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  • 1.
    Angner, Erik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Det lätta och det rätta2018In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3, p. 3-10Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 2.
    Bak, Krzysztof
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas, History of Literature.
    Psykologi och moral i Andreas Bjerres kriminalstudier2014In: Arche - tidskrift för psykoanalys, humaniora och arkitektur, ISSN 2000-7817, Vol. 46-47, no 1, p. 220-231Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Bak, Krzysztof
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Culture and Aesthetics.
    Psykologi och moral i Andreas Bjerres kriminalstudier2013Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Bognar, Greg
    La Trobe University, Australia.
    Fair Innings2015In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 29, no 4, p. 251-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In many societies, the aging of the population is becoming a major problem. This raises difficult issues for ethics and public policy. On what is known as the fair innings view, it is not impermissible to give lower priority to policies that primarily benefit the elderly. Philosophers have tried to justify this view on various grounds. In this article, I look at a consequentialist, a fairness-based, and a contractarian justification. I argue that all of them have implausible implications and fail to correspond to our moral intuitions. I end by outlining a different kind of consequentialist justification that avoids those implications and corresponds better to our considered moral judgments.

  • 5.
    Bognar, Greg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Priority Setting and Age2016In: Prioritization in Medicine: An International Dialogue / [ed] Eckhard Nagel, Michael Lauerer, Springer, 2016, p. 163-177Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The role of age in priority setting is one of the most controversial issues in health policy. It has also been a contentious topic for many years in medical ethics and philosophy, and any discussion of age as a criterion for setting priorities in health care is likely to stir up intense public debate. Age is an easily observable characteristic; hence it is tempting to use it when priorities must be set between different resource uses or patient groups. Indeed, age considerations pervade health systems worldwide. Consequently, there is an urgent need to clarify the role that age can play in health care resource allocation.

  • 6.
    Bognar, Greg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    QALYs, DALYs, and Their Critics2015In: The Routledge Companion to Bioethics / [ed] John D. Arras, Elizabeth Fenton, Rebecca Kukla, Routledge, 2015, p. 44-55Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Bognar, Greg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Scarcity2018In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, John Wiley & Sons, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is often said that economics is the science of scarcity. But since a lot of economics is just applied ethics, it is perhaps more apt to say the real science of scarcity is ethics. Scarcity is arguably one of the fundamental problems that morality has evolved to address, and most discussions in ethics assume some kind of scarcity in the background. I show this by considering a number of issues in ethics, from resource allocation to self‐control, where scarcity plays a major role.

  • 8.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons2018In: The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Preference-based views of well-being2016In: The Oxford handbook of well-being and public policy / [ed] Matthew D. Adler, Marc Fleurbaey, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 321-346Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 10. Ericsson, Lars O.
    Justice in the distribution of economic resources: a critical and normative study1975Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory2015In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 10, no 8, p. 533-546Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post-millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so-called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non-ideal’ theory, of ‘practice-independent’ theory from ‘practice-dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action-guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a number of methodological assumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice-dependent in the sense that an existing (social, political, or institutional) practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle without first understanding the practice (or its point and purpose) this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments. We will investigate how this practice-dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive.

  • 12.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Why Political Realists Should Not Be Afraid of Moral Values2015In: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, E-ISSN 2153-7984, Vol. 40, p. 459-464Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a previous article, we unpacked the so-called "ethics first premise"-the idea that ethics is "prior" to politics when theorizing political legitimacy-that is denied by political realists. We defended a "justificatory" reading of this premise, according to which political justification is irreducibly moral in the sense that moral values are among the values that ground political legitimacy. We called this the "necessity thesis." In this paper we respond to two challenges that Robert Jubb and Enzo Rossi raise against our proposal. Their first claim is that our argument for the necessity thesis is question begging, since we assume rather than show that freedom and equality are moral values. The second claim is that Bernard Williams's Basic Legitimacy Demand demonstrates the possibility of giving political legitimacy a non-moral foundation, since it allows for a distinction to be made between politics and sheer domination. We refute both claims.

  • 13.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bystanders, risks, and consent2019In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper considers the moral status of bystanders affected by medical research trials. Recent proposals advocate a very low threshold of permissible risk imposition upon bystanders that is insensitive to the prospective benefits of the trial, in part because we typically lack bystanders' consent. I argue that the correct threshold of permissible risk will be sensitive to the prospective gains of the trial. I further argue that one does not always need a person's consent to expose her to significant risks of even serious harm for the sake of others. That we typically need the consent of participants is explained by the fact that trials risk harmfully using participants, which is very hard to justify without consent. Bystanders, in contrast, are harmed as a side‐effect, which is easier to justify. I then consider whether the degree of risk that a trial may impose on a bystander is sensitive to whether she is a prospective beneficiary of that trial.

  • 14.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming: Why We're Required to Turn the Trolley2018In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 68, no 272, p. 460-480Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for the sake of others. Cases in which we have lesser-evil justifications of harming for the sake of others are rescue cases. Ordinarily, an agent is under a duty to rescue unless doing so imposes too great a cost on her, or violates someone else's rights. When neither of these defeating conditions obtain, one is required to rescue even if this involves causing harm to innocent people.

  • 15.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Parry, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wrongful Observation2019In: Philosophy & Public Affairs, ISSN 0048-3915, E-ISSN 1088-4963, Vol. 47, no 1, p. 104-137Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper emerged from the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace's ‘Conversations on War’ series. We are grateful to participants at those workshops for helpful discussion. Versions of this paper were presented at the University of Birmingham Global Ethics Seminar; the LSE Choice Group Seminar; the University of Warwick Centre for Ethics, Law and Philosophy; the Moral and Political Philosophy Seminar at Australian National University; the Uppsala Women in Philosophy conference; the University of Melbourne Philosophy Department seminar; the University of Washington Philosophy Department seminar; and as a public lecture at the University of Southampton. For very helpful written comments and conversations, thanks to Avia Pasternak, Tom Parr, Derek Matravers, Bob Goodin, Al Wilson, Nic Southwood, Seth Lazar, Suzanne Uniacke, and Christian Barry. Thanks to two associate editors for this journal, whose comments significantly improved the paper. Work on this paper was supported by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, Grant no. 1521101.

  • 16.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Determining Accomplice LiabilityManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Priority for Victims of Rights Violations?Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Seth Lazar, Sparing Civilians, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)2018In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Should Infringers Pay Compensation?Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Taking Risks and Suffering WrongsManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Victims of War2019Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In my thesis, I explore the moral status of different types of agents who suffer harm. I seek to determine whether these agents are victims of wrongful harm, that is, whether they had a right not to suffer harm. Since a victim has certain claims on others - including claims to aid or compensation, to the punishment of the victimizer, or to an apology - it is important to establish who counts as a victim and how victims’ claims compare in strength. In the thesis, I consider the moral status of accomplices, risk-takers and provocateurs, and explore the extent to which such people might lack rights against harm. I also consider the comparative status of victims of unjustified harm and victims of justified harm. I focus on these types of agents because their victimhood is challenged by recent arguments in the literature. I show that some of these arguments unjustifiably weaken or deny a sufferer’s victimhood and her concomitant rights.

    In the first paper, I argue that accomplices, those who contribute to but do not directly pose a threat, often forfeit rights to a lesser extent than principal wrongdoers who pose the threat. Treating accomplices as morally on par with principals would often wrong them. I offer an account that helps to determine the extent to which an accomplice lacks rights against harm. In the second paper, I argue against the view that taking a risk of suffering a wrongful harm diminishes the strength of one’s right against the harm. Risk-takers compromise their rights only if their risk-taking imposes unjustifiable costs. In the third paper, I argue that provocateurs are similar to agents who contribute to another’s wrongful threat. In contrast to wrongdoers who forfeit their rights in proportion to the threat they pose, provocateurs often forfeit rights only against a lesser harm. Treating provocateurs as morally on par with wrongdoers would therefore wrong them. Lastly, I consider innocent victims of justified harm and innocent victims of unjustified harm. I argue that the stringency of their claims to compensation does not differ. I thereby push back against arguments that want to see the perceived differential moral residue of justified and unjustified harm reflected in the victim’s compensation claim. In order to defend my conclusion, I discuss the grounds on which compensation is owed to innocent victims of justified harm in the fourth paper.

  • 22.
    Jensen, Tommy
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Business, Management & Organisation.
    Sandström, Johan
    Luleå Tekniska Universitet.
    In Defence of Stakeholder Pragmatism2013In: Journal of Business Ethics, ISSN 0167-4544, E-ISSN 1573-0697, Vol. 114, no 2, p. 225-237Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article seeks to defend and develop a stakeholder pragmatism advanced in some of the work by Edward Freeman and colleagues. By positioning stakeholder pragmatism more in line with the democratic and ethical base in American pragmatism (as developed by William James, John Dewey and Richard Rorty), the article sets forth a fallibilistic stakeholder pragmatism that seeks to be more useful to companies by expanding the ways in which value is and can be created in a contingent world. A dialogue between a defence company and peace and arbitration society is used to illustrate the main plot of this article

  • 23.
    Klamm-Doneen, Kristin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Norm-Expressivism: Requirements & Possibilities for Moral Emotions: Narrow Moral Emotions and Broad Capacities2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The contemporary metaethical theory, norm-expressivism, maintains that a moral judgment expresses one’s acceptance of norms governing guilt and anger. The theory’s founder, Allan Gibbard, argues that this understanding of the moral claim is supported through both the realization of weaknesses in other accounts and a naturalistic consideration of the way in which moral judgments function in our moral lives. Thus, a moral judgment is the acceptance of norms that permit (or require, in this case) anger at those who engage in wrongdoing and feelings of guilt by those who do wrong. Because Gibbard arrives at this analysis, in part, through an understanding of the natural psychic mechanisms that determine our moral lives, norm-expressivism is then (largely) grounded upon the cogency of certain empirical claims. Should norm-expressivism be a cogent theory, then this would have implications upon the nature of guilt and anger. Guilt and anger would need to, in fact, be stronger motivators than are other moral emotions, moral judgments must be capable of influencing these moral emotions and yet anger and guilt could not entail (nor necessarily be caused by) moral judgments. Should guilt and anger turn out to be (or be necessarily caused by) moral judgments, then norm-expressivism would offer a circular account of the moral judgment. This project will survey diverse theories of emotion in order to assess the compatibility of these theories with norm-expressivism. After introducing norm-expressivism, I will propose seven conditions for a compatible theory of emotion. I will argue that norm-expressivists can find theories of emotion that frame the nature of guilt and anger in ways consistent with the truth of their metaethical theory. While many facts about the nature of guilt and anger remain unanswered by the scope of this project, I will argue that there are theories of emotion (and more than Gibbard supposed) that provide frameworks to explain both the nature of emotion and emotion typology in a way consistent with norm-expressivism.

  • 24.
    Lindenfors, Patrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Science, Department of Zoology, Animal Ecology. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Önsketänkande att svenska värderingar är universella2016In: Dagens nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, no 13 juliArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 25.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av Stefan Björklund, En anständig indvidualism: Adam Smith flankerad av Francis Hutcheson och David Hume2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 4, p. 54-57Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Premat, Christophe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Romance Studies and Classics.
    Ethique et robotique2015Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [fr]

    Aborder la relation entre éthique et robotique revient avant tout à interroger l´éthos en tant que comportement collectif vis-à-vis de la robotique conçue comme un prolongement de la technê, c´est-à-dire d´un assemblage de savoir-faire pratiques. La robotique constitue le sous-domaine de la technique confiné à la création et à l´usage des robots. Dans ce cadre, les robots sont des machines dont la finalité est d´effectuer des tâches automatisées pénibles pour l´être humain. Les robots sont des machines prévisibles et codées en fonction d´une finalité qui est humaine et qui est d´alléger les souffrances humaines liées à la péniblité d´une tâche, à une maladie, à une déficience physique ou tout simplement à l´âge. Ils sont utilisés dans un cadre de gestion des tâches collectives qui peuvent devenir des instruments de surveillance et de compilation de données. C´est ici que nous sommes en prise avec un comportement à adopter vis-à-vis de ces robots. 

  • 27.
    Premat, Christophe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Romance Studies and Classics.
    Murray Bookchin, Pouvoir de détruire, pouvoir de créer. Vers une écologie sociale et libertaire, Paris, L'Echappée, coll. « Versus », 20192019In: Lectures, E-ISSN 2116-5289Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [fr]

    Au lecteur qui souhaite comprendre en profondeur les défis sociaux de l’écologie, le recueil de textes traduits en français de Murray Bookchin (1921-2006) par Helen Arnold, Daniel Blanchard et Renaud Garcia représente une véritable aubaine et s’inscrit dans un effort systématique de recherches effectuées autour de l’œuvre de Murray Bookchin, comme en témoignent les dernières traductions aux éditions « Atelier de création libertaire » (Pour un municipalisme libertaire en 2018, Notre environnement synthétique en 2017, Qu’est-ce que l’écologie sociale ? en 2012). Pouvoir de détruire, pouvoir de créer est un texte assez court qui a d’abord été publié dans la revue Roots en 1969 avant d’être reproduit en 1973 dans l’ouvrage Western Man and Environmental Ethics : Attitudes toward Nature and Technology.

  • 28.
    Roth, Hans Ingvar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies, Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS).
    Diskriminering2008 (ed. 1)Book (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Roth, Hans Ingvar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies, Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS). Lunds universitet, Lund, Swden.
    Educación en Derechos Humanos: Posibilidades y DesafiosHuman Rights Education: Possibilities and Challenges2013In: Paideia, ISSN 1904-9633, no 52, p. 31-54Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Human Rights as they are formulated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 have become a moral lingua franca. We have also witnessed a so called Human Rights Revolution in the post war period with more declarations and conventions concerning vulnerable groups such as children, women, indigenous populations and disabled people. Stronger mechanisms for implementations such as Human Rights Courts (for example the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg) and the International Criminal Court in Hague have been introduced. In spite of this “Human Rights Revolution” the education –both at school and university level– concerning human rights have lagged behind. It is only in the later decade that serious attempts have been made to introduce hu-man rights in curriculums and in various subjects in the schools in several coun-tries around the world. The same phenomenon applies to many universities. This article tries to analyze this standing of human rights education from a global perspective and understand why the processes of formulating and implementing such an education have been so slow. A further question that will be raised is how a human rights education can be defined and practiced especially at various levels in school.

  • 30.
    Roth, Hans Ingvar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies, Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS).
    Ian McEwan - The Children Act2015In: Dixikon, E-ISSN 2001-1768Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 31.
    Roth, Hans Ingvar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies, Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS).
    När Konfucius kom till FN: Peng Chun Chang och FN:s förklaring om de mänskliga rättigheterna2016Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This book ("When Confucius Came to the United Nations") is a biography of Peng Chun Chang´s life (1892-1957). Chang was a Chinese diplomat and philosopher who was one of the main drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The book is also an analysis of Chang´s thoughts on ethics and human rights.

  • 32.
    Roth, Hans Ingvar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies, Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS).
    Peng Chun Chang, Intercultural Ethics and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2016In: Ethics and Communication: Global Perspectives / [ed] Göran Collste, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016, p. 95-124Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Roth, Hans Ingvar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies, Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies (SUITS).
    Splittring bäddar för turkisk maktkamp - om konflikten mellan AKP och Gülen rörelsen2015In: Svenska dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, no 24 februariArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 34.
    Schult, Tanja
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of History.
    Hur ska vi hantera Auschwitz?2012In: Upsala nya tidning, ISSN 1104-0173Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 35.
    Sundberg, Mikaela
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.
    The dynamics of coordinated comparisons: How simulationists in astrophysics, oceanography and meteorology create standards for results2011In: Social Studies of Science, ISSN 0306-3127, E-ISSN 1460-3659, Vol. 41, no 1, p. 107-125Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the social dynamics of so-called intercomparison projects. An intercomparison project is a type of collaborative project that takes place in a number of simulation-based research areas such as astrophysics and climate modelling. Intercomparison projects can be seen as form of metrological practice in which the participants compare the results of numerical simulations of the 'same' scientific problem in order to ensure their reliability and validity. The paper is based on case studies of astrophysics, meteorology and oceanography, and the focus is on the organization and coordination of intercomparison projects. I argue that such projects have the effect of defining which scientists work on a particular problem and that they also serve as organizational vehicles for creating and presenting a dominant view of - and a standard result for - that problem. These types of projects are important for understanding numerical simulation-based research, because they show that expectations about desirable results are generated within the group.

  • 36.
    Svärd, Per-Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Köttsamhällets egen ideologi2014In: Arbetaren, ISSN 0345-0961, no 38, p. 10-11Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 37.
    Tanyi, Attila
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire2011In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 14, no 1, p. 101-115Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to both accounts, I argue in detail that the phenomenological view is not as implausible as he claims it to be, whereas the tracking view, on its best version advocated by Thomas Scanlon, is an instance of the phenomenological view and is therefore also defensible.

  • 38.
    Tjällén, Biörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of History. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for Medieval Studies.
    Aristotle’s heroic virtue and medieval theories of monarchy2015In: Shaping heroic virtue: studies in the art and politics of supereminence in Europe and Scandinavia / [ed] Stefano Fogelberg Rota, Andreas Hellerstedt, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2015, p. 55-66Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 39.
    Torpman, Olle
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Miljöetik: Från problem till lösning2017Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Vi blir allt fler människor på jorden och våra aktiviteter tär på miljön. Vi skövlar regnskogarna, utfiskar haven och släpper ut gifter och koldioxid i atmosfären. Temperaturen höjs, vattennivåer stiger och djurarter hotas av utrotning. Naturkatastrofer och felslagna skördar gör att världens svältsituation förvärras. Med större medvetenhet om de stegrande miljöproblemen aktualiseras frågor om våra moraliska förpliktelser att förhindra denna utveckling. Har vi ett ansvar att stoppa miljöförstöringen? I så fall, gentemot vad eller vem? Och hur ser vårt ansvar ut gentemot kommande generationer? Trots den vetenskapliga enigheten om miljöproblemen står världen oenig om hur de ska lösas. Utgångspunkten i denna bok är att oenigheterna till stor del beror på att vi har olika grundsyn i moralfrågor – frågor som varken vetenskaperna eller politiken kan besvara. För detta syfte behövs etiken. Miljöetiken är den gren av etiken där de moraliska frågorna kring miljöproblemen studeras i detalj. Det är också vad som görs i denna bok.

  • 40.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Döden är förhandlingsbar2009Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Resonerar kring det "förhandlingsutrymme" som finns då människor dör inom sjukvården. De kan erbjudas smärtlindring som på skyndar döden, de kan få livsuppehållande behandling avbruten, de kan få sova in i döden, för att nämna tre omdiskuterade möjligheter. Det är emellertid inte reglerat när man få denna typ av hjälp att dö och det är också oklart vem som bestämmer. I boken argumenterar författaren för tydligare riktlinjer.

  • 41.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Extremt underburna barn2009In: Läkartidningen, Vol. 106, no 28-29, p. 1796-1797Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 42. Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    The relevance of metaethics to ethics1974Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
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