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  • 1.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder2017In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, no 4, 794-799 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.

  • 2.
    Needham, Paul
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Transient Things and Permanent Stuff2010In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 88, no 1, 147-166 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A view of individuals as constituted of quantities of matter, both understood as continuants enduring over time, is elaborated in some detail. Constitution is a three-place relation which can't be collapsed to identity because of the place-holder for a time and because individuals and quantities of matter have such a radically different character. Individuals are transient entities with limited lifetimes, whereas quantities are permanent existents undergoing change in physical and chemical properties from time to time. Coincidence, considered as a matter of occupying the same place, is developed, alongside sameness of constitutive matter, as a criterion of identity for individuals. Quantities satisfy the mereological criterion of identity, applicable to entities subject to mereological relations and operations such as regions of space and intervals of time. A time-dependent analogue of mereological parthood is defined for individuals, in terms of which analogues of the other mereological relations can be defined. But it is argued that there is no analogue of the mereological operation of summation for individuals.

  • 3.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK.
    G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons2006In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 84, no 4, 525-534 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.

  • 4.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (ed.)2013In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 91, no 4, 821-824 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Stefánsson, H. Orri
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What Is 'Real' in Probabilism?2017In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, no 3, 573-587 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.

  • 6.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Infelicitous cancellation: The explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature revisited2015In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 93, no 3, 465-474 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: first, that that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated, by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a cancellation can succeed even if it results in an infelicitous utterance, and that unless we take this possibility into account we run the risk of misdiagnosing philosophically significant cases.

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