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  • 1.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defending Defensive Killing: Reply to Barry, McMahan, Ferzan, Renzo and Haque2018In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 15, no 6, p. 750-766Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article responds to objections to the account of permissible harming developed in Defensive Killing, as raised by Christian Barry, Jeff McMahan, Kimberly Ferzan, Massimo Renzo and Adil Ahmad Haque. Each paper deserves much more attention than I can give it here. I focus on Barry’s important observations regarding the liability to defensive harm of those who fail to rescue. In response to McMahan, I grant some of McMahan’s objections to my rejection of the moral equivalence of threats and bystanders, but reject his analysis of my Shield cases. I welcome much of Ferzan’s development of my account of ‘futile’ defence, but offer some concerns regarding her own view of when honour can be appropriately defended. I argue that Renzo’s objections to my account of bloodless invasions are unpersuasive, and identify some problems with Renzo’s own view. Finally, I defend my account of civilian liability against Adil Haque’s critique.

  • 2.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jeff McMahan, Killing In War, New York: Oxford University Press, 20092013In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Killing in War is based upon McMahan’s 2007 Uehiro Lectures, but draws on the substantial body of work on the ethics of war that McMahan has produced over the last decade or so. In this sense, it was a classic before it was written, representing as it does the most sustained, persuasive, and influential attack to date on the ‘ortho-dox’ Walzerian view of just war. It is, undoubtedly, compulsory reading for anyone working in this field, and consolidates McMahan’s position as the most important just war theorist of the last forty years.

  • 3.
    Furendal, Markus
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Book review of G.A. Cohen Finding Oneself in the Other, edited by Michael Otsuka2015In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 343-346Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Hecht, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Seth Lazar, Sparing Civilians, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)2018In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory: Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen2016In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 461-473Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

  • 6.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence2016In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 397-402Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This precis is a brief summary of the book's content.

  • 7.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Personal and the Fitting2014In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 341-52Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen's Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). In this book, Ronnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value an instance of the notion of good for a person in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: (i) Rennow-Rasmussen's discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; (ii) his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of 'for someone's sake (FSS) attitudes'; and (iii) his critique of the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.

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