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  • 1.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Häggström, Olle
    Chalmers.
    Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures2008In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 35, p. 409-420Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In any two-sided matching market, a stable matching can be found by a central agency using the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale and Shapley. But if the market is decentralized and information is incomplete then stability of the ensuing matching is not to be expected. Despite the prevalence of such matching situations, and the importance of stability, little theory exists concerning instability. We discuss various measures of instability and analyze how they interact with the structure of the underlying preferences. Our main result is that even the outcome of decentralized matching with incomplete information can be expected to be “almost stable” under reasonable assumptions.

  • 2.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Sjöstrand, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    On two theorems of Quinzii and rent controlled housing allocation in Sweden2007In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 9, no 3, p. 515-526Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Eriksson, Kimmo
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Sjöstrand, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Strimling, Pontus
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences2008In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 36, p. 421-440Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A fundamental fact in two-sided matching is that if amarket allows several stable outcomes, then one is optimal for all men in the sense that no man would prefer another stable outcome.We study a related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market where agents enter and search for a mate for at most n rounds before exiting again. Assuming independent preferences, we find that this game has multiple equilibria, some of which are highly asymmetric between sexes. We also investigate how the set of equilibria depends on a sex difference in the outside option of not being mated at all.

  • 4.
    Lagerås, Andreas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Science, Department of Mathematics.
    Seim, David
    University of Toronto, Canada; Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Sweden.
    Strategic complementarities, network games and endogenous network formation2016In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 45, no 3, p. 497-509Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates the role of strategic complementarities in the context of network games and network formation models. In the general model of static games on networks, we characterize conditions on the utility function that ensure the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, regardless of the network structure. By applying the game to empirically-relevant networks that feature nestedness—Nested Split Graphs—we show that equilibrium strategies are non-decreasing in the degree. We extend the framework into a dynamic setting, comprising a game stage and a formation stage, and provide general conditions for the network process to converge to a Nested Split Graph with probability one, and for this class of networks to be an absorbing state. The general framework presented in the paper can be applied to models of games on networks, models of network formation, and combinations of the two.

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