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  • 1.
    Ronnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Aporia of Perfection2018In: Filozofia (Bratislava), ISSN 0046-385X, Vol. 73, no 9, p. 707-716Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I introduce a new aporia, the aporia of perfection. This aporia includes three claims: (1) Ought implies possibility, (2) We ought to be perfect, and (3) It is not possible that we are perfect. All these propositions appear to be plausible when considered in themselves and there are interesting arguments for them. However, together they entail a contradiction. Hence, at least one of the sentences must be false. I consider some possible solutions to the puzzle and discuss some pros and cons of these solutions. I conclude that we can avoid the contradiction that follows from (1) (3) and still hold on to our basic intuitions, if we instead of (1) (3) accept some slightly different propositions.

  • 2.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Aktualism, possibilism och handlingsriktighet2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1, p. 35-41Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Alethic-Deontic Logic and the Alethic-Deontic Octagon2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 3, p. 27-68Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper will introduce and explore a set of alethic-deontic systems. Alethic-deontic logic is a form of logic that combines ordinary (alethic) modal logic, which deals with modal concepts such as necessity, possibility and impossibility, and deontic logic, which investigates normative expressions such as “ought”, “right” and “wrong”. I describe all the systems axiomatically. I say something about their properties and prove some theorems in and about them. We will be especially interested in how the different deontic and modal concepts are related to each other in various systems. We will map these relationships in an alethic-deontic octagon, a figure similar to the classical so-called square of opposition.

  • 4.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Alethic-Deontic Logic: Deontic Accessibility Defined in Terms of Alethic Accessibility2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 3, p. 3-26Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    According to many normative theories, to say that something ought to be, or ought to be done, is to state that the being or doing of this thing is in some sense a necessary condition (requirement) of something else. In this paper, I explore the consequences of such a view. I consider what kind of alethic-deontic logic is appropriate for theories of this sort. Alethic-deontic logic is a kind of bimodal logic that combines ordinary alethic (modal) logic and deontic logic. Ordinary alethic logic is a branch of logic that deals with modal concepts, such as necessity and possibility, modal sentences, arguments and systems. Deontic logic is the logic of norms. It deals with normative words, such as "ought", "right" and "wrong", normative sentences, arguments and systems. I will define the so-called deontic accessibility relation in terms of the so-called alethic accessibility relation, and I will examine the consequences of this definition. It will turn out that a particular alethic-deontic system, Strong alethic-deontic logic, is plausible given this definition. By adding a certain frame-condition, the accessibility condition, we obtain a slightly stronger system, Full alethic-deontic logic. Some of the technical details of these systems are briefly described. Most of the systems mentioned in this paper are developed in more detail elsewhere.

  • 5.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Alethic-Deontic Logic: Some Theorems2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 1, p. 61-77Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to prove some theorems in alethic-deontic logic. Alethic-deontic logic is a kind of bimodal logic that combines ordinary alethic (modal) logic and deontic logic. Ordinary alethic logic is a branch of logic that deals with modal concepts, such as necessity and possibility, modal sentences, arguments and systems. Deontic logic is the logic of norms. It is about normative words, such as “ought”, “right” and “wrong”, normative sentences, arguments and systems. Alethic-deontic logic contains both modal and normative concepts and can be used to study how these interact. This paper contains some interesting theorems that can be proved in alethic-deontic logic. I will show that all primitive deontic operators are redundant when prefixed to the alethic operators in some systems. I will prove that necessarily equivalent sentences have the same deontic status in many systems. I will establish that the set of sentences in some alethic-deontic systems can be partitioned into five, mutually exclusive, exhaustive subsets. Finally, I will show that there are exactly ten distinct modalities in some alethic-deontic systems.

  • 6.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Allmänna normer och strukturen hos normativa system: En logisk analys2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 3, p. 69-98Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Den här uppsatsen handlar om allmänna eller generella eller universella normer och strukturen hos normativa system. Allmänna normer är normer som uttalar sig om alla entiteter eller individer eller fenomen av ett visst slag. Men vilken logisk form har de? Kan de användas för att härleda andra generella normer och normer som handlar om enskilda individer? Det tycks förekomma åtminstone två olika typer av föreskrifter av denna typ: normer där vi kvantifierar över handlingar eller beteenden och normer där vi kvantifierar över personer, människor eller levande eller medvetna varelser. I den här uppsatsen undersöker jag den logiska formen hos dessa. Jag koncentrerar mig på den senare typen och visar hur det är naturligt att använda en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att symbolisera föreskrifter av detta slag och förstå deras logiska form. Jag beskriver hur det är möjligt att använda allmänna normer för att härleda andra allmänna eller partikulära normer och hur man med hjälp av en eller flera allmänna föreskrifter kan bygga upp ett helt normativt system.

  • 7.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    An Introduction to Deontic Logic2010Book (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bimodal Logic2012In: Polish Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1897-1652, E-ISSN 2154-3747, Vol. 6, no 2, p. 71-93Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many interesting philosophical principles include two kinds of modalities, e.g. epistemic and doxastic, alethic and epistemic, or alethic and deontic modalities. The purpose of this essay is to describe a set of bimodal systems, i.e. systems that include two kinds of modal operators, in which it is possible to investigate some formalizations of such principles. All in all we will consider 4,194,304 logics. All logics are described semantically and proof theoretically. We use possible world semantics to characterize the logics semantically and both axiomatic systems and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics and we consider some relationships between the various systems.

  • 9.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bimodal tidslogik med monotemporala ramar2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 53-76Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Tidslogik är en gren av logiken som handlar om temporala begrepp, satser, argument och system. Inom denna gren av logiken undersöker man t.ex. uttryck såsom ”Det kommer alltid vara fallet att”, ”Det kommer någon gång i framtiden vara fallet att”, ”Det har alltid varit fallet att”, ”Det var någon gång i det förflutna fallet att”. Logiska relationer mellan satser som innehåller temporala begrepp studeras och giltigheten hos argument som består av sådana satser analyseras. I tidigare arbeten har jag diskuterat hur tidslogiken kan betraktas som en form av multimodal logik. I den här uppsatsen visar jag hur tidslogiken kan beskrivas som en bimodal logik, ett slags modallogik som endast innehåller två typer av temporala operatorer. Den semantik jag använder är baserad på monotemporala ramar. En monotemporal ram är en relationell struktur som endast innehåller en primitiv tillgänglighetsrelation, nämligen relationen tidigare än / senare än. Jag utvecklar ett antal så kallade semantiska tablåsystem och bevisar att dessa är sunda och fullständiga i relation till deras semantik.

  • 10.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Boulesic-Doxastic Logic2019In: Australasian Journal of Logic, ISSN 1448-5052, Vol. 16, no 3, p. 83-132Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I will develop a set of boulesic-doxastic tableau systems and prove that they are sound and complete. Boulesic-doxastic logic consists of two main parts: a boulesic part and a doxastic part. By 'boulesic logic' I mean 'the logic of the will', and by `doxastic logic' I mean 'the logic of belief'. The first part deals with 'boulesic' concepts, expressions, sentences, arguments and theorems. I will concentrate on two types of boulesic expression: 'individual x wants it to be the case that' and 'individual x accepts that it is the case that'. The second part deals with 'doxastic' concepts, expressions, sentences, arguments and theorems. I will concentrate on two types of doxastic expression: 'individual x believes that' and 'it is imaginable to individual x that'. Boulesic-doxastic logic investigates how these concepts are related to each other. Boulesic logic is a new kind of logic. Doxastic logic has been around for a while, but the approach to this branch of logic in this paper is new. Each system is combined with modal logic with two kinds of modal operators for historical and absolute necessity and predicate logic with necessary identity and 'possibilise quantifiers. I use a kind of possible world semantics to describe the systems semantically. I also sketch out how our basic language can be extended with propositional quantifiers. All the systems developed in this paper are new.

  • 11.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Commitment: Some formal interpretations2012In: Disputatio, ISSN 0873-626X, E-ISSN 2182-2875, Vol. 4, no 33, p. 445-457Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We often use sentences that seem conditional in nature when we reason about normative issues, e.g. ‘If you have promised to do something, you should keep your promise’ and ‘If you have done something bad, you should apologize’. We seem to think that promise-making in some sense commits us to promise-keeping and that acting bad in some sense creates an obligation to apologize. It is, however, not obvious how we should symbolize such sentences in a formal language. The purpose of this essay is to investigate some different possible formalizations of different conditional obligation sentences. I consider seven different interpretations of the concept of commitment or conditional obligation and I say something about the logical properties of these different interpretations.

  • 12.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Contrary-to-Duty Paradoxes and Counterfactual Deontic Logic2019In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 47, no 4, p. 1247-1282Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, I will discuss some examples of the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox, a well-known puzzle in deontic logic. A contrary-to-duty obligation is an obligation telling us what ought to be the case if something forbidden is true, for example: 'If she is guilty, she should confess'. Contrary-to-duty obligations are important in our moral and legal thinking. Therefore, we want to be able to find an adequate symbolisation of such obligations in some logical system, a task that has turned out to be difficult. This is shown by the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox. I will investigate and evaluate one kind of solution to this problem that has been suggested in the literature, which I will call the 'counterfactual solution'. I will use some recent systems that combine not only counterfactual logic and deontic logic, but also temporal logic, in my analysis of the paradox. I will argue that the counterfactual solution has many attractive features and that it can give a fairly satisfactory answer to some examples of the contrary-to-duty paradox, but that it nevertheless has some serious problems. The conclusion is that, notwithstanding the many attractive features of the solution, there seem to be other approaches to the paradox that are more promising.

  • 13.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Counterfactuals and Semantic Tableaux2009In: Logic and logical philosophy, ISSN 1425-3305, Vol. 18, no 1, p. 71-91Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some counterfactual logics. All in all I will discuss 1024 systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Soundness results are obtained for every tableau system and completeness results for a large subclass of these.

  • 14.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Diodorus Cronus Mästerargument: Några Reflektioner2014In: Filosofiska Notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 41-57Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Det sägs att den gamla grekiska tänkaren Diodorus Cronus argumenterade för uppfattningen att någonting är möjligt endast om det är eller kommer att vara sant. Hans argument går under benämningen "Mästerargumentet". I den här uppsatsen tittar jag närmare på detta. Jag tar upp två möjliga tolkningar och går igenom några argument för utgångspunkterna. Jag visar hur det är möjligt att acceptera alla premisser i argumentet, givet att de tolkas på ett visst sätt, samtidigt som man förkastar slutsatsen. Det här innebär positiva nyheter för alla som tycker att det ligger någonting i Diodorus Cronus resonemang men samtidigt tror att det finns möjligheter som aldrig realiseras.

  • 15.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dyadic Deontic Logic and Semantic Tableaux2009In: Logic and Logical Philosophy, ISSN 1425-3305, Vol. 18, no 3-4, p. 221-252Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some dyadic deontic logics. We will consider 16 different pure dyadic deontic tableau systems and 32 different alethic dyadic deontic tableau systems. Possible world semantics is used to interpret our formal languages. Some relationships between our systems and well known dyadic deontic logics in the literature are pointed out and soundness results are obtained for every tableau system. Completeness results are obtained for all 16 pure dyadic deontic systems and for 16 alethic dyadic deontic systems.

  • 16.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dyadisk deontisk logik: en härledning av några teorem2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 19-52Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Deontisk logik är en gren av logiken som handlar om normativa begrepp, satser, argument och system. Dyadisk deontisk logik är en typ av deontisk logik som innehåller särskilda symboler som kan användas för att analysera villkorliga normer av formen: ”Det bör vara fallet att A givet att B är fallet”, ”Det är tillåtet att A givet att B är fallet” och ”Det är förbjudet att A givet att B är fallet”. Sven Danielsson, Bengt Hansson, Bas van Fraassen, David Lewis, Frans von Kutschera och Lennart Åqvist är några av pionjärerna inom denna gren av logiken. Jag har i tidigare arbeten utvecklat en rad semantiska tablåsystem som bl.a. kan användas för att bevisa teorem och analysera och värdera argument i dyadisk deontisk logik. I den här uppsatsen visar jag hur ett av dessa system kan användas för att härleda en mängd av de axiom som presenteras av Danielsson, Hansson, van Fraassen, Lewis, von Kutschera och Åqvist.

  • 17.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Extensions of Deontic Logic: An Investigation into some Multi-Modal Systems2012Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Deontic logic is a branch of logic that deals with normative concepts, propositions, arguments and systems. The main purpose of this compilation thesis is to investigate how deontic logic can be extended in a number of ways. We consider several multimodal systems, i.e. systems that include more than one modality, e.g. deontic, alethic and temporal modalities. We also say something about some logics that include counterfactuals. The purpose of Paper I is to develop a class of semantic tableau systems for some counterfactual logics. We discuss 1024 systems. Soundness results are obtained for every tableau system and completeness results for a large subclass of these. In Paper II we describe a class of semantic tableau systems for some dyadic deontic logics. We consider 16 pure dyadic deontic systems and 32 alethic dyadic deontic systems. Soundness results are proved for every tableau system and completeness results are obtained for all 16 pure dyadic deontic systems and for 16 alethic dyadic deontic systems. In Paper III we consider several different interpretations of the concept of conditional obligation or commitment and we say something about its logical properties. Paper IV deals with several bimodal systems, i.e. systems that include two kinds of modal operators. Bimodal systems are interesting because many philosophical principles include two kinds of modalities, e.g. the ought-implies-can principle, the knowledge-implies-belief principle and the means-end principle. We study 4,194,304 bimodal logics and we use both axiomatic systems and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We show that all our axiomatic and tableau systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics. The purpose of Paper V is to describe a set of 2,147,483,648 temporal alethic-deontic systems, i.e. systems that include temporal, alethic and deontic operators. We show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.

  • 18.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    FN:s allmänna förklaring om de mänskliga rättigheterna och kvantifierad deontisk logik2014In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 18, no 2, p. 22-34Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [sv]

    FN:s allmänna förklaring om de mänskliga rättigheterna innehåller en katalog över ett antal mänskliga fri- och rättigheter. I den här uppsatsen argumenterar jag för att det krävs en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att förstå den logiska formen hos flera av de normer som uttrycks i denna förklaring. Jag tar upp ett antal argument som förefaller vara giltiga, men som inte kan bevisas i klassisk logik. Därefter visar jag hur dessa argument kan formaliseras och bevisas med hjälp av en kvantifierad deontisk logik. Avslutningsvis tar jag upp en potentiell invändning emot uppsatsens konklusion. Enligt denna invändning behöver vi inte en kvantifierad deontisk logik, eftersom de argument jag diskuterar i uppsatsen kan analyseras i klassisk logik om vi inför vissa implicita premisser. Jag tar upp fyra problem med denna invändning och drar slutsatsen att den inte i sig tycks vara tillräckligt allvarlig för att förkasta uppsatsens slutsats. Diskussionen ger stöd åt uppfattningen att vi behöver en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att analysera många typer av normativa uttryck och kastar också förhoppningsvis nytt ljus över hur vissa centrala utsagor i FN:s allmänna förklaring om de mänskliga rättigheterna bör tolkas och vilken logisk form de har.

  • 19.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fritt val tillåtelser2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 1, p. 3-37Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Den här uppsatsen handlar om fritt val (FV) tillåtelser (FVT). Jag går igenom den s.k. fritt val tillåtelser paradoxen och nämner några möjliga lösningar på denna. Därefter presenterar jag mitt eget förslag på hur man bör förstå tillåtelser av detta slag och hur man kan lösa (FVT) paradoxen. Jag tar upp några potentiella invändningar mot denna analys och visar hur dessa kan bemötas. Ibland har (FVT) paradoxen använts som ett argument emot s.k. standard deontisk logik (SDL). Jag argumenterar för att man kan acceptera förekomsten av (FV) tillåtelser utan att behöva förkasta (SDL). Däremot pekar diskussionen på behovet av en kvantifierad deontisk logik.

  • 20.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Platsbestämda normer och kvantifierad deontisk logik2015In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 77-92Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Det tycks finnas normer som är knutna till vissa platser eller geografiska områden, normer som uttalar sig om vad som bör, får och inte får vara fallet på olika ställen. Det är uppenbart att juridiska förbud, tillåtelser och plikter ofta är av detta slag, men det är rimligt att anta att även moraliska påbud kan vara relaterade till specifika orter. Vi skall kalla sådana normer ”platsbestämda”. I den här uppsatsen undersöker jag den logiska formen hos sådana föreskrifter. Jag tar upp ett antal argument som innehåller påståenden om plikter, tillåtelser och förbud som alla på något sätt är kopplade till vissa platser. En del av dessa är intuitivt giltiga medan andra är intuitivt ogiltiga. Jag visar hur man kan använda en kvantifierad deontisk logik för att förklara dessa intuitioner. Den grundläggande tolkningen av platsbestämda normer som presenteras i den här uppsatsen bygger på Donald Davidsons analys av handlingssatser. Om denna är korrekt, pekar den på behovet av en kvantifierad deontisk logik. Faktumet att tolkningen medför intuitivt rimliga resultat visar att analysen ifråga är fruktbar.

  • 21.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quantified Temporal Alethic-Deontic Logic2015In: Logic and Logical Philosophy, ISSN 1425-3305, E-ISSN 2300-9802, Vol. 24, no 1, p. 19-59Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to describe a set of quantified temporal alethic-deontic systems, i.e., systems that combine temporal alethic-deontic logic with predicate logic. We consider three basic kinds of systems: constant, variable and constant and variable domain systems. These systems can be augmented by either necessary or contingent identity, and every system that includes identity can be combined with descriptors. All logics are described both semantically and proof theoretically. We use a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T × W semantics, to characterize them semantically and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We also show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.

  • 22.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Semantic Tableau Versions of Some Normal Modal Systems with Propositional Quantifiers2019In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 26, no 3, p. 505-536Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Symbolic Logic (1932), C. I. Lewis developed five modal systems S1 - S5. S4 and S5 arc so-called normal modal systems. Since Lewis and La.ngford's pioneering work many other systems of this kind have been investigated, among them the 32 systems that can be generated by the five axioms T, D, B, 4 and 5. Lewis also discusses how his systems can be augmented by propositional quantifiers and how these augmented logics allow us to express some interesting ideas that cannot be expressed in the corresponding quantifier-free logics. In this paper, I will develop 64 normal modal semantic tableau systems that can be extended by propositional quantifiers yielding 64 extended systems. All in all, we will investigate 128 different systems. I will show how these systems can be used to prove some interesting theorems and I will discuss Lewis's so-called existence postulate and some of its consequences. Finally, I will prove that all normal modal systems are sound and complete and that all systems (including the extended systems) are sound with respect to their semantics. It is left as an open question whether or not the extended systems are complete.

  • 23.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Temporal alethic–deontic logic and semantic tableaux2012In: Journal of Applied Logic, ISSN 1570-8683, E-ISSN 1570-8691, Vol. 10, no 3, p. 219-237Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to describe a set of temporal alethic–deontic systems, i.e. systems that include temporal, alethic and deontic operators. All in all we will consider 2,147,483,648 systems. All systems are described both semantically and proof theoretically. We use a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T ×W semantics, to characterize our systems semantically and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof theoretically. We also show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.

  • 24.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Golden Rule and The Platinum Rule2015In: Journal of Value Inquiry, ISSN 0022-5363, E-ISSN 1573-0492, Vol. 49, no 1, p. 221-236Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between the so-called golden rule and the so-called platinum rule. According to the golden rule (GR) you ought to treat others as you want to be treated by them; and according to the platinum rule (PR), you ought to treat others as they want to be treated by you. In this essay I argue for the following propositions. (1) (GR) and (PR) are logically independent. (2) (PR) can be derived from (GR) given that you want to be treated by others as they want to be treated by you. (3) (GR) is derivable from (PR) given that others want to be treated by you as you want to be treated by them. And (4) (GR) and (PR) are equivalent given that you want to be treated by others as they want to be treated by you, and others want to be treated by you as you want to be treated by them. I consider some possible interpretations of (GR) and (PR), and I also address the question of whether (GR) is more plausible than (PR) or vice versa, or whether they are complementary. I discuss one argument for the view that (PR) is better than (GR) and mention several arguments for the view that (GR) is better than (PR). The discussion suggests that (GR) and (PR) are complementary.

  • 25.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism2015In: Kriterion, ISSN 0100-512X, E-ISSN 1981-5336, Vol. 29, no 1, p. 79-97Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I show that one version of motivational internalism follows from the so-called ideal observer theory. Let us call the version of the ideal observer theory used in this essay (IOT). According to (IOT), it is necessarily the case that it ought to be that A if and only if every ideal observer wants it to be the case that A. We shall call the version of motivational internalism that follows from (IOT) (moral) conditional belief motivational internalism (CBMI). According to (CBMI), it is necessarily the case that, for every x: if x were an ideal observer, it would be the case that x believes that it ought to be that A only if x wants it to be the case that A. Given that it is necessarily true that no ideal observer has any false beliefs, (IOT) entails (CBMI). Or, so I shall argue.

  • 26.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tidslogik som multimodal logik2014In: Filosofiska notiser, ISSN 2002-0198, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 59-90Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Tidslogik är en gren av logiken som handlar om temporala begrepp, satser, argument och system. Inom denna gren av logiken undersöker man t.ex. uttryck såsom "Det kommer alltid vara fallet att", "Det kommer någon gång i framtiden vara fallet att", "Det har alltid varit fallet att", "Det var någon gång i det förflutna fallet att". Logiska relationer mellan satser som innehåller temporala begrepp studeras och giltigheten hos argument som består av sådana satser analyseras. Ett multimodalt språk är ett modalt språk som inkorporerar flera olika modala operatorer. En multimodal semantik är en modal semantik som innehåller flera olika s.k. tillgänglighetsrelationer som svarar mot de olika modala operatorerna. Och ett multimodalt system är ett modalt system (av teorem) som är baserat på ett multimodalt språk. Multimodal logik är en gren av modallogiken som handlar om multimodala språk, semantiska teorier och system. I den här uppsatsen visar jag hur tidslogiken kan betraktas som en del av den multimodala logiken. Jag utvecklar ett antal så kallade semantiska tablåsystem och bevisar att dessa är sunda och fullständiga i relation till deras semantik.

  • 27.
    Rönnedal, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Transgressions Are Equal, and Right Actions Are Equal: some Philosophical Reflections on Paradox III in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum2017In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 45, no 1, p. 317-334Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Paradoxa Stoicorum, the Roman philosopher Cicero defends six important Stoic theses. Since these theses seem counterintuitive, and it is not likely that the average person would agree with them, they were generally called paradoxes. According to the third paradox, (P3), (all) transgressions (wrong actions) are equal and (all) right actions are equal. According to one interpretation of this principle, which I will call (P3'), it means that if it is forbidden that A and it is forbidden that B, then not-A is as good as not-B; and if it is permitted that A and it is permitted that B, then A is as good as B. In this paper, I show how it is possible to prove this thesis in dyadic deontic logic. I also try to defend (P3') against some philosophical counterarguments. Furthermore, I address the claim that (P3') is not a correct interpretation of Cicero's third paradox and the assertion that it does not matter whether (P3') is true or not. I argue that it does matter whether (P3') is true or not, but acknowledge that (P3') is perhaps a slightly different principle than Cicero's thesis. The upshot is that (P3') seems to be a plausible principle, and that at least one part of paradox III in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum appears to be defensible.

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