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  • 1. Dancygier, Rafaela M.
    et al.
    Lindgren, Karl-Oskar
    Oskarsson, Sven
    Vernby, Kåre
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Uppsala University, Sweden; Uppsala Center for Labor Studies (UCLS), Sweden.
    Why Are Immigrants Underrepresented in Politics? Evidence from Sweden2015In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 109, no 4, p. 703-724Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Widespread and persistent political underrepresentation of immigrant-origin minorities poses deep challenges to democratic practice and norms. What accounts for this underrepresentation? Two types of competing explanations are prevalent in the literature: accounts that base minority underrepresentation on individual-level resources and accounts that emphasize political opportunity structures. However, due to the lack of data suitable for testing these explanations, existing research has not been able to adjudicate between these theories. Using registry-based microdata covering the entire Swedish adult population between 1991 and 2010 our study is the first to empirically evaluate these alternative explanations. We examine election outcomes to municipal councils over the course of six elections and find that variation in individual-level resources cannot explain immigrants' underrepresentation. Further, when comparing immigrants and natives who face comparable political opportunity structures a large representation gap remains. Instead, we argue that discrimination by party gatekeepers plays a more significant role in perpetuating the underrepresentation of immigrants than do individual resources or structural variables.

  • 2. Folke, Olle
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Canada.
    Rickne, Johanna
    The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions2016In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 110, no 3, p. 559-578Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this analysis of how electoral rules and outcomes shape the internal organization of political parties, we make an analogy to primary elections to argue that parties use preference-vote tallies to identify popular politicians and promote them to positions of power. We document this behavior among parties in Sweden's semi-open-list system and in Brazil's open-list system. To identify a causal impact of preference votes, we exploit a regression discontinuity design around the threshold of winning the most preference votes on a party list. In our main case, Sweden, these narrow primary winners are at least 50% more likely to become local party leaders than their runners-up. Across individual politicians, the primary effect is present only for politicians who hold the first few positions on the list and when the preference-vote winner and runner-up have similar competence levels. Across party groups, the primary effect is the strongest in unthreatened governing parties.

  • 3.
    Harstad, Bård
    et al.
    Northwestern University.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Bribes, Lobbying, and Development2011In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 105, no 1, p. 1-18Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4. Hyytinen, Ari
    et al.
    Meriläinen, Jaakko
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Saarimaa, Tuukka
    Toivanen, Otto
    Tukiainen, Janne
    Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections2018In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 112, no 1, p. 68-81Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze the effect of municipal employees' political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as-random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about 1%. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.

  • 5.
    Kuyper, Jonathan W.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Systemic Representation: Democracy, Deliberation, and Nonelectoral Representatives2016In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 110, no 2, p. 308-324Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article explores the relationship between non-electoral representatives and democratic legitimacy by combining the recent constructivist turn in political representation with systemic work in deliberative theory. Two core arguments are advanced. First, non-electoral representatives should be judged by their position in a wider democratic system. Second, deliberative democracy offers a productive toolkit by which to evaluate these agents. I develop a framework of systemic representation which depicts the elemental parts of a democratic system and assigns normative standards according to the space occupied. The framework gives priority of democratic analysis to the systemic level. This helps mitigate a central concern in the constructivist turn which suggests that representatives mobilize constituencies in ways that are susceptible to framing and manipulation. I engage in case-study analysis of the collapsed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement to unpack the different spaces occupied by non-electoral representative and elucidate the varied democratic demands that hinge on this positioning.

  • 6.
    Lindqvist, Erik
    et al.
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Östling, Robert
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Political Polarization and the Size of Government2010In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 104, no 3, p. 543-565Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, we study the relationship between political polarization and public spending using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. Political polarization is strongly associated with smaller government in democratic countries, but there is no relationship between polarization and the size of government in undemocratic countries. The results are robust to a large set of control variables, including gross domestic product per capita and income inequality.

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