not to be?2012In: Discusiones Filosóficas, ISSN 0124-6127, Vol. 13, no 21, p. 65-85Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Can it be better (or worse) for me to exist than not to exist? Several philosophers have denied this, on the ground that if it could, then if I didn't exist, this would have been worse (better) for me, which is absurd. In our paper we argue that these philosophers are mistaken: Claims about the comparative value or disvalue of existence need not imply any absurdities. Such claims, which are of central importance for population ethics and for the status of the so-called Person-Affecting Restriction, can be rationalized if one adheres to the so-called fitting-attitudes analysis of value.

  • 42.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds universitet.
    Millian Superiorities2005In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 127-146Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 43.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds Universitet.
    The Value of Existence2015In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] I. Hirose and J. Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 424-444Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 44.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds universitet.
    Value and Unacceptable Risk: Temkin’s Worries about Continuity Reconsidered2005In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 177-197Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 45.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds universitet.
    Value Superiority2015In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] I. Hirose and J. Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 225-248Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Ryberg, Jesper
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2016In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Derek Parfit's original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is characterized as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics. The last three decades have witnessed an increasing philosophical interest in questions such as “Is it possible to make the world a better place by creating additional happy people?” and “Is there a moral obligation to have children?” The main problem has been to find an adequate theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory. As the name indicates, Parfit finds the Repugnant Conclusion unacceptable and many philosophers agree. However, it has been surprisingly difficult to find a theory that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other equally counterintuitive conclusions. Thus, the question as to how the Repugnant Conclusion should be dealt with and, more generally, what it shows about the nature of ethics has turned the conclusion into one of the cardinal challenges of modern ethics.

  • 47.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ryberg, Jesper
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2010In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 48.
    Arvidsson, Stefan
    Stockholm University.
    Marxismens filosofi: apropos ett jubiluem2007Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 49. Assadian, Bahram
    et al.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Are The Natural Numbers Fundamentally Ordinals?2018In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There are two ways of thinking about the natural numbers: as ordinal numbers or as cardinal numbers. It is, moreover, well‐known that the cardinal numbers can be defined in terms of the ordinal numbers. Some philosophies of mathematics have taken this as a reason to hold the ordinal numbers as (metaphysically) fundamental. By discussing structuralism and neo‐logicism we argue that one can empirically distinguish between accounts that endorse this fundamentality claim and those that do not. In particular, we argue that if the ordinal numbers are metaphysically fundamental then it follows that one cannot acquire cardinal number concepts without appeal to ordinal notions. On the other hand, without this fundamentality thesis that would be possible. This allows for an empirical test to see which account best describes our actual mathematical practices. We then, finally, discuss some empirical data that suggests that we can acquire cardinal number concepts without using ordinal notions. However, there are some important gaps left open by this data that we point to as areas for future empirical research.

  • 50. Axelos, Kostas
    et al.
    Premat, Christophe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Romance Studies and Classics.
    Il y va de la pensée pensante: Entretien avec Christophe Premât2014In: L'exil est la patrie de la pensée / [ed] Servanne Jollivet, Katherina Daskalaki, Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm , 2014, p. 65-74Chapter in book (Other academic)
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