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  • 1.
    Besley, Timothy J.
    et al.
    London School of Economics and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.
    Burchardi, Konrad B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ghatak, Maitreesh
    London School of Economics.
    Incentives and the De Soto Effect2012In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 127, no 1, p. 237-282Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the consequences of improving property rights to facilitate the use of fixed assets as collateral, popularly attributed to the influential policy advocate Hernando de Soto. We use an equilibrium model of a credit market with moral hazardto characterize the theoretical effects and also develop a quantitative analysis using data from Sri Lanka. We show that the effects are likely to be nonlinear and heterogeneous by wealth group. They also depend on the extent of competition between lenders. There can be significant increases in profits and reductions in interest rates when credit markets are competitive. However, since these are due to reductions in moral hazard, that is, increased effort, the welfare gains tend to be modest when cost of effort is taken into account. Allowing for an extensive margin where borrowers gain access to the credit market can make these effects larger depending on the underlying wealth distribution.

  • 2.
    Burchardi, Konrad B.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development (BREAD), UK; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), UK.
    Chaney, Thomas
    Hassan, Tarek A.
    Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments2019In: The Review of Economic Studies, ISSN 0034-6527, E-ISSN 1467-937X, Vol. 86, no 4, p. 1448-1486Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We use 130 years of data on historical migrations to the U.S. to show a causal effect of the ancestry composition of U.S. counties on foreign direct investment (FDI) sent and received by local firms. To isolate the causal effect of ancestry on FDI, we build a simple reduced-form model of migrations: Migrations from a foreign country to a U.S. county at a given time depend on (1) a push factor, causing emigration from that foreign country to the entire U.S., and (2) a pull factor, causing immigration from all origins into that U.S. county. The interaction between time-series variation in origin-specific push factors and destination-specific pull factors generates quasi-random variation in the allocation of migrants across U.S. counties. We find that doubling the number of residents with ancestry from a given foreign country relative to the mean increases the probability that at least one local firm engages in FDI with that country by 4 percentage points. We present evidence that this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in information frictions, and not by better contract enforcement, taste similarities, or a convergence in factor endowments.

  • 3.
    Burchardi, Konrad B.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. The Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development, UK; Centre for Economic Policy Research, UK.
    Gulesci, Selim
    Lerva, Benedetta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sulaiman, Munshi
    Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts2019In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 134, no 1, p. 281-347Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output-sharing rules that make farmers less-than-full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agricultural productivity. We report results from a field experiment designed to estimate and understand the effects of sharecropping contracts on agricultural input choices, risk-taking, and output. The experiment induced variation in the terms of sharecropping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord, tenants were randomized into three groups: (i) some kept 50% of their output; (ii) others kept 75%; (iii) others kept 50% of output and received a lump-sum payment at the end of their contract, either fixed or stochastic. We find that tenants with higher output shares used more inputs, cultivated riskier crops, and produced 60% more output relative to control. Income or risk exposure have at most a small effect on farm output; the increase in output should be interpreted as an incentive effect of the output-sharing rule. JEL Codes: O12, Q12, Q15.

  • 4.
    Burchardi, Konrad B.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Hassan, Tarek A.
    The Economic Impact of Social Ties: Evidence from German Reunification2013In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 128, no 3, p. 1219-1271Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We use the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to show that personal relationships which individuals maintain for noneconomic reasons can be an important determinant of regional economic growth. We show that West German households who had social ties to East Germany in 1989 experienced a persistent rise in their personal incomes after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the presence of these households significantly affects economic performance at the regional level: it increases the returns to entrepreneurial activity, the share of households who become entrepreneurs, and the likelihood that firms based within a given West German region invest in East Germany. As a result, West German regions that (for idiosyncratic reasons) have a high concentration of households with social ties to the East exhibit substantially higher growth in income per capita in the early 1990s. A one standard deviation rise in the share of households with social ties to East Germany in 1989 is associated with a 4.7 percentage point rise in income per capita over six years. We interpret our findings as evidence of a causal link between social ties and regional economic development. JEL Codes: O10, O43, J61, L14, F20.

  • 5.
    Burchardi, Konrad B.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Penczynski, Stefan P.
    Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games2014In: Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN 0899-8256, E-ISSN 1090-2473, Vol. 84, p. 39-57Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one third of the participants play non-strategically. The non-strategic level-0 actions are not uniformly distributed.

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