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  • 1. Bjorvatn, Kjetil
    et al.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CEPR, UK .
    Are not-for-profits different? Theory and evidence on the pricing of health services in Uganda2016In: Economics of Governance, ISSN 1435-6104, E-ISSN 1435-8131, Vol. 17, no 1, p. 1-10Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Public provision of health and education in developing countries is often insufficient and inefficient. There is thus a call for a greater involvement of private providers to supply affordable and high-quality services to the population. In particular, it is often suggested that not-for-profit institutions should play a larger role, given their social mission. But do not-for-profits really behave differently from for-profit institutions? The literature does not provide a clear answer to this question. The present contribution offers evidence based on a simple theoretical model and price data from health care providers in Uganda with different governance structures. Using differences in market structure as source of variation, we find that not-for-profits indeed behave differently from for-profit institutions, with a pricing behavior that is consistent with an emphasis on health impact and not just profit maximization. Our results thus provide an argument for a policy trying to attract not-for-profit health clinics to fill the gap of an inefficient public health provision.

  • 2.
    Björkman, Martina
    et al.
    Bocconi University.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    When is Community-Based Monitoring Effective?: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Primary Health in Uganda2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3. Björkman Nyqvist, Martina
    et al.
    Corno, Lucia
    de Walque, Damien
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Incentivizing Safer Sexual Behavior: Evidence from a Lottery Experiment on HIV Prevention2018In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, ISSN 1945-7782, E-ISSN 1945-7790, Vol. 10, no 3, p. 287-314Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate the effect of a financial lottery program in Lesotho with relatively low expected payments but a chance to win a high prize conditional on negative test results for sexually transmitted infections. The intervention resulted in a 21.4 percent reduction in HIV incidence over two years. Lottery incentives appear to be particularly effective in targeting individuals with ex ante risky sexual behavior, consistent with the hypothesis that lotteries are more valued by individuals willing to take risks.

  • 4. Björkman Nyqvist, Martina
    et al.
    Corno, Lucia
    de Walque, Damien
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Using lotteries to incentivize safer sex behavior: evidence from a randomized controlled trial on HIV prevention2015Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Financial incentives are a promising HIV prevention strategy. This paper assesses the effect on HIV incidence of a lottery program in Lesotho with low expected payments but a chance to win a high prize conditional on negative test results for sexually transmitted infections. The intervention resulted in a 21.4 percent reduction in HIV incidence over two years. Lottery incentives appear to be particularly effective for individuals willing to take risks. This paper estimates a model linking sexual behavior to HIV incidence and finds that risk-loving individuals reduce the number of unprotected sexual acts by 0.3/month for every $1 increase in the expected prize.

  • 5. Björkman Nyqvist, Martina
    et al.
    de Walque, Damien
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Experimental Evidence on the Long-Run Impact of Community-Based Monitoring2017In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, ISSN 1945-7782, E-ISSN 1945-7790, Vol. 9, no 1, p. 33-69Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We evaluate the longer run impact of a local accountability intervention in primary health care provision in Uganda. Short-run improvements in health care delivery and health outcomes remained in the longer run despite minimal follow-up. We find no impact on the quality of care or health. outcomes of a lower cost intervention that focused on encouraging participation but did not provide information on staff performance. We provide suggestive evidence that informed beneficiaries are more likely to identify and challenge (mis)behavior by providers and, as a result, turn their focus to issues that they can manage locally.

  • 6. Björkman Nyqvist, Martina
    et al.
    Guariso, Andrea
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CEPR, England.
    Yanagizawa-Drott, David
    Reducing Child Mortality in the Last Mile: Experimental Evidence on Community Health Promoters in Uganda2019In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, ISSN 1945-7782, E-ISSN 1945-7790, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 155-192Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The delivery of basic health products and services remains abysmal in many parts of the world where child mortality is high. This paper shows the results from a large-scale randomized evaluation of a novel approach to health care delivery In randomly selected villages, a sales agent was locally recruited and incentivized to conduct home visits, educate households on essential health behaviors, provide medical advice and referrals, and sell preventive and curative health products. Results after 3 years show substantial health impact: under 5-years child mortality was reduced by 27 percent at an estimated average cost of $68 per life-year saved.

  • 7.
    Bold, Tessa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Filmer, Deon
    Martin, Gayle
    Molina, Ezequiel
    Stacy, Brian
    Rockmore, Christophe
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wane, Waly
    Enrollment without Learning: Teacher Effort, Knowledge, and Skill in Primary Schools in Africa2017In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, ISSN 0895-3309, E-ISSN 1944-7965, Vol. 31, no 4, p. 185-204Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    School enrollment has universally increased over the last 25 years in low-income countries. Enrolling in school, however, does not assure that children learn. A large share of children in low-income countries complete their primary education lacking even basic reading, writing, and arithmetic skills. Teacher quality is a key determinant of student learning, but not much is known about teacher quality in low-income countries. This paper discusses an ongoing research program intended to help fill this void. We use data collected through direct observations, unannounced visits, and tests from primary schools in seven sub-Saharan African countries to answer three questions: How much do teachers teach? What do teachers know? How well do teachers teach?

  • 8.
    Bold, Tessa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Kaizzi, Kayuki C.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Yanagizawa-Drott, David
    LEMON TECHNOLOGIES AND ADOPTION: MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND EVIDENCE FROM AGRICULTURAL MARKETS IN UGANDA2017In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 132, no 3, p. 1055-1100Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    To reduce poverty and food insecurity in Africa requires raising productivity in agriculture. Systematic use of fertilizer and hybrid seed is a pathway to increased productivity, but adoption of these technologies remains low. We investigate whether the quality of agricultural inputs can help explain low take-up. Testing modern products purchased in local markets, we find that 30% of nutrient is missing in fertilizer, and hybrid maize seed is estimated to contain less than 50% authentic seeds. We document that such low quality results in low average returns. If authentic technologies replaced these low-quality products, however, average returns are high. To rationalize the findings, we calibrate a learning model using data from our agricultural trials. Because agricultural yields are noisy, farmers' ability to learn about quality is limited and this can help explain the low quality equilibrium we observe, but also why the market has not fully collapsed.

  • 9.
    Bold, Tessa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Kaizzi, Kayuki
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Yanagizawa-Drott, David
    Low quality, low returns, low adoption: evidence from the market for fertilizer and hybrid seed in Uganda2015Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    To reduce poverty and food insecurity in Africa requires raising productivity in agriculture. Systematic use of fertilizer and hybrid seed is a pathway to increased productivity, but adoption of these technologies remains low. We investigate whether the quality of agricultural inputs can help explain low take-up. Testing modern products purchased in local markets, we find that 30% of nutrient is missing in fertilizer, and hybrid maize seed contains less than 50% authentic seeds. We document that such low quality results in negative average returns. If authentic technologies replaced these low-quality products, average returns for smallholder farmers would be over 50%.

  • 10.
    Bold, Tessa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. Goethe University Frankfurt.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Policies and Institutions for Effective Service Delivery: The Need of a Microeconomic and Micropolitical Approach2013In: Journal of African Economies, ISSN 0963-8024, E-ISSN 1464-3723, Vol. 22, p. ii16-ii38Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The recent political economy literature on institutions for growth views low and ineffective spending on service delivery sectors as a symptom of the underlying institutional environment. But if institutions are the outcome of decisions by policymakers and serve the purpose of benefitting some at the cost of the majority, what can be done to facilitate empowerment and thus the development of inclusive political institutions? In this paper, we argue that a microeconomic approach that explicitly takes political and bureaucratic incentives and constraints into account provides a fruitful, and complementary, way forward. We discuss several promising lines of research.

  • 11.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    2015 års Ekonomipris till Angus Deaton2015In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 8, p. 6-16Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 12. Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The power of information in public services: Evidence from education in Uganda2011In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 95, no 7-8, p. 956-966Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we argue that innovations in governance of social services are an effective way to improve outcomes such as attainment of universal primary education. To test this hypothesis we exploit an unusual policy experiment: a newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing the capture of public funds by providing schools (parents) with systematic information to monitor local officials' handling of a large education grant program. Combining survey and administrative data, we show that public access to information can be a powerful deterrent to the capture of funds at the local level and that the reduction in the capture of funds that resulted had a positive effect on school enrollment and learning outcomes.

  • 13. Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    WORKING FOR GOD?: EVIDENCE FROM A CHANGE IN FINANCING OF NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN UGANDA2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 6, p. 1159-1178Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What motivates religious nonprofit health care providers? This paper uses a change in financing of nonprofit health care providers in Uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that financial aid leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These findings are consistent with the view that religious nonprofit providers are intrinsically motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively. (JEL: L31, I11, O15)

  • 14.
    Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    World Bank.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Working for God?: Evidence from a Change in Financing of Not-for-Profit Health Care Providers in Uganda2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    What motivates religious not-for-profit health care providers? This paper uses a change in financing of not-for-profit health care providers in Uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that financial aid leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These findings are consistent with the view that religious not-for-profit providers are intrinsically motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively.

  • 15.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Absorption Capacity and Disbursement Constraints2008In: Reinventing Foreign Aid, The MIT Press , 2008Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Collusion Among Interest Groups: Foreign Aid and Rent-Dissipation1996Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a game-theoretic model of public policy in a developing country in order to explain a number of empirical regularities. It is shown that under certain circumstances, an increase in government revenue will be completely crowded out by increased rent dissipation, leaving the provision of public goods unaltered. In this model, there are two possible ways in which foreign aid may affect the outcome. First, as foreign aid to a large extent can be seen as general budget support, the paper provides an explanation for why increased disbursements do not necessarily lead to higher provision of public goods. Second, the mere fact that the donor is expected to allocate aid according to the recepients' future needs may increase rent dissipation and reduce the number of periods in which efficient policies can be sustained.

  • 17.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Foreign-Aid and Rent Seeking2008In: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice, Springer, Heidelberg , 2008Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability: Theory and Evidence1994Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Why do investment rates differ so markedly across countries in the developing world? This paper tries to explain these differences by studying a political model of institutional reform. The model implies that countries with more unstable and polarized political systems will have more inefficient legal systems, resulting in poorly enforced property rights and, thus, lower levels of domestic investment and higher levels of nonmarketable production and capital flight. These predictions of the model hold up when confronted with cross-country data for 101 countries. Extensive sensitivity analysis shows that the empirical results are robust to an ample of prospective statistical problems.

  • 19.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Local Accountability Improves Health Services2010In: Institutional Microeconomics of Development / [ed] Tim Besley and Rajshri Jayaraman, Mass.: MIT Press , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The institutional economics of foreign aid2006In: Swedish Economic Policy Review, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 115-37Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible?: Aid Dependence and Conditionality1995Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In spite a vast amount of both theoretical and empirical work on foreign assistance and development, little is known about the incentive effects of aid. In fact, recent surveys of aid only briefly mention the possibility of moral hazard situations in the recipient-donor relation, but conclude that conditionality is a way to deal with the problem. However, in this paper we show that an aid contract, as proposed in the literature, is not time-consistent. This may be one explanation for the poor results of the vast amount of foreign aid dispursed to the developing world. Moreover, we show that tied aid, or delegation to a donor agency with less aversion to poverty may improve the equilibrium for all parties in the discretionary environment. Finally, we provide some evidence supporting the basic idea of the paper, namely that aid induces weak fiscal discipline and that increased difficulties lead to higher inflow of aid.

  • 22.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much?: Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper uses a unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features: not all firms report that they need to pay bribes and there is considerable variation in reported graft across firms facing similar institutions/policies. To explain these patterns we develop a simple bargaining model. Consistent with the model, we find that the incidence of corruption can be explained by the variation in policies/regulations across industries. How much must bribe-paying firms pay? Combining the quantitative data on corruption with detailed financial information from the surveyed firms, we show that firms' "ability to pay" and firms' "refusal power" can explain a large part of the variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms. These results suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, and that prices of public services are partly determined in order to extract bribes.

  • 23.
    Svensson, Jakob
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Björkman, Martina
    Bocconi University.
    Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-Based Monitoring Project in Uganda2009In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 124, no 2, p. 735-769Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring of public primary health care providers in Uganda. Through two rounds of village meetings, localized nongovernmental organizations encouraged communities to be more involved with the state of health service provision and strengthened their capacity to hold their local health providers to account for performance. A year after the intervention, treatment communities are more involved in monitoring the provider, and the health workers appear to exert higher effort to serve the community. We document large increases in utilization and improved health outcomes—reduced child mortality and increased child weight—that compare favorably to some of the more successful community-based intervention trials reported in the medical literature.                 

  • 24.
    Svensson, Jakob
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Björkman-Nyqvist, Martina
    de Walque, Damien
    Information is Power: Experimental Evidence in the Long-Run Impact of Community Based Monitoring2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents the results of two field experiments on

    local accountability in primary health care in Uganda. Efforts

    to stimulate beneficiary control, coupled with the provision

    of report cards on staff performance, resulted in significant

    improvements in health care delivery and health outcomes

    in both the short and the longer run. Efforts to stimulate

    beneficiary control without providing information on

    performance had no impact on quality of care or health outcomes.

    The paper shows that informed users are more likely

    to identify and challenge (mis)behavior by providers and as a

    result turn their focus to issues that they can manage locally.

  • 25.
    Svensson, Jakob
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fisman, Raymon
    Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence2007In: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 83, no 1, p. 63-75Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth. Using industry-location averages to circumvent potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that of taxation. This provides some validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than taxation.

  • 26.
    Svensson, Jakob
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Hamilton, Alexander
    The Vicious Circle of Poverty, Poor Public Service Provision, and State Legitimacy: A View from the Ground in Sudan2014Report (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Yanagizawa, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Getting Prices Right: The Impact of the Market Information System in Uganda2009In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3, p. 434-445Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Market Information Service project in Uganda collected data on prices for the main agricultural commodities in major market centers and disseminated the information through local FMradio stations in various districts. Exploiting the variation across space between households with and without access to a radio, we find evidence suggesting that better-informed farmers managed to bargain for higher farm-gate prices on their surplus production.

1 - 27 of 27
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