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  • 1. Andrić, Vuko
    et al.
    Herlitz, Anders
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value2022Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 100, nr 3, s. 595-604Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.

  • 2.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder2017Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, nr 4, s. 794-799Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.

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  • 3.
    Hartman, Robert J.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck2020Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 98, nr 1, s. 105-118Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally praiseworthy and blameworthy in virtue of, and only in virtue of, their character traits. After explicating two versions of the Character Response, I argue that they both involve implausible accounts of moral responsibility and fail to provide a good solution to the problem of moral luck. I close by noting how proponents of moral luck can preserve a kernel of truth from the Character Response to explain away the intuition that the drivers are equally blameworthy.

  • 4.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    The Statistical Riddle of Induction2023Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 101, nr 2, s. 313-326Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for making such inferences—namely, classical statistics. Taken together, this would indicate that (iii) ‘naturalness’ is not such a relevant concept for the problem of induction, after all. I have no objections against (i) and (iii). But, contrary to (ii), I argue that classical statistics does face a version of Goodman’s problem, which I call the statistical riddle of induction. Given that his problem merely is an instance of the more general problem of underdetermination, this is hardly surprising. Perhaps more importantly, I also show how my riddle can be used for exposing a common fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, without relying on Bayesian assumptions.

  • 5.
    Needham, Paul
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Transient Things and Permanent Stuff2010Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 88, nr 1, s. 147-166Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A view of individuals as constituted of quantities of matter, both understood as continuants enduring over time, is elaborated in some detail. Constitution is a three-place relation which can't be collapsed to identity because of the place-holder for a time and because individuals and quantities of matter have such a radically different character. Individuals are transient entities with limited lifetimes, whereas quantities are permanent existents undergoing change in physical and chemical properties from time to time. Coincidence, considered as a matter of occupying the same place, is developed, alongside sameness of constitutive matter, as a criterion of identity for individuals. Quantities satisfy the mereological criterion of identity, applicable to entities subject to mereological relations and operations such as regions of space and intervals of time. A time-dependent analogue of mereological parthood is defined for individuals, in terms of which analogues of the other mereological relations can be defined. But it is argued that there is no analogue of the mereological operation of summation for individuals.

  • 6.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK.
    G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons2006Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 84, nr 4, s. 525-534Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.

  • 7.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (ed.)2013Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 91, nr 4, s. 821-824Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 8.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    The Golden Rule: A Defence2024Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the so-called golden rule, we ought to treat others as we want to be treated by them. This rule, in one form or another, is part of every major religion, and it has been accepted by many philosophers with various ethical views. However, if the literal golden rule is interpreted as an absolute rule, it is problematic. In this paper, I introduce a new version of this famous principle that is similar to various classical definitions. According to this variant, the rule can be formulated in the following way: If you want it to be the case that if 𝑥 were in your situation and you were in 𝑥’s situation then 𝑥 would do 𝐻 to you, and you have a good will, then you ought to do 𝐻 to x. I show how this version can be derived from a small set of highly plausible premises, and I defend it against some of the most interesting and/or common objections against the golden rule in the literature. I conclude that we have good reason to believe in this rendition of the principle.

  • 9.
    Stefánsson, H. Orri
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    On the Ratio Challenge for Comparativism2018Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 96, nr 2, s. 380-390Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) is a useful fiction, unlike comparative belief, which they regard as real. The challenge is to make sense of claims like ‘I am twice as confident in A as in B’ in terms of comparative belief only. After showing that at least some comparativists can meet this challenge, I discuss implications for Zynda's [2000] and Stefánsson's [2017] defences of comparativism.

  • 10.
    Stefánsson, H. Orri
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    What Is 'Real' in Probabilism?2017Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, nr 3, s. 573-587Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.

  • 11.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Infelicitous Cancellation: The Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicature Revisited2015Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 93, nr 3, s. 465-474Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: first, that that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated, by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a cancellation can succeed even if it results in an infelicitous utterance, and that unless we take this possibility into account we run the risk of misdiagnosing philosophically significant cases.

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