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  • 1.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Can Reductive Individualists Allow Defence Against Political Aggression?2015In: Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 1 / [ed] David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter defends reductive individualism against the claim that it is unable to sanction wars of national defense that seek to protect non-vital interests, such as political goods. It does so by rebutting the two arguments: the Conditional Force Argument and the Proliferation Problem. The Conditional Force Argument holds that, by the reductivist’s own lights, wars that seek to defend only political goods are necessarily disproportionate and therefore always unjust. The Proliferation Problem holds that there is no morally significant difference between states and some other collectives. So, even if it can showed that it is proportionate for states to wage defensive wars against threats to non-vital interests, the grounds are lacking for restricting this permission to states.

  • 2.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Chatterjee, Deen K., ed. The Ethics of Preventive War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20132015In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 126, no 1, p. 215-220Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Collectivism and Reductivism in the Ethics of War2016In: A Companion to Applied Philosophy / [ed] Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, David Coady, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2016, p. 342-355Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defending Defensive Killing: Reply to Barry, McMahan, Ferzan, Renzo and Haque2018In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 15, no 6, p. 750-766Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article responds to objections to the account of permissible harming developed in Defensive Killing, as raised by Christian Barry, Jeff McMahan, Kimberly Ferzan, Massimo Renzo and Adil Ahmad Haque. Each paper deserves much more attention than I can give it here. I focus on Barry’s important observations regarding the liability to defensive harm of those who fail to rescue. In response to McMahan, I grant some of McMahan’s objections to my rejection of the moral equivalence of threats and bystanders, but reject his analysis of my Shield cases. I welcome much of Ferzan’s development of my account of ‘futile’ defence, but offer some concerns regarding her own view of when honour can be appropriately defended. I argue that Renzo’s objections to my account of bloodless invasions are unpersuasive, and identify some problems with Renzo’s own view. Finally, I defend my account of civilian liability against Adil Haque’s critique.

  • 5.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defensive killing2014Book (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    If You'll Be My Bodyguard: Agreements to Save and the Duty to Minimize Harm2019In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 129, no 2, p. 204-229Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article explores how agreements to preferentially save can ground an exception to the duty to minimize harm when saving. A rescuer preferentially saves if she knowingly fails to minimize harm among prospective victims, even though minimizing harm would not have imposed greater costs on the rescuer herself. Allowing rescuers to act on agreements to preferentially save is justified by the reasons we have to respect the agreements that agents form as a means of pursuing their own ends.

  • 7.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    II—Claim Rights, Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications2015In: Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0309-7013, E-ISSN 1467-8349, Vol. 89, no 1, p. 267-285Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the relationship between a person's claim right not to be harmed and the duties this claim confers on others. I argue that we should reject Jonathan Quong's evidence-based account of this relationship, which holds that an agent A's possession of a claim against B is partly determined by whether it would be reasonable for A to demand B's compliance with a correlative duty. When B's evidence is that demanding compliance would not be reasonable, A cannot have a claim against B. I suggest that some of the putatively problematic cases that Quong identifies can be resolved by plausibly narrowing the scope of the right not to be harmed. I also argue that Quong's view leads to implausible conclusions, and that his account of what happens to A's claim in the face of lesser-evil justifications is inconsistent with his broader view. I then defend the view that agents are required, and not merely permitted, to act on lesser-evil justifications. I further argue that A may not defend herself against the infliction of harms that are justified on lesser-evil grounds. However, she may defend herself in cases where B is only evidentially, and not objectively, justified in harming her.

  • 8.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jeff McMahan, Killing In War, New York: Oxford University Press, 20092013In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Killing in War is based upon McMahan’s 2007 Uehiro Lectures, but draws on the substantial body of work on the ethics of war that McMahan has produced over the last decade or so. In this sense, it was a classic before it was written, representing as it does the most sustained, persuasive, and influential attack to date on the ‘ortho-dox’ Walzerian view of just war. It is, undoubtedly, compulsory reading for anyone working in this field, and consolidates McMahan’s position as the most important just war theorist of the last forty years.

  • 9.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention2014In: The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention / [ed] Don E. Scheid, Cambridge University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming: Why We're Required to Turn the Trolley2018In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 68, no 272, p. 460-480Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for the sake of others. Cases in which we have lesser-evil justifications of harming for the sake of others are rescue cases. Ordinarily, an agent is under a duty to rescue unless doing so imposes too great a cost on her, or violates someone else's rights. When neither of these defeating conditions obtain, one is required to rescue even if this involves causing harm to innocent people.

  • 11.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Combatant Liability in War2014In: How We Fight: Ethics in War / [ed] H Frowe and G Lang, Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad VimIn: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad Vim: A Response to Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun2016In: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 117-129Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction2016 (ed. 2)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? The Ethics of War and Peace is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time.

  • 15.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Just War Framework2018In: Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War / [ed] Seth Lazar, Helen Frowe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Role of Necessity in Liability to Defensive Harm2016In: The Ethics of Self-Defence / [ed] Christian Coons, Michel Weber, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 152-170Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War and Intervention2014In: Issues in Political Theory / [ed] Catriona McKinnon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War in Political Philosophy2017In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.

  • 19.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lang, Gerald
    How we fight: ethics in war2014Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lazar, Seth
    The Ethics of War2018In: The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War / [ed] Seth Lazar, Helen Frowe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 21. Lazar, Seth
    et al.
    Frowe, HelenStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War2015Collection (editor) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the site FAQs.

  • 22. Lazar, Seth
    et al.
    Frowe, HelenStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War2018Collection (editor) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest - among philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts - in the ethics of war. This resurgence of interest has multiple causes: escalating and persistent conflicts around the globe over the last 20 years, the growth of new forms of unconventional and asymmetrical warfare, and the appearance of new issues like targeted killings and drone strikes. Much of the most innovative theoretical and applied research over this time has radically called into question traditional modes of just war theory. This Oxford Handbook offers a guide to thinking through the ethics of war. It has two aims: to present chapters that introduce the reader to a broad range of the central topics in just war theory, and to make significant advances in each of those debates. The first section focuses on methodology, and the second section on historical just war theory in the Western tradition. The remaining sections align with the traditional categories of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum - Resort, Conduct, and Aftermath.

1 - 22 of 22
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