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  • 1.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Am I a Series?2009In: TheoriaArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Being and Betterness2010In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 285-302Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I discuss the question of whether a person's existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person's existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts

  • 3.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constituted Simples?2009In: PhilosophiaArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time2009In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 247-256Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare — intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.

  • 5.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Francescotti on Fission2009In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 90, no 4, p. 476-481Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non-branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.

  • 6.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kaufman's Response to Lucretius2008In: Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Parfit on Fission2009In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 150, no 1, p. 21-35Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about “fission.” One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper I shall provide a critique that does not rely on either of these contentions. There are other, interrelated reasons to reject Parfit’s defense of the two theses. In particular, the availability of the following view creates trouble for Parfit: I determinately survive fission, but it is indeterminate which fission product I am.

  • 8.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av D. Munter & K. Löfgren, 8 filosofiska texter2008In: Filosofisk tidskriftArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of L. R. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life2009In: Philosophical QuarterlyArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Roache's Argument against the Cohabitation View2011In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 309-310Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Rebecca Roache's recent critique of David Lewis's cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.

  • 11.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Time of Death's Badness2011In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Timing Problem2011In: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death, Oxford University Press , 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
1 - 12 of 12
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