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  • 1.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    On Physical Relations in Driving: Judgements, Cognition and Perception2014Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Drivers need to make judgements of physical relationships related to driving speed, such as mean speed, risks, travel time and fuel consumption, in order to make optimal choices of vehicle speed. This is also the case for the general public, politicians and other stakeholders who are engaged in traffic issues. This thesis investigates how drivers’ judgements of travel time (Study I and II), fuel consumption (Study III) and mean speed (Study IV) relate to actual physical measures.

    A cognitive time-saving bias has been found in judgements of travel time. The time saving bias implies that people overestimate the time saved when increasing speed from a high speed and underestimate the time saved when increasing speed from a low speed. Previous studies have mainly investigated the bias from a cognitive perspective in questionnaires. In Study I the bias was shown to be present when participants were engaged in a driving simulator task where participants primarily rely on perceptual cues. Study II showed that intuitive time saving judgements can be debiased by presenting drivers with an alternative speedometer that indicate the inverted speed in minutes per kilometre.

    In Study III, judgements of fuel consumption at increasing and decreasing speeds were examined, and the results showed systematic deviations from correct measures. In particular, professional truck drivers underestimated the fuel saving effect of a decrease in speed. Study IV showed that subjective mean speed judgements differed from objective mean speeds and could predict route choice better than objective mean speeds. The results indicate that biases in these judgements are robust and that they predict behaviour.

    The thesis concludes that judgements of mean speeds, time savings and fuel consumption systematically deviate from physical measures. The results have implications for predicting travel behaviour and the design of driver feedback systems.

  • 2.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, Linköping, Sweden.
    Patten, Christopher
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, USA.
    Eriksson, Lars
    Estimated Time of Arrival and Debiasing the Time Saving Bias2015In: Ergonomics, ISSN 0014-0139, E-ISSN 1366-5847, Vol. 58, no 12, p. 1939-1946Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The time saving bias predicts that the time saved when increasing speed from a high speed is overestimated, and underestimated when increasing speed from a slow speed. In a questionnaire, time saving judgements were investigated when information of estimated time to arrival was provided. In an active driving task, an alternative meter indicating the inverted speed was used to debias judgements. The simulated task was to first drive a distance at a given speed, and then drive the same distance again at the speed the driver judged was required to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first drive. A control group performed the same task with a speedometer and saved less than the targeted three minutes when increasing speed from a high speed, and more than three minutes when increasing from a low speed. Participants in the alternative meter condition were closer to the target. The two studies corroborate a time saving bias and show that biased intuitive judgements can be debiased by displaying the inverted speed.

  • 3.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Driving faster or slower? Biased judgments of fuel consumption at changing speeds2012In: Advances in human aspects of road and rail transportation / [ed] Neville Stanton, London: CRC Press, 2012, p. 293-297Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Driving Faster or Slower? Speed Changes and Judged Effects on Fuel ConsumptionArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector continue to increase. Lower speeds on roads would reduce fuel consumption and thereby emissions. Drivers choose the speed of their vehicles, but do they realize the full benefit of a reduced speed on fuel consumption? In a set of questionnaires, professional truck drivers and student groups were asked to judge fuel consumption at decreasing and increasing speeds. The truck drivers underestimated the amount of fuel saved by decreasing speed, but made more accurate judgments of fuel lost at increasing speeds. Student groups made better judgments of fuel saved at decreasing speeds than the truck drivers. It is important that drivers understand the full benefit of a reduced speed on fuel consumption. This may affect both preferred driving speed and attitudes towards lower speed limits. Some policy suggestions on how to promote environmentally efficient driving were discussed.

  • 5.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Eriksson, Lars
    Karlstad University.
    Debiasing time saving judgements by manipulation of speed display2014In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Europe Chapter 2013 Annual Conference / [ed] De Waard, D., Brookhuis, K., Wiczorek, R., Di Nocera, F., Barham, P., Weikert, C., Kluge, A., Gerbino, W., & Toffetti, A., Groningen, NL: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Europe chapter , 2014, p. 161-168Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The time saving bias predicts that when increasing speeding from a high speed (e.g. 100 kph) the time saved is overestimated and underestimated when increasing speed from a slow speed (e.g. 30 kph). An alternative meter indicating the inverted speed (min/km) was used to debias time saving judgements in an active driving task. The simulated driving task was to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed the driver judged was required in order to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first drive. A control group performed the same task with a speedometer and saved less than the targeted three minutes when increasing speed from a high speed and more than three minutes when increasing from a low speed, as predicted by the time saving bias. Participants in the alternative meter group were closer to the target. The study shows that biased intuitive judgements can be affected by changing information format.

  • 6.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI), Sweden.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Eriksson, Lars
    The time-saving bias: Judgements, cognition and perception2013In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 492-497Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Biases in people's judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity have been studied mainly with hypothetical scenarios (Svenson, 2008). The present study asked whether the classic time-saving bias persists as a perceptual bias when we control the speed of an activity and assess the perceived time elapsed at different speeds. Specifically, we investigated the time-saving bias in a driving simulator. Each participant was asked to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed she or he judged necessary to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first trip. We found that that the time-saving bias applies to active driving and that it affects the choice of driving speed. The drivers' time-saving judgements show that the perception of the time elapsed while driving does not eliminate the time-saving bias.

  • 7.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, OR 97 401, USA.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, Linköping, Department of Behavioural Sciences, Linköping University.
    Mertz, C. K.
    Department of Behavioural Sciences, Linköping University.
    Debiasing overoptimistic beliefs about braking capacity2013In: Accident Analysis and Prevention, ISSN 0001-4575, E-ISSN 1879-2057, Vol. 58, p. 75-80Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigated, using questionnaires, different strategies for removing drivers’ overoptimism (Svenson et al., 2012a) about how fast their speed could be decreased when they were speeding compared with braking at the speed limit speed. Three different learning groups and a control group made collision speed judgments. The first learning group had the distance a car travels during a driver's reaction time for each problem. The second group had this information and also feedback after each judgment (correct speed). The third group judged collision speed but also braking distance and received correct facts after each problem. The control group had no information at all about reaction time and the distance traveled during that time. The results suggested the following rank order from poor to improved performance: control, group 1, group 3 and group 2 indicating that information about distance driven during a driver's reaction time improved collision speed judgments and that adding stopping distance information did not add to this improvement.

  • 8.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI), Sweden.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Peters, Ellen
    Judgments of mean speed and predictions of route choice2011In: Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, ISSN 1369-8478, E-ISSN 1873-5517, Vol. 14, no 6, p. 504-511Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How are driving speeds integrated when speeds vary along a route? In a first study, we examined heuristic processes used in judgments of mean speed when the mean speeds on parts of the trip varied. The judgments deviated systematically from objective mean speeds because the distances driven at different speeds were given more weight than travel time spent on the different distances. The second study showed that when there was a 10-15 min pause during a travel the effect on the mean speed decrease was underestimated for driving speeds of 90 km/h and higher. In the third study, the objective mean speeds and the subjective biased mean speed judgments were used to predict choices between routes with different speed limits. The results showed that subjective judgments predicted decisions to maximize mean speed significantly better than objective mean speeds. Finally, some applied and basic research implications of the results were discussed.

  • 9.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gonzalez, Nichel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Institute, Sweden.
    Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments2014In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 9, no 5, p. 465-478Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Svenson (2011) showed that choices of one of two alternative productivity increases to save production resources (e.g., man-months) were biased. Judgments of resource savings following a speed increase from a low production speed linewere underestimated and following an increase of a high production speed line overestimated. The objective formula for computing savings includes differences between inverse speeds and this is intuitively very problematic for most people.The purpose of the present studies was to explore ways of ameliorating or eliminating the bias. Study 1 was a control study asking participants to increase the production speed of one production line to save the same amount of production resources(man-months) as was saved by a speed increase in a reference line. The increases judged to match the reference alternatives showed the same bias as in the earlier research on choices. In Study 2 the same task and problems were used as in Study 1,but the participants were asked first to judge the resource saving of the reference alternative in a pair of alternatives before they proceeded to the matching task. This weakened the average bias only slightly. In Study 3, the participants were askedto judge the resources saved from each of two successive increases of the same single production line (other than those of the matching task) before they continued to the matching problems. In this way a participant could realize that a secondproduction speed increase from a higher speed (e.g., from 40 to 60 items /man-month) gives less resource savings than the same speed increase from a first lower speed (e.g., from 20 to 40 items/man-month. Following this, the judgments of thesame problems as in the other studies improved and the bias decreased significantly but it did not disappear. To be able to make optimal decisions about productivity increases, people need information about the bias and/or reformulations of the problems.

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