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  • 1.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Your Loss Is My Gain: a Recruitment Experiment With Framed Incentives2014Report (Other academic)
  • 2.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment with Framed Incentives2018In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 16, no 2, p. 522-559Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As predicted by loss aversion, numerous studies find that penalties elicit greater effort than bonuses, even when the underlying payoffs are identical. However, loss aversion also predicts that workers will demand higher wages to accept penalty contracts. In six experiments I recruited workers online under framed incentive contracts to test the second prediction. None find evidence for the predicted distaste for penalty contracts. In four experiments penalty framing actually increased the job offer acceptance rate relative to bonus framing. I rule out a number of explanations, most notably self-commitment motives do not seem to explain the finding. Two experiments that manipulate salience are successful at eliminating the effect, but do not significantly reverse it. Overall, loss aversion seems to play surprisingly little role in this setting. The results also highlight the importance of behavioral biases for infrequent, binding decisions such as contract take-up. (JEL: D03, J41, D86)

  • 3.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CESifo, Germany.
    Fallucchi, Francesco
    Kölle, Felix
    Nosenzo, Daniele
    Quercia, Simone
    Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?2017In: Journal of the Economic Science Association, ISSN 2199-6784, Vol. 3, no 2, p. 174-182Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts.

  • 4.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fetzer, Thiemo
    Ghatak, Maitreesh
    Commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit2018In: Journal of Development Economics, ISSN 0304-3878, E-ISSN 1872-6089, Vol. 134, p. 209-225Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit, and rise in individual liability lending. But empirical evidence is lacking, and there have been no rigorous analyses of possible causes. We first show using the well-known MIX Market dataset that there is evidence for a decline. Second, we show theoretically that commercialization-an increase in competition and a shift from non-profit to for-profit lending (both of which are present in the data)-drives lenders to reduce their use of joint liability loan contracts. Third, we test the model's key predictions, and find support for them in the data.

  • 5.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fetzer, Thiemo
    Ghatak, Maitreesh
    Group lending without joint liability2016In: Journal of Development Economics, ISSN 0304-3878, E-ISSN 1872-6089, Vol. 121, p. 217-236Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. We are motivated by an apparent shift away from the use of joint liability by microfinance institutions, combined with recent evidence that a) converting joint liability groups to individual-liability groups did not affect repayment rates, and b) an intervention that increased social capital in individual liability borrowing groups led to improved repayment performance. First, we show that individual lending with or without groups may constitute a welfare improvement over joint liability, so long as borrowers have sufficient social capital to sustain mutual insurance. Second, we explore how the lender's lower transaction costs in group lending can encourage insurance by reducing the amount borrowers have to pay to bail one another out. Third, we discuss how group meetings might encourage insurance, either by increasing the incentive to invest in social capital, or because the time spent in meetings can facilitate setting up insurance arrangements. Finally, we perform a simple simulation exercise, evaluating quantitatively the welfare impacts of alternative forms of lending and how they relate to social capital.

  • 6.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fetzer, Thiemo
    Ghatak, Maitreesh
    Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance2018In: Economic Journal, ISSN 0013-0133, E-ISSN 1468-0297, Vol. 128, no 610, p. 1019-1046Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, and calls for regulation of the sector, we analyse borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analysed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible enforcement externalities competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending.

  • 7.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ghatak, Maitreesh
    Is the credit worth it? For-profit lenders in microfinance with rational and behavioral borrowers2018In: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, ISSN 1370-4788, E-ISSN 1467-8292, Vol. 89, no 1, p. 175-199Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The bulk of the literature on microcredit has focused on either not-for-profit lenders or assumes a perfectly competitive, zero-profit market equilibrium.Yet the market has experienced a significant shift toward for-profit lending and the as-sumptions of perfect competition are likely to be too strong in many locations. We reviewthe state of the literature on for-profit lending in microcredit, consider its implicationsfor both conventionally ‘rational’ borrowers and for borrowers with behavioral biases,and point out directions for future research.

  • 8.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Haushofer, Johannes
    Depression through the Lens of Economics: A Research Agenda2018In: The Economics of Poverty Traps / [ed] Christopher B. Barrett, Michael R. Carter, Jean-Paul Chavas, University of Chicago Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Major depressive disorder (MDD) is one of the most prevalent mental illnesses worldwide. Existing evidence suggests that it has both economic causes and consequences, such as unemployment. However, depression has not received significant attention in the economics literature, and existing work is almost entirely empirical. We see great potential for traditional, theoretical economic analysis to both develop new insights about depression, and to form new connections to other areas of economics. In this paper, we begin with an overview of the canonical symptoms of depression, identifying a set of key facts that lend themselves well to economic analysis. We illustrate these facts with descriptive analysis of data from Indonesia. We then discuss what we see as fruitful avenues for new theoretical work, building on those facts.

  • 9.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CESifo, Germany.
    Haushofer, Johannes
    Roth, Christopher
    Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand2018In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 108, no 11, p. 3266-3302Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We propose a technique for assessing robustness to demand effects of findings from experiments and surveys. The core idea is that by deliberately inducing demand in a structured way we can bound its influence. We present a model in which participants respond to their beliefs about the researcher's objectives. Bounds are obtained by manipulating those beliefs with "demand treatments." We apply the method to 11 classic tasks, and estimate bounds averaging 0.13 standard deviations, suggesting that typical demand effects are probably modest. We also show how to compute demand-robust treatment effects and how to structurally estimate the model.

1 - 9 of 9
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