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  • 1.
    Besson, Corine
    et al.
    University of London, UK.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    University of Oxford, UK; St Hilda’s College, Oxford, UK.
    The open future, bivalence and assertion2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 167, no 2, p. 251--271Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

  • 2.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Belief, Truth and Blindspots2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 100-122Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Logical Disagreement2018In: Metaepistemology / [ed] Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, Daniel Whiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Metasemantics out of Economics?2015In: Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome / [ed] Andrew Reisner and Iwao Hirose, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 52-60Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies, Sweden.
    Moral Supervenience2018In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 48, no 3-4, p. 592-615Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.

  • 6.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. SCAS.
    The limits of expressivism2015In: Meaning without representation: essays on truth, expression, normativity, and naturalism / [ed] Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben, Michael Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 224-244Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that the concept of meaning is normative, and that his own brand of expressivism can be applied in the semantic and intentional domain. In this paper, I  argue that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense self-undermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are semantic sentences, and if these are understood to express non-cognitive attitudes of some kind, the expressivist’s explanations are spurious.

  • 7.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    St Hilda’s College, Oxford, United Kingdom.
    The love of truth2010In: Studies in history and philosophy of science, ISSN 0039-3681, E-ISSN 1879-2510, Vol. 41, no 4, p. 422-432Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it.

  • 8.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning2017In: A Companion to the Philosophy of Language / [ed] Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, Alexander Miller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017, 2, p. 649-669Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish Collegium of Advanced Studies, Sweden.
    The normativity of MEANING and the hard problem of intentionality2018In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 61, no 7, p. 742-754Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This note addresses two of Gibbard's central contentions in Meaning and Normativity: first, that the concept of meaning is normative, and second, that an expressivist account of semantic concepts and statements can shed light on the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining intentionality in naturalistic terms.

  • 10.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Rules of Thought By Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis2016In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 76, no 3, p. 393-397Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Rules of Thought , by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis (henceforth IJ), is a dense and ambitious book whose principal aim is to defend the view that philosophical inquiry is a priori inquiry into essential natures. The book covers a broad range of philosophical issues spanning the philosophy of mind and language, the epistemology of metaphysical modality and the philosophy of philosophy. It will be of considerable interest to many, since there is something in it for just about everyone. That said, the authors do not do as much as one might like to make their views accessible to the uninitiated or convincing to the unconverted.

  • 11.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bayne, Tim
    Manchester University.
    Belief and Its Bedfellows2013In: New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure / [ed] Nikolaj Nottelmann, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 124-144Chapter in book (Refereed)
1 - 11 of 11
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