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  • 1.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI), Sweden.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Eriksson, Lars
    The time-saving bias: Judgements, cognition and perception2013In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 492-497Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Biases in people's judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity have been studied mainly with hypothetical scenarios (Svenson, 2008). The present study asked whether the classic time-saving bias persists as a perceptual bias when we control the speed of an activity and assess the perceived time elapsed at different speeds. Specifically, we investigated the time-saving bias in a driving simulator. Each participant was asked to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed she or he judged necessary to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first trip. We found that that the time-saving bias applies to active driving and that it affects the choice of driving speed. The drivers' time-saving judgements show that the perception of the time elapsed while driving does not eliminate the time-saving bias.

  • 2.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    The nonsense math effect2012In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 7, p. 746-749Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Mathematics is a fundamental tool of research. Although potentially applicable in every discipline, the amount oftraining in mathematics that students typically receive varies greatly between different disciplines. In those disciplineswhere most researchers do not master mathematics, the use of mathematics may be held in too much awe. To demonstratethis I conducted an online experiment with 200 participants, all of which had experience of reading research reports anda postgraduate degree (in any subject). Participants were presented with the abstracts from two published papers (one inevolutionary anthropology and one in sociology). Based on these abstracts, participants were asked to judge the qualityof the research. Either one or the other of the two abstracts was manipulated through the inclusion of an extra sentencetaken from a completely unrelated paper and presenting an equation that made no sense in the context. The abstract thatincluded the meaningless mathematics tended to be judged of higher quality. However, this "nonsense math effect" wasnot found among participants with degrees in mathematics, science, technology or medicine.

  • 3.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution. Mälardalen University, Sweden.
    Andersson, Per A.
    Strimling, Pontus
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    When is it appropriate to reprimand a norm violation? The roles of anger, behavioral consequences, violation severity, and social distance2017In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 12, no 4, p. 396-407Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Experiments on economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial consequences that punishment may have on norm violators' behavior. Going beyond the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed anger, and this effect was mediated by perceived aggressiveness. Thus the same emotions that motivate peer punishers may make them come across as aggressive, to the detriment of their reputation. However, the negative effect of showing anger disappeared when the norm violation was sufficiently severe. Ratings of punishers were also influenced by social distance, such that it is less appropriate for a stranger than a friend to reprimand a violator. In sum, peer punisher ratings were very high for a friend reprimanding a severe norm violation, but particularly poor for a stranger showing anger at a mild norm violation. We found no effect on ratings of whether the reprimand had the beneficial consequence of changing the violator's behavior. Our findings provide insight into how peer punishers can avoid negative reputational effects. They also point to the importance of going beyond economic games when studying peer punishment.

  • 4.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution. Mälardalen University, Sweden.
    Jansson, Fredrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution. Linköping University, Sweden.
    Procedural priming of a numerical cognitive illusion2016In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 205-212Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A strategy activated in one task may be transferred to subsequent tasks and prevent activation of other strategies that would otherwise come to mind, a mechanism referred to as procedural priming. In a novel application of procedural priming we show that it can make or break cognitive illusions. Our test case is the 1/k illusion, which is based on the same unwarranted mathematical shortcut as the MPG illusion and the time-saving bias. The task is to estimate distances between values of fractions on the form 1/k. Most people given this task intuitively base their estimates on the distances between the denominators (i.e., the reciprocals of the fractions), which may yield very poor estimations of the true distances between the fractions. As expected, the tendency to fall for this illusion is related to cognitive style (Study 1). In order to apply procedural priming we constructed versions of the task in which the illusion is weak, in the sense that most people do not fall for it anymore. We then gave participants both strong illusion and weak illusion versions of the task (Studies 2 and 3). Participants who first did the task in the weak illusion version would often persist with the correct strategy even in the strong illusion version, thus breaking the otherwise strong illusion in the latter task. Conversely, participants who took the strong illusion version first would then often fall for the illusion even in the weak illusion version, thus strengthening the otherwise weak illusion in the latter task.

  • 5.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Simpson, Brent
    Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina.
    Emotional reactions to losing explain gender differences in entering a risky lottery2010In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 159-163Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A gender difference in risk preferences, with women being more averse to risky choices, is a robust experimental finding. Speculating on the sources of this difference, Croson and Gneezy recently pointed to the tendency for women to experience emotions more strongly and suggested that feeling more strongly about negative outcomes would lead to greater risk-aversion. Here we test this hypothesis in an international survey with 424 respondents from India and 416 from US where we ask questions about a hypothetical lottery. In both countries we find that emotions about outcomes are stronger among women, and that this effect partially mediates gender difference in willingness to enter the lottery.

  • 6.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Simpson, Brent
    The available evidence suggests the percent measure should not be used to study inequality: Reply to Norton and Ariely2013In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 8, no 3, p. 395-396Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this reply, we reiterate the main point of our 2012 paper, which was that the measure of inequality used by Norton and Ariely (2011) was too difficult for it to yield meaningful results. We describe additional evidence for this conclusion, and we also challenge the conclusion that political differences in perceived and desired inequality are small.

  • 7.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Centrum för evolutionär kulturforskning, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution & Mälardalen University.
    Simpson, Brent
    University of South Carolina.
    What do Americans know about inequality? It depends on how you ask them2012In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 7, p. 741-745Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A recent survey of inequality (Norton and Ariely, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 9–12) asked respondentsto indicate what percent of the nation’s total wealth is—and should be—controlled by richer and poorer quintiles ofthe U.S. population. We show that such measures lead to powerful anchoring effects that account for the otherwiseremarkable findings that respondents reported perceiving, and desiring, extremely low inequality in wealth. We showthat the same anchoring effects occur in other domains, namely web page popularity and school teacher salaries. Weintroduce logically equivalent questions about average levels of inequality that lead to more accurate responses. Finally,when we made respondents aware of the logical connection between the two measures, the majority said that typicalresponses to the average measures, indicating higher levels of inequality, better reflected their actual perceptions andpreferences than did typical responses to percent measures.Keywords: inequality, response bias, anchoring-and-adjustment,

  • 8.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Simpson, Brett
    Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina.
    Deception and price in a market with asymmetric information2007In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 2, no 1, p. 23-28Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    In markets with asymmetric information, only sellers have knowledge about the quality of goods. Sellers may of course make a declaration of the quality, but unless there are sanctions imposed on false declarations or reputations are at stake, such declarations are tantamount to cheap talk. Nonetheless, in an experimental study we find that most people make honest declarations, which is in line with recent findings that lies damaging another party are costly in terms of the liar’s utility. Moreover, we find in this experimental market that deceptive sellers offer lower prices than honest sellers, which could possibly be explained by the same wish to limit the damage to the other party. However, when the recipient of the offer is a social tie we find no evidence for lower prices of deceptive offers, which seems to indicate that the rationale for the lower price in deceptive offers to strangers is in fact profit-seeking (by making the deal more attractive) rather than moral.

  • 9.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies. Mälardalen University, Sweden.
    Strimling, Pontus
    Spontaneous associations and label framing have similar effects in the public goods game2014In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 9, no 5, p. 360-372Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e. g., The Teamwork Game) can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame selection. In the absence of such cues, participants may still spontaneously associate a game with a preexisting frame. We used the public goods game to compare the effect of such spontaneous frame selection with the effect of label framing. Participants in a condition where the public goods game was labeled The Teamwork Game tended to contribute at the same level as participants who spontaneously associated the unlabeled game with teamwork, whereas those who did not associate the the unlabeled game with teamwork tended to make lower contributions. We conclude that neutrally described games may be subject to spontaneous frame selection effects comparable in size to the effects of label framing.

  • 10.
    Kerimi, Neda
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Montgomery, Henry
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Zakay, Dan
    Coming close to the ideal alternative: The concordant-ranks strategy2011In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 6, no 3, p. 196-210Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We present the Concordant-Ranks (CR) strategy that decision makers use to quickly find an alternative that is proximate to an ideal alternative in a multi-attribute decision space. CR implies that decision makers prefer alternatives that exhibit concordant ranks between attribute values and attribute weights. We show that, in situations where the alternatives are equal in multi-attribute utility (MAU), minimization of the weighted Euclidean distance (WED) to an ideal alternative implies the choice of a CR alternative. In two experiments, participants chose among, as well as evaluated, alternatives that were constructed to be equal in MAU. In Experiment 1, four alternatives were designed in such a way that the choice of each alternative would be consistent with one particular choice strategy, one of which was the CR strategy. In Experiment 2, participants were presented with a CR alternative and a number of arbitrary alternatives. In both experiments, participants tended to choose the CR alternative. The CR alternative was on average evaluated as more attractive than other alternatives. In addition, measures of WED, between given alternatives and the ideal alternative, by and large agreed with the preference order for choices and attractiveness evaluations of the different types of alternatives. These findings indicate that both choices and attractiveness evaluations are guided by proximity of alternatives to an ideal alternative.

  • 11. Scherbaum, Stefan
    et al.
    Frisch, Simon
    Leiberg, Susanne
    Lade, Steven J.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Science, Stockholm Resilience Centre. Stockholm University, Nordic Institute for Theoretical Physics (Nordita). KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.
    Goschke, Thomas
    Dshemuchadse, Maja
    Process dynamics in delay discounting decisions: An attractor dynamics approach2016In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 11, no 5, p. 472-495Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How do people make decisions between an immediate but small reward and a delayed but large one? The outcome of such decisions indicates that people discount rewards by their delay and hence these outcomes are well described by discounting functions. However, to understand irregular decisions and dysfunctional behavior one needs models which describe how the process of making the decision unfolds dynamically over time: how do we reach a decision and how do sequential decisions influence one another? Here, we present an attractor model that integrates into and extends discounting functions through a description of the dynamics leading to a final choice outcome within a trial and across trials. To validate this model, we derive qualitative predictions for the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions and for the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions that are unique to this type of model. We test these predictions in four experiments based on a dynamic delay discounting computer game where we study the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions via mouse tracking and the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions via sequentially manipulated options. We discuss how integrating decision process dynamics within and across trials can increase our understanding of the processes underlying delay discounting decisions and, hence, complement our knowledge about decision outcomes.

  • 12.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Slovic, Paul
    Mertz, C. K.
    Fuglestad, Tina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Effects of main actor, outcome and affect on biased braking speedjudgments2012In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 7, no 3, p. 235-243Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Subjects who judged speed in a driving scenario overestimated how fast they could decelerate when speeding comparedto when keeping within the speed limit (Svenson, 2009). The purpose of the present studies were to replicatestudies conducted in Europe with subjects in the U.S., to study the influence of speed unit (kph vs. mph), affectivereactions to outcome (collision) and identity of main actor (driver) on braking speed judgments. The results replicatedthe European findings and the outcome affective factor (passing a line/killing a child) and the actor factor (subject/driverin general) had significant effects on judgments of braking speed. The results were related to psychological theory andapplied implications were discussed.

  • 13.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gonzalez, Nichel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Institute, Sweden.
    Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments2014In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 9, no 5, p. 465-478Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Svenson (2011) showed that choices of one of two alternative productivity increases to save production resources (e.g., man-months) were biased. Judgments of resource savings following a speed increase from a low production speed linewere underestimated and following an increase of a high production speed line overestimated. The objective formula for computing savings includes differences between inverse speeds and this is intuitively very problematic for most people.The purpose of the present studies was to explore ways of ameliorating or eliminating the bias. Study 1 was a control study asking participants to increase the production speed of one production line to save the same amount of production resources(man-months) as was saved by a speed increase in a reference line. The increases judged to match the reference alternatives showed the same bias as in the earlier research on choices. In Study 2 the same task and problems were used as in Study 1,but the participants were asked first to judge the resource saving of the reference alternative in a pair of alternatives before they proceeded to the matching task. This weakened the average bias only slightly. In Study 3, the participants were askedto judge the resources saved from each of two successive increases of the same single production line (other than those of the matching task) before they continued to the matching problems. In this way a participant could realize that a secondproduction speed increase from a higher speed (e.g., from 40 to 60 items /man-month) gives less resource savings than the same speed increase from a first lower speed (e.g., from 20 to 40 items/man-month. Following this, the judgments of thesame problems as in the other studies improved and the bias decreased significantly but it did not disappear. To be able to make optimal decisions about productivity increases, people need information about the bias and/or reformulations of the problems.

  • 14.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Department of Psychology, Lund University, Sweden.
    Lindholm, Torun
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Post decision consolidation and distortion of facts2009In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 4, no 5, p. 397-407Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Participants decided whom of two patients to prioritize for surgery in three studies. The factual quantitative information about the patients (e.g., probability of surviving surgery) was given in vignette form with case descriptions on Visual Analogue Scales — VAS’s. Differentiation and Consolidation theory predicts that not only the attractiveness of facts but also the mental representations of objective facts themselves will be restructured in post-decision processes in support of a decision (Svenson, 2003). After the decision, participants were asked to reproduce the objective facts about the patients. The results showed that distortions of objective facts were used to consolidate a prior decision. The consolidation process relied on facts initially favoring the non-chosen alternative and on facts rated as less, rather than more important.

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