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  • 1.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    State Capacity, Conflict, and Development2010In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 78, no 1, p. 1-34Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.

  • 2.
    Boppart, Timo
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. University of Zurich, Switzerland.
    Structural Change and the Kaldor Facts in a Growth Model With Relative Price Effects and Non-Gorman Preferences2014In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 82, no 6, p. 2167-2196Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    U.S. data reveal three facts: (1) the share of goods in total expenditure declines at a constant rate over time, (2) the price of goods relative to services declines at a constant rate over time, and (3) poor households spend a larger fraction of their budget on goods than do rich households. I provide a macroeconomic model with non-Gorman preferences that rationalizes these facts, along with the aggregate Kaldor facts. The model is parsimonious and admits an analytical solution. Its functional form allows a decomposition of U.S. structural change into an income and substitution effect. Estimates from micro data show each of these effects to be of roughly equal importance.

  • 3.
    Buhai, I. Sebastian
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Portela, Miguel A.
    Teulings, Coen N.
    van Vuuren, Aico
    RETURNS TO TENURE OR SENIORITY?2014In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 82, no 2, p. 705-730Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm. Second, workers' wages rise with seniority, where seniority is defined as a worker's tenure relative to the tenure of his colleagues. Controlling for tenure, the probability of a worker leaving the firm decreases with seniority. The increase in expected seniority with tenure explains a large part of the negative duration dependence of the separation hazard. Conditional on ten years of tenure, the wage differential between the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the seniority distribution is 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark and 2.3-3.4 in Portugal.

  • 4. Davila, Julio
    et al.
    Hong, Jay H.
    Krusell, Per
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor
    Constrained Efficiency in the Neoclassical Growth Model With Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Shocks2012In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 80, no 6, p. 2431-2467Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate the welfare properties of the one-sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. We focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature. Our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first-order condition of a constrained planner's problem. This condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low: the factor composition of income of the (consumption-)poor. Using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature, we illustrate that there can be either over- or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long-run distribution of wealth. For the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution, the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking: it has much too low a steady-state capital stock.

  • 5. Golosov, Mikhail
    et al.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Krusell, Per
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tsyvinski, Aleh
    Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium2014In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 82, no 1, p. 41-88Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model with an externality—through climate change—from using fossil energy. Our central result is a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions (or, equivalently, for the optimal carbon tax). This formula, which holds under quite plausible assumptions, reveals that the damage is proportional to current GDP, with the proportion depending only on three factors: (i) discounting, (ii) the expected damage elasticity (how many percent of the output flow is lost from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere), and (iii) the structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere. Thus, the stochastic values of future output, consumption, and the atmospheric CO2 concentration, as well as the paths of technology (whether endogenous or exogenous) and population, and so on, all disappear from the formula. We find that the optimal tax should be a bit higher than the median, or most well-known, estimates in the literature. We also formulate a parsimonious yet comprehensive and easily solved model allowing us to compute the optimal and market paths for the use of different sources of energy and the corresponding climate change. We find coal—rather than oil—to be the main threat to economic welfare, largely due to its abundance. We also find that the costs of inaction are particularly sensitive to the assumptions regarding the substitutability of different energy sources and technological progress.

  • 6.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Kuruscu, Burhanettin
    Dep. of Economics, University of Toronto.
    Smith, Jr., Anthony A.
    Yale Department of Economics.
    Temptation and Taxation2010In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 78, no 6, p. 2063-2084Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Tyrefors Hinnerich, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Pettersson-Lidbom, Per
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    DEMOCRACY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: EVIDENCE FROM SWEDEN 1919-19382014In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 82, no 3, p. 961-993Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we compare how two different types of political regimes-direct versus representative democracy-redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation. Most importantly, we exploit the existence of a population threshold, which partly determined a local government's choice of democracy to implement a regression-discontinuity design. The results indicate that direct democracies spend 40-60 percent less on public welfare. Our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite's potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization.

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