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  • 1.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Sweden.
    Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?2009In: Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem / [ed] Melinda A. Roberts, David T. Wasserman, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009, p. 289-314Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defining Democratic Decision Making2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski, Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Democracy for the 21th century: research challenges2019In: Sociology looks at the twenty-first century: from local universalism to global contextualism / [ed] Y. Elkana, S. Randeria, B. Wittrock, Brill Academic Publishers, 2019, p. 165-186Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Desert as Fit: An Axiomatic Analysis2006In: The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman / [ed] Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, Michael J. Zimmerman, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, p. 3-17Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Egalitarian Concerns and Population Change2013In: Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics / [ed] Nir Eyal, Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, Dan Wikler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 74-92Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We usually examine our considered intuitions regarding inequality, including health inequality, by comparing populations of the same size. Likewise, the standard measures of inequality and its badness have been developed on the basis of only such comparisons. Real world policies to mitigate inequalities, however, will most often also affect the size of a population. For example, many health policies are very likely to prevent deaths and affect procreation decisions. Population control policies, such as China’s one-child policy, trivially affect population size. In addition, if we are interested in measuring the development of global inequality during the last thirty years or so, we have to take into account the great population expansion in countries such as India and China. Hence, we need to consider how to extend measures of inequality to different number cases, that is, how to take into account the complication that population numbers are often not equal between the compared alternatives. Moreover, examining different number case is a fruitful way of probing our ideas about egalitarian concerns and will reveal as yet unnoticed complexities and problems in our current conceptualization of the value of equality, or so I’ll argue. 

  • 6.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Egalitarianism and Population Change2009In: Intergenerational Justice / [ed] Axel Gosseries, Lukas H. Meyer, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 325-348Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Egalitarianism and Population Change2012In: Intergenerational Justice / [ed] Axel Gosseries, Lukas H. Meyer, Oxford University Press, 2012, 2, p. 323-345Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    En motvillig filosof2013In: Vägar till vetenskapen: Sveriges unga akademi om att bli och vara forskare / [ed] C. Nordlund, Santérus Förlag, 2013Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 9.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Etica delle popolazioni e metaetica2012In: Iride, ISSN 1122-7893, no 1, p. 35-44Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper focuses on the relations between population ethics and metaethics. Population ethics gives rise to well-known paradoxes, such as the paradox of mere addition. After presenting a version of this paradox, it is argued that a different way to dismantle it might be by considering it as a way to change our standard view of justification in moral theory. Two possible views are considered: a non-cognitivist approach to justification and to the explanation of inconsistency in morals; Parfit's suggestion that certain paradoxes might be «quarantined» without shaking our confidence in moral theories encapsulating them.

  • 10.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Oxford, UK.
    Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics2003In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 225-236Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Fred Feldman has proposed a desert-adjusted version of utilitarianism, ‘justicism’, as a plausible population axiology. Among other things, he claims that justicism avoids Derek Parfit's ‘repugnant conclusion’. This paper explains the theory and tries to straighten out some of its ambiguities. Moreover, it is shown that it is not clear whether justicism avoids the repugnant conclusion and that it is has other counter-intuitive implications. It is concluded that justicism is not convincing as a population axiology.

  • 11.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institutet för Framtidsstudier (IF).
    Future Generations and Interpersonal Compensations: Moral Aspects of Energy1995Book (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Future Generations, Power, and Democracy2011In: Perspectives: Journal Réseau français des instituts d’études avancées, no 4, p. 10-11Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 13.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Université Paris Descartes, France.
    Life Extension versus Replacement2008In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, ISSN 0264-3758, E-ISSN 1468-5930, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 211-227Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea, or so it has been argued. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of well-being above which a life has to reach to have positive contributive value to a population, so-called Critical Level Utilitarianism. Secondly, the view that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been, a view I call Comparativism. I shall show that although these theories do capture some of our intuitions about the value of longevity, they contradict others, and they have a number of counterintuitive implications in other cases that we ultimately have to reject them.

  • 14.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Life Extension versus Replacement2011In: Enhancing Human Capacities / [ed] Ruud ter Meulen, Julian Savulescu, Guy Kahane, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, p. 368-385Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. The chapter discusses two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea. The first is critical level utilitarianism (CLU) and the other is view comparativism. The chapter describes the pure case of life extension versus life replacement and then presents some different views about the value of life extension, indicating some of the arguments in favor and against life extension fail. Then, it turns to the implications of critical level utilitarianism and comparativism in regards to life extension versus replacement, the main topic of this chapter. A case is presented to explain that there is a conflict between intuitions regarding life extension and comparativism.

  • 15.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Measuring and distributing influence2008In: CERSES News: La lettre du Centre de Recherche Sens, Ethique, Vol. 1, no 1Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 16.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Praktisk filosofi.
    Meritarian Axiologies and Distributive Justice2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard welfarist axiologies do not care who is given what share of the good. For example, giving Wlodek two apples and Ewa three is just as good as giving Wlodek three and Ewa two, or giving Wlodek five and Ewa zero. A common objection to such theories is that they are insensitive to matters of distributive justice. To meet this objection, one can adjust the axiology to take distributive concerns into account. One possibility is to turn to what I will call Meritarian axiologies. According to such theories, individuals can have a claim to, deserve, or merit, a certain level of wellbeing depending on their merit level, and the value of an outcome is determined not only by people’s wellbeing but also by their merit level.

  • 17.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    One More Axiological Impossibility Theorem2009In: Logic, ethics, and all that jazz: essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2009, p. 23-37Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Politisk och ekonomisk demokrati2012In: Tillsammans: en fungerande ekonomisk demokrati / [ed] B. Rothstein, Stockholm: SNS förlag, 2012, p. 71-95Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    University of Toronto, Canada.
    Population Axiology1999Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Population Ethics and Imprecision2016In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 82, no 2, p. 166-181Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing what he calls “imprecision” in value comparisons.  He suggests that in a range of important cases, populations of different sizes are only imprecisely comparable. Parfit suggests that this feature of value comparisons opens up a way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other counterintuitive conclusions, and thus solves one of the major challenges in ethics. In this paper, I shall try to clarify Parfit’s proposal and evaluate whether it will help us with the paradoxes in population ethics.

  • 21.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Future Studies, Sweden.
    Précis Population Ethics2017In: Ars Vivendi Journal, E-ISSN 2188-8175, no 8/9, p. 3-6Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 22.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Oxford, UK.
    Superiority in Value2005In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 123, no 1-2, p. 97-114Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Superiority in Value2005In: Recent Work on Intrinsic Value / [ed] Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Michael J. Zimmerman, Springer, 2005, p. 291-304Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 24.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    The Affirmative Answer to the Existential Question and the Person Affecting Restriction2015In: Weighing and reasoning: themes from the philosophy of John Broome / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Andrew Reisner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The person affecting restriction states that one outcome can only be better than another if it is better for someone. The existential question concerns whether existence can be better or worse for a person than non-existence, the personal value of existence. According to the affirmative answer, existence can be better or worse than non-existence for a person. This chapter discusses the implications of the restriction and the affirmative answer to the existential question for population ethics, the value of future generations, and especially for the possibility of avoiding the so-called repugnant conclusion, an undesirable implication of classical utilitarianism.

  • 25.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory2005In: Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations I / [ed] Folke Tersman, Stockholm: Filosofiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet , 2005, p. 14-29Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    The Democratic Boundary Problem Reconsidered2018In: Ethics, Politics & Society, ISSN 2184-2582, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 89-122Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Who should have a right to take part in which decisions in democratic decision making? This “boundary problem” is a central issue for democracy and is of both practical and theoretical import. If nothing else, all different notions of democracy have one thing in common: a reference to a community of individuals, “a people”, who takes decision in a democratic fashion. However, that a decision is made with a democratic decision method by a certain group of people doesn’t suffice for making the decision democratic or satisfactory from a democratic perspective. The group also has to be the right one. But what makes a group the right one? The criteria by which to identify the members of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions have been surprisingly difficult to pin down. In this paper, I shall revisit some of the problems discussed in my 2005 paper in light of some recent criticism and discussion of my position in the literature, and address a number of new issues.

  • 27.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies, Sweden; L'institut d'etudes avancees-Paris, France.
    The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics2011In: Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior / [ed] Ehtibar Dzhafarov, Lacey Perry, World Scientific, 2011, p. 1-26Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    The Paradoxes of Future Generations and Normative Theory2004In: The Repugnant Conclusion / [ed] Jesper Ryberg, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 201-218Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As the title of this paper indicates, I’m going to discuss what we ought to do in situations where our actions affect future generations. More specifically, I shall focus on the moral problems raised by cases where our actions affect who’s going to live, their number and their-well being. I’ll start, however, with population axiology. Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as”. This field has been riddled with “paradoxes” which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. Derek Parfit’s Mere Addition Paradox is a case in point. The main question of my paper concerns the implication of such axiological paradoxes for normative theories. Do the axiological paradoxes translate into paradoxes for normative theories or will they, as some believe, disappear if we switch to a normative framework?

  • 29.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Uppsala University, Sweden; University of Oxford, UK.
    The Person Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People2003In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, no 3-4, p. 185-195Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too 'impersonal' axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the context of medical ethics where many of the problems of population axiology are actualized. Examples are embryo or egg selection, pre-implantation genetic testing, assisted reproduction programmes, abortion, just to mention a few. I discuss a number of different interpretations of the Restriction and in particular one interpretation which I call Comparativism. According to this view, we should draw a distinction between uniquely and non-uniquely realizable people. The former people only exist in one out of two possible outcomes, whereas the latter exist in both of the compared outcomes. The idea is that we should give more weight to the well-being of non-uniquely realizable people or take it into account in a different way as compared to the well-being of uniquely realizable people. I argue that the different versions of the Person Affecting Restriction and Comparativism either have counterintuitive implications of their own or are compatible with traditional theories such as Utilitarianism.

  • 30.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2013In: International Encyclopaedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 4560-4563Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Derek Parfit originally formulated the Repugnant Conclusion as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (1984: 388).

  • 31.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Very Repugnant Conclusion2003In: Logic, Law, Morality / [ed] Krister Segerberg, Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2003, p. 29-44Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 32.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vem bör ha rösträtt? Avgränsningsproblemet i demokratisk teori2005In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 9, no 2, p. 47-63Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vår moral och framtida generationer2012Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 34.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Better to be than not to be?2012In: Discusiones Filosóficas, ISSN 0124-6127, Vol. 13, no 21, p. 65-85Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Can it be better (or worse) for me to exist than not to exist? Several philosophers have denied this, on the ground that if it could, then if I didn't exist, this would have been worse (better) for me, which is absurd. In our paper we argue that these philosophers are mistaken: Claims about the comparative value or disvalue of existence need not imply any absurdities. Such claims, which are of central importance for population ethics and for the status of the so-called Person-Affecting Restriction, can be rationalized if one adheres to the so-called fitting-attitudes analysis of value.

  • 35.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Better to Be than not to Be?2010In: The Benefit of Broad Horizons: intellectual and institutional preconditions for a global social science: festschrift for Björn Wittrock on the occasion of his 65th birthday / [ed] Hans Joas, Barbro Klein, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010, p. 399-414Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 36.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Millian Superiorities2005In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 127-146Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Suppose one sets up a sequence of less and less valuable objects such that each object in the sequence is only marginally worse than its immediate predecessor. Could one in this way arrive at something that is dramatically inferior to the point of departure? It has been claimed that if there is a radical value difference between the objects at each end of the sequence, then at some point there must be a corresponding radical difference between the adjacent elements. The underlying picture seems to be that a radical gap cannot be scaled by a series of steps, if none of the steps itself is radical. We show that this picture is incorrect on a stronger interpretation of value superiority, but correct on a weaker one. Thus, the conclusion we reach is that, in some sense at least, abrupt breaks in such decreasing sequences cannot be avoided, but that such unavoidable breaks are less drastic than has been suggested. In an appendix written by John Broome and Wlodek Rabinowicz, the distinction between two kinds of value superiority is extended from objects to their attributes.

  • 37.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds Universitet.
    The Value of Existence2015In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] I. Hirose and J. Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 424-444Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 38.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Value and Unacceptable Risk: Temkin’s Worries about Continuity Reconsidered2005In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 177-197Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult to determine what conclusions should be drawn from this result. Contrary to what Temkin suggests, substitutivity of equivalents is a notoriously controversial principle. But even in the absence of substitutivity, the counter-intuitive conclusion is derivable from a strengthened version of continuity for easy cases. The best move, therefore, might be to question the latter principle, even in its original simple version: as we argue, continuity for easy cases gives rise to a sorites.

  • 39.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    Lunds universitet.
    Value Superiority2015In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] I. Hirose and J. Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 225-248Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 40.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute of Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Ryberg, Jesper
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2017In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Derek Parfit’s original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is stated as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics. The last three decades have witnessed an increasing philosophical interest in questions such as “Is it possible to make the world a better place by creating additional happy people?” and “Is there a moral obligation to have children?” The main problem has been to find an adequate theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives (or their life-time welfare or well-being - we shall use these terms interchangeably here), and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory. As the name indicates, Parfit finds the Repugnant Conclusion unacceptable and many philosophers agree. However, it has been surprisingly difficult to find a theory that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other equally counterintuitive conclusions. Thus, the question as to how the Repugnant Conclusion should be dealt with and, more generally, what it shows about the nature of ethics has turned the conclusion into one of the cardinal challenges of modern ethics.

  • 41. de-Graft Aikins, Ama
    et al.
    Wikler, Dan
    Allotey, Pascale
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Beisel, Uli
    Cooper, Melinda
    Eyal, Nir
    Hausman, Dan
    Lutz, Wolfgang
    Norheim, Ole F.
    Roberts, Elizabeth
    Vågerö, Denny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Public Health Sciences.
    Jebari, Karim
    Global Health and the Changing Contours of Human Life2018In: Rethinking Society for the 21st Century: Report of the International Panel on Social Progress: Volume 3: Transformations in Values, Norms, Cultures / [ed] International Panel on Social Progress (IPSP), Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 713-752Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The “contours of human life” include childhood and adolescence, reproduction, the experiences of health, illness, disability, and death. These stages and aspects of life are universal and will remain so. However, social, environmental, and scientific changes are transforming their timing, texture, and patterns – and these transformations are not universally shared. Serious inequalities persist, among and within countries and regions, in longevity, morbidity, and disability, control over reproduction and sexuality, and care at the end of life. This chapter addresses these changing contours of human life in six sections: coming into being; longevity; diminished health; reproduction; enhancement; and death and dying.

  • 42. Richardson, Henry S.
    et al.
    Schokkaert, Erik
    Bartolini, Stefano
    Brennan, Geoffrey
    Casal, Paula
    Clayton, Matthew
    Jaeggi, Rahel
    Gopal Jayal, Niraja
    Kelbessa, Workineh
    Satz, Debra
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Campbell, Tim
    Caney, Simon
    Roemer, John
    Social Progress: A compass2018In: Rethinking Society for the 21st Century: Report of the International Panel on Social Progress: Volume 1: Socio-Economic Transformations / [ed] International Panel on Social Progress (IPSP), Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 41-80Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter sets out the main normative dimensions that should be used in assessing whether societies have made social progress and whether a given set of proposals is likely to bring progress. Some of these dimensions are values, bearing in the first instance on the evaluation of states of affairs; others are action-guiding principles. Values can inspire and in that sense also guide actions. Principles aim to offer more specific guidance on how to rank, distribute, and realize values. Recognizing a multiplicity of values and principles is important not only to being respectful of the variety of reasonable views about what matters but also because it is difficult to reduce the list of dimensions that ultimately matter to a shorter one in a way that reflects all aspects of the phenomena in question. Many of the chapters that follow will explicitly address only a subset of these values and principles: the ones most salient for their issues or areas; but in principle, all remain relevant.

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