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  • 1.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeater Goes External2017In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 45, no 2, p. 701-715Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour's reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they illustrate how internalist constraints are inserted into the set up of the problem and therefore unduly constrain the domain of satisfactory solutions. Lastly, the proposal is defended against some objections. Firstly, that by posing externalist conditions on defeat, the account becomes too open. Secondly, that an externalist account fails to take into account the epistemic assessments of our fellows in the epistemic practice of forming beliefs and making epistemic claims, which can be based on accessible warrant only.

  • 2.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding Understanding: An Epistemological Investigation2014In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 971-985Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Understanding has received growing interest from epistemologists in recent years, but no consensus regarding its epistemic properties has yet been reached. This paper extracts, but also rejects, candidates of epistemic properties for construing an epistemological model of understanding from the writings of epistemologists participating in the current discussion surrounding that state. On the basis of these results, a suggestion is put forward according to which understanding is a non-basic epistemic state of warrant rather than knowledge. It is argued that this move provides a satisfactory conciliatory answer to the central question whether understanding is a factive epistemic state. Some differ- ences between understanding and knowledge are recorded along the way: for instance, that in contrast to knowledge, understanding does not require belief and that, even though neither knowledge nor understanding iterates, so that a subject can both know without knowing that she knows, as well as understanding without understanding that she understands, the reasons for the failure is different. 

  • 3.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism2016In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 44, no 3, p. 793-808Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There are powerful arguments for free will scepticism. However, it seems obvious that some of our actions are done of our own free will. It has been argued that we can solve this puzzle by giving 'free' a contextualist analysis. In everyday contexts we are often allowed to ignore sceptical arguments, and can truly say that we acted freely. In the more demanding context of philosophy, it is true that we never do anything freely. Our freedom is elusive; it escapes us as soon as sceptical arguments are brought up. This kind of freedom contextualism has been criticized for conceding too much to the sceptic. Furthermore, it has problematic implications for moral responsibility. I develop an alternative contextualist analysis of 'free', according to which it is proper in certain contexts to ignore sceptical arguments even if they are brought up. Ignoring them is proper when doing so is necessary for engaging in an activity that is obviously justified. I argue that engaging in deliberation and inter-agential interaction with other people are obviously justified activities that require ignoring sceptical arguments. In these contexts, we do have a non-elusive kind of freedom.

  • 4.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Roache's Argument against the Cohabitation View2011In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 309-310Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Rebecca Roache's recent critique of David Lewis's cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.

  • 5.
    Olinder, Ragnar Francén
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Svavarsdottir's Burden2012In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 40, no 3, p. 577-589Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is sometimes observed that the debate between internalists and externalists about moral motivation seems to have reached a deadlock. There are those who do, and those who don't, recognize the intuitive possibility of amoralists: i.e. people having moral opinions without being motivated to act accordingly. This makes Sigrun Svavarsdttir's methodological objection to internalism especially interesting, since it promises to break the deadlock through building a case against internalism (construed as a conceptual thesis), not on such intuitions, but on a methodological principle for empirical investigations. According to the objection, internalists incur the burden of argument, since they have to exclude certain explanations of the (verbal and non-verbal) behavior of apparent amoralists, while externalists don't. In this paper I argue that the objection fails: the principle for empirical investigations is plausible, but Svavarsdttir's application of it to internalism is not. Once we clearly distinguish between the conceptual and the empirical aspects of the internalist and externalist explanations of apparent amoralists, we see that these views incur an equal burden of explanation. I end the paper with a positive suggestion to the effect that there is a third alternative, a view that involves accepting neither internalism nor externalism, which does not incur an explanatory burden of the relevant sort.

  • 6.
    Parry, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Just War Theory, Legitimate Authority, and Irregular Belligerency2015In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 43, no 1, p. 175-196Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Since its earliest incarnations, just war theory has included the requirement that war must be initiated and waged by a legitimate authority. However, while recent years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence in interest in just war theory, the authority criterion is largely absent from contemporary discussions. In this paper I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying, by arguing that the authority criterion plays a much more important role within just war theorising than is commonly supposed. As standardly understood, the authority criterion provides a necessary condition for the justification of the resort to war, but has no bearing on the question of permissible conduct in war. In opposition, I argue for an alternative interpretation of the criterion, which attributes to it a fundamental role in assessing this latter question. With this revised interpretation in place, I then demonstrate its advantages by applying it to the practical issue of armed conflicts that are initiated and fought by non-traditional belligerents. While several theorists have recognised that this common feature of modern armed conflict poses a challenge to mainstream just war theory in general-and to the authority criterion in particular-I argue that existing discussions frequently misconstrue the nature of the challenge, since they assume the standard interpretation of the authority requirement and its role within the theory. I then show that the revised interpretation provides a clearer account of both the challenge posed by non-traditional belligerency and the kind of response that it requires.

  • 7.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Transgressions Are Equal, and Right Actions Are Equal: some Philosophical Reflections on Paradox III in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum2017In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 45, no 1, p. 317-334Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Paradoxa Stoicorum, the Roman philosopher Cicero defends six important Stoic theses. Since these theses seem counterintuitive, and it is not likely that the average person would agree with them, they were generally called paradoxes. According to the third paradox, (P3), (all) transgressions (wrong actions) are equal and (all) right actions are equal. According to one interpretation of this principle, which I will call (P3'), it means that if it is forbidden that A and it is forbidden that B, then not-A is as good as not-B; and if it is permitted that A and it is permitted that B, then A is as good as B. In this paper, I show how it is possible to prove this thesis in dyadic deontic logic. I also try to defend (P3') against some philosophical counterarguments. Furthermore, I address the claim that (P3') is not a correct interpretation of Cicero's third paradox and the assertion that it does not matter whether (P3') is true or not. I argue that it does matter whether (P3') is true or not, but acknowledge that (P3') is perhaps a slightly different principle than Cicero's thesis. The upshot is that (P3') seems to be a plausible principle, and that at least one part of paradox III in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum appears to be defensible.

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