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  • 1.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Jesus College, Oxford, UK.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, Oxford, UK.
    Expressivism and Moral Certitude2009In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 59, no 235, p. 202-215Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucialstructural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting forsubjects’ certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge haveindependently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection.We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view whichincorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith’s challenge, it isunlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed.

  • 2.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder2017In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, no 4, p. 794-799Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.

  • 3.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Om moraliska övertygelsers styrka och emotivismens svaghet2010In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 4Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4. Danielsson, Sven
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, Oxford, UK.
    Brentano and the Buck-Passers2007In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 116, no 463, p. 511-522Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buck-passing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski.

  • 5. Hirose, Iwao
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Introduction to Value Theory2015In: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Jonas Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 1-9Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 6. Hirose, Iwao
    et al.
    Olson, JonasStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory2015Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good (even if this is not the only thing we ought to do). This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.

    The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently.

  • 7. Johansson, Jens
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against pluralism in metaethics2015In: The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods / [ed] Christopher Daly, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 593-609Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Disagreement in ethics abounds. This has led some philosophers to argue that there is an irreducible plurality of moral values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., and that there is no universally valid way of balancing them. This kind of moral pluralism in combination with the absence of determinate rankings of values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., has been thought by some to imply that some cases of disagreement in ethics are rationally irresolvable, which in its turn, explains why disagreement in ethics abounds and remains pervasive.

  • 8.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Adam Smith av Bo Sandelin2011In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 51-57Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought, red. Sven Eliaeson, Patricia Mindus och Stephen P. Turner2016In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brentano's Metaethics2017In: The Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School / [ed] Uriah Kriegel, New York: Routledge, 2017, p. 187-195Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Buck-Passing Accounts2013In: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] LaFollette, Hugh, Blackwell Publishing, 2013, p. 625-636Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Doubts about Intrinsic Value2015In: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Jonas Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 44-59Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 13.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Error theory and reasons for belief2011In: Reasons for belief / [ed] Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 75-93Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Error Theory in Metaethics2017In: The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics / [ed] Tristram McPherson, David Plunkett, New York: Routledge, 2017, p. 58-71Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge2009In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 12, no 4, p. 365-378Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable isfor that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object ofcertain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if anobject is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FAanalyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to befavoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour.All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge: there arecircumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due tothe personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing onthe value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to thepartiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and considerEwing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirelysatisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing couldhave offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer.

  • 16.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Förnuft och känsla: Rationalism, sentimentalism och Humes metaetik2011In: Förnuft, känsla och moral: Perspektiv på David Hume / [ed] Robert Callergård, Stockholm: Thales, 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK.
    G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons2006In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 84, no 4, p. 525-534Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.

  • 18.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism2011In: Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6 / [ed] Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 181-204Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (ed.)2013In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 91, no 4, p. 821-824Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence Of Moral Error Theory2010In: New Waves in Metaethics / [ed] Michael Brady, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 62-84Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence of Moral Error Theory2009Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Mark Schroeder. Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 12015In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Metaethics2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 3219-3235Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Moral philosophers often ask whether abortion is morally permissible, whether the suffering of nonhuman animals is on a par morally with human suffering, and whether an action is morally right if and only if it maximizes happiness. Political philosophers often ask whether persons have inviolable rights to their bodies and whether distributive inequality that benefits the worst off is morally acceptable. These are all examples of first-order moral questions. But such questions are not the business of moral and political philosophers only. First-order moral questions pervade everyday thinking and acting: Is it wrong to eat meat? Ought one to donate more to charities? Is there reason to vote in elections?

  • 24.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Moral error theory: history, critique, defence2014Book (Refereed)
  • 25.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory: Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen2016In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 461-473Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

  • 26.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics2011In: Hume after 300 Years: Conference Programme and Abstracts, 2011Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics2011In: Hume Studies, ISSN 0319-7336, E-ISSN 1947-9921, Vol. 37, no 1, p. 19-42Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics, that is, his account of vulgar moral thought and discourse, and his revisionary metaethics, that is, his account of how vulgar moral thought and discourse could be reformed so as to no longer involve error. This essay concludes that Hume is a projectivist and an error theorist in descriptive metaethics, while he is a projectivist and a subjectivist in revisionary metaethics.

  • 28.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence2016In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 397-402Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This precis is a brief summary of the book's content.

  • 29.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism: Reviewing Price's Review2014In: Philosophical Papers, ISSN 0556-8641, E-ISSN 1996-8523, Vol. 43, no 3, p. 429-445Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper revisits Richard Price’s Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (1757/1787). Price was a defender of rationalism about ethics and he anticipated many views and arguments that became influential as the metaethical and ethical debates evolved over the later centuries. The paper explores and assesses Price’s arguments in favour of rationalism and against sentimentalism, with a view to how they bear on the modern metaethical debate.

  • 30.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism2009In: Spheres of Reason / [ed] Simon Robertson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 164-182Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay focuses on two recent trends in metaethics. One is the revival of non-naturalistic realism, or just non-naturalism for short. The other is the preoccupation with reasons. The two trends are not unconnected. The renewal of interest in non-naturalism seems to have gained fuel from the preoccupation with reasons. The essay distinguishes between old and new non-naturalism. Old non-naturalism places intrinsic goodness at the normative centre stage; new non-naturalism places the notion of a reason at the normative centre stage. There is a presentiment about, that new non-naturalism’s shift of focus from intrinsic goodness to reasons promises to make non-naturalism a more credible and viable metaethical position. This line of thinking involves a fallacy I propose to call the extensional fallacy. Unmasking the extensional fallacy reveals that the notion of a reason is no less problematic than the notion of intrinsic goodness, and that the supervenience of the normative on the natural is no less problematic for new non-naturalism than for old non-naturalism. Another currently popular view is this: On old non-naturalism goodness is reason-providing. But since it is intuitively incredible that goodness is reason-providing, old non-naturalism must be rejected in favour of new non-naturalism. The idea that goodness is not reason-providing is intuitively compelling and I argue that old non-naturalism is perfectly consistent with this idea; the contrary view is based on dubious readings of Moore.

  • 31.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av Stefan Björklund, En anständig indvidualism: Adam Smith flankerad av Francis Hutcheson och David Hume2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 4, p. 54-57Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 32.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, University of Oxford, UK.
    Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life2006In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 33.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of Richard Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism2018In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, ISSN 2210-5697, Vol. 8, no 1, p. 66-71Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 34.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Skorupski's Middle Way in Metaethics2012In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 85, no 1, p. 192-200Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 35.
    Olson, Jonas
    University of Oxford, UK.
    The Ethics of Care and Empathy, By M. Slote2009In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 69, no 1, p. 190-192Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It2009In: Logic, Ethics, and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2009, p. 203-214Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and non-philosophers. It leaves for expressivists two awkward explanatory tasks. Number one is that of explaining why natural selection—which, by expressivism’s own lights, favoured moral thought and talk because of their socially useful regulative and coordinating functions—did not favour a stance that would make moral thought and talk more effective in fulfilling these functions. Number two is that of explaining how moral thought and talk survive in cultural evolution, despite the prevalence of the freshman objection and related worries. I conclude that expressivism as a theory of actual moral discourse rather than a revisionist theory is either false or committed to an implausible error theory, according to which ordinary speakers are systematically mistaken about what they are up to when they make moral judgements.

  • 37.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It2010In: Ratio (Oxford. Print), ISSN 0034-0006, E-ISSN 1467-9329, Vol. 23, no 1, p. 87-101Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and non-philosophers. It leaves for expressivists two awkward explanatory tasks. Number one is that of explaining why natural selection – which, by expressivism's own lights, favoured moral thought and talk because of their socially useful regulative and coordinating functions – did not favour a stance that would make moral thought and talk more effective in fulfilling these functions. Number two is that of explaining how moral thought and talk survive in cultural evolution, despite the prevalence of the freshman objection and related worries. I conclude that expressivism as a theory of actual moral discourse rather than a revisionist theory is either false or committed to an implausible error theory, according to which ordinary speakers are systematically mistaken about what they are up to when they make moral judgements.

  • 38.
    Olson, Jonas
    Brasenose College, Oxford, UK.
    The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value2006In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 115, no 4, p. 540-542Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 39.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Personal and the Fitting2014In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 341-52Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen's Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). In this book, Ronnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value an instance of the notion of good for a person in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: (i) Rennow-Rasmussen's discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; (ii) his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of 'for someone's sake (FSS) attitudes'; and (iii) his critique of the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.

  • 40.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem2009In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 21, p. 225-232Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The so called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant solution proposals to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang’s solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.

  • 41.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thick Concepts, Simon Kirchin (ed.)2013In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 42.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, edited by David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little (Oxford: OUP, 2013)2014In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 64, no 257, p. 672-675Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 43.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Thomas Hurka, British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing2016In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 28, no 2, p. 234-237Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 44.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano's and Reid's2017In: The Monist, ISSN 0026-9662, E-ISSN 2153-3601, Vol. 100, no 1, p. 106-119Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgement. However, their respective versions of inuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethics and some of its unorthodox features. These features tie in with notorious difficulties for moral realism concerning the nature of moral truth and the relation between moral judgement and motivation to act. 

  • 45.
    Olson, Jonas
    University of Oxford, UK.
    Welfare and Rational Care, by Stephen Darwall2006In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 171-177Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Olson, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude2012In: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, ISSN 1559-3061, E-ISSN 1559-3061, Vol. 6, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 47.
    Olson, Jonas
    et al.
    Oxford University, UK.
    Svensson, Frans
    Regimenting Reasons2005In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 71, no 3, p. 203-214Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Belief-Desire model (the B-D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It is necessary to go beyond common philosophical practice and distinguish not merely between two such different uses but to make a tripartite distinction. Our aim is largely conciliatory: we grant the main parts of the points made by Stoutland and Dancy but argue that once the B-D model has been properly stated, and different uses of the term ‘reason’ sufficiently regimented, the B-D proponent is able to accommodate their respective criticisms within the framework of the B-D model and thereby undermine their case against the model.

  • 48.
    Olson, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Timmons, Mark
    A. C. Ewing's first and second thoughts on metaethics2011In: Underivative duty: British moral philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing / [ed] Thomas Hurka, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 183-211Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 49.
    Olson, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Timmons, Mark
    University of Arizona.
    Ewing, A. C.2013In: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] LaFollette, Hugh, Blackwell Publishing, 2013, p. 1817-1823Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A. C. Ewing (1899–1973) came last in the tradition of British moral philosophers that began with Henry Sidgwick and continued with H. A. Prichard, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and C. D. Broad. Philosophers in this tradition shared a nonnaturalist realist view of moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, but they differed on the relations between normative concepts and on normative ethics. Ewing made substantial contributions to these controversies and anticipated several moves in the contemporary debates as he sought to reconcile putatively incompatible views. Attempts to find conciliatory “middle ways” are a recurring theme in Ewing's work. This essay focuses on three main topics: moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, the relation between intrinsic goodness and ought, and utilitarianism and Rossian deontology. Finally, it describes briefly Ewing's work in other areas of moral philosophy.

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