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  • 1.
    Beckman, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Trade Unions and Popular Representation: Nigeria and South Africa comperad2010In: Rethinking Popular Representation / [ed] O.Törnqvist, K. Strokke, N. Webster, New york and Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillian , 2010Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Rethinking Popular Representation starts out from the deep concern with contemporary tendencies towards depoliticisation of public issues and popular interests. It is argued that the root cause of this is flawed representation, due to both elitist institution building and fragmented citizen participation. Hence the book makes a case for the need to rethink more democratic popular representation. Towards this end the book outlines an overarching analytical framework for popular representation, examines key theoretical issues and empirical experiences of popular representation and provides a policy-oriented conclusion.

  • 2.
    Beckman, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Andrae, G
    Union power and the formal-informal divide2010In: Missing Links in Labour Geography / [ed] A.C Bergene, S.B Endresen and H.M Knutsen, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited , 2010Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Beckman, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Andrae, Gunilla
    Alliances across The formal-informal divide: South African debets and Nigerian experiences2010In: Africa´s informal Workers: Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organization in Urban Africa / [ed] I Lindell, London & New york: Zed Books , 2010Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Beckman, Björn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Sachikonye, L..M
    Introduction2010In: Trade Unions and party Politics: Labour Movements in Africa / [ed] B, Beckman, S. Buhlungu and Sachikonye, Cape Town: HSCR PRESS , 2010Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    2008. Do global climate change and the interest of future generations have implications for democracy?2008In: Environmental Politics, Vol. 17, no 4, p. 610-624Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Barnkoventionen och den svenska grundlagen2001In: Mänskliga rättigheter: aktuella forskningsfrågor / [ed] Göran Gunner, Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2001, p. 17-32Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 7.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Children and the right to vote2018In: The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children / [ed] Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder and Jurgen De Wispelaere, Milton: Routledge, 2018, p. 479-491Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Citizenship and Voting Rights: Should Resident Aliens Vote?2006In: Citizenship Studies, Vol. 10, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Climate Change Duties and the Human Right to Democracy2015In: The Ethics of Climate Governance / [ed] Aaron Maltais and Catriona McKinnon, London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    De 'kunnige' och 'erfarne' statsråden? Demokratin och kravet på politisk kompetens2010In: Regeringsmakten i Sverige: ett experiment i parlamentarism 1917-2009 / [ed] Jörgen Hermansson, Stockholm: SNS , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy2019In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, ISSN 1369-8230, E-ISSN 1743-8772, Vol. 22, no 4, p. 412-431Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and sub-versions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper argues that quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making.

  • 12.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Democracy and future generations. Should the unborn have a voice?2013In: Spheres of Global Justice: Volume 2 Fair Distribution - Global Economic, Social and Intergenerational Justice / [ed] Jean-Christophe Merle, Dordrecht: Springer Publishing Company, 2013, p. 775-788Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article examines the view that the interests of future generations should be taken into consideration in decisions likely to affect them. In particular, it has been argued that the interests of future generations should be represented in local, national or international political decisions. This view is analyzed in terms of justice-seeking and democracy-seeking arguments and the extent to which the representation of future generations will promote the respective values of justice and democracy. In order to promote democracy, such representation must be consistent with the criterion of democratic inclusion. Assuming that democratic inclusion is conceptualized in legal terms, the representation of future generations is consistent with democracy only to the extent that they are likely to be bound by the decisions made today. It is shown here that future generations are not bound by the decisions made today. Thus, it follows that representing the interests of future generations in political decisions is not consistent with securing democracy for the living generation. The intergenerational problem is therefore one where the demands of justice and democracy may conflict.

  • 13.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Democracy and genetic privacy: the value of bodily integrity2005In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 8, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14. Beckman, Ludvig
    Democracy and the Right to Exclusion2014In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 395-411Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A defining feature of democracy is the inclusion of members of the political association. However, the corresponding right to exclusion has attracted undeservedly scant attention in recent debates. In this paper, the nature of the right to exclusion is explored. On the assumption that inclusion requires the allocation of legal power-rights to the people entitled to participate in the making of collective decisions, two conceptions of the right to exclusion are identified: the liberty-right to exclude and the claim-right to exclude. The choice between them depends on the nature of the interests that justifies the power-rights of people included. The position is defended that if rights to democratic participation are power-rights, we must also accept that the people included have claim-rights to the exclusion of non-members.

  • 15.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Democracy, national responsibility and climate change justice2012In: Democratization, ISSN 1351-0347, E-ISSN 1743-890X, Vol. 19, no 5, p. 843-864Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Nations are regularly considered the main bearers of responsibility for climatechange. Accordingly, the differences between nations are crucial inunderstanding how responsibilities should be distributed. In this article, Iexamine the relevance of differences in type of political regime to this end.The claim defended here is that democratic institutions are constitutive ofthe conditions for when members of nations can be held responsible as acollective for the outcomes affecting the climate. The implications of thisaccount are demonstrated, first, in relation to claims of historicalresponsibility and, second, in relation to the burdens assigned to Annex Icountries by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Theanalysis shows why democratic institutions – at present and in the past –are essential in order to conclude that the members of a nation shareresponsibility for the harm caused by the aggregate greenhouse emissions oftheir nation. In connection to this analysis, we also show why responsibilityfor the costs of climate change is also sometimes justly placed onauthoritarian nations.

  • 16.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Democratic Inclusion, Law, and Causes2008In: Ratio Juris, Vol. 21, no 3, p. 348-364Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Democratic legitimacy does not require constitutional referendum: On ‘the constitution’ in theories of constituent power2018In: European Constitutional Law Review, ISSN 1574-0196, E-ISSN 1744-5515, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 567-583Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Democratization and inclusion2011In: Routledge Handbook on Democratization / [ed] Jeffrey Haynes, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 161-174Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Demokrati och kompetenskrav: barn, ungdomar och rätten till politiskt inflytande2003In: Demokrati och lärande: om valfrihet, gemenskap och övervägande i skola och samhälle / [ed] Britta Jonsson, Klas Roth, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2003, p. 75-94Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Demokratins innersta väsen undlfyr forskarna2007In: Axess, no 4Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 21.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Demokratipolitikens metoder: Insatser för ett ökat valdeltagande – en kunskapsöversikt2009Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 22.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Den rimliga integrationen2011Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    I Sverige och i många andra länder talas det om vikten av integration. Det har sagts att integration kan betyda vad som helst. Men vilka är det som behöver integreras och vad kan integration betyda i ett demokratiskt samhälle? Handlar det om att leva tillsammans som jämlikar? En gemensam identitet? Och vem ska integreras med vem? På vilket sätt?Utifrån sin nya bok ”Den rimliga integrationen” försöker Ludvig Beckman hitta svaren som tidigare har tagits för givna men i en tid av ökad migration och mångfald måste omvärderas och diskuteras på nytt. Det behövs en ny förståelse av integration – en rimlig integration.

  • 23.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Folket i demokratin2015In: Demokrati: Historien og Ideene / [ed] Raino Malnes, Dag Einar Thorsen, Oslo: Dreyer Forlag A/S, 2015, p. 33-45Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Fri åsiktsbildning och yttrandefrihet som individuell rättighet2018In: Opinionsfrihet och religion / [ed] Bo Lindberg, Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2018, p. 113-124Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 25.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Genteknik och personlig integritet2007In: Medvetande, genetik och samhälle, Atlantis , 2007Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 26.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Global diffusion and the role of courts in shaping the human right to vote2013In: The Politics of the Globalization of Law / [ed] Alison Brysk, London: Routledge, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Godtagbart i ett demokratiskt samhälle? De hemliga tvångsmedlen och rätten till personlig integritet2006In: Svensk Juristtidning, no 1Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Herbert Tingsten – idékritikens fader2006In: Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, Vol. 108, no 3Article, review/survey (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 29.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Idékritik och statsvetenskapens nytta2006In: Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, Vol. 108, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 30.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Irregular migration and democracy: the case for inclusion2013In: Citizenship Studies, ISSN 1362-1025, E-ISSN 1469-3593, Vol. 17, no 1, p. 48-60Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper examines the democratic status of irregular immigrants from the vantagepoint of different models of democratic inclusion. The argument developed is thatirregular immigrants are in fact members of the democratic state by virtue of beingsubjected to the legally binding norms in the territory of the state. The extension of thevote and other political rights to irregular immigrants nevertheless remains problematicdue to their ‘illegal’ status. Because this status follows from the restrictive borderpolicies implemented by most contemporary states, it shows that the ideal ofdemocratic inclusion is scarcely reconcilable with a policy of restrictive cross-bordermovement. The conclusion defended in the paper is that the interest in keeping bordersrestricted reduces the prospects for democratic inclusion in contemporary states.

  • 31.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Is Residence Special?: Democracy in the Age of Migration and Human Mobility2012In: Territories of Citizenship / [ed] Beckman, L; Erman, E, London: Palgrave , 2012, p. 18-39Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 32.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Is there a Moral Right to Vote?2017In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 20, no 4, p. 885-897Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the justification of a moral right to vote is that it is not clear that the vote is instrumental to the preservation of some critical interest of the voter. Because a single vote has ‘no impact’ on electoral outcomes, the right to vote is unlikely to serve the interests of the individual. The account developed in this paper holds that moral voting rights can be justified once we acknowledge that voting by a sub-set of citizens is among the necessary preconditions for democratic institutions making a significant difference to their collective interests. The justification of a moral right to vote does not, then, apply to each individual citizen but only to a sub-set of them. In order to justify inclusive moral voting rights, the further consideration must be added that individuals have critical interests in public recognition of equal status. An inclusive moral right to vote accordingly depends on both collective interest in the outcomes of democratic institutions and on individual interest in equal recognition.

  • 33.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Jämlikhet2009In: Politisk teori, Stockholm: Liber , 2009, p. 37-53Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 34.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Legal Power and the Right to Vote: Does the Right to Vote Confer Power?2017In: Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, ISSN 0841-8209, E-ISSN 2056-4260, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 5-22Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This paper evaluates this notion on the basis of two conceptions of political power: the causal view, according to which power equals the ability to exert causal effect, and the legal view, according to which power equals the legal ability to produce legal effect. The proposition defended is that causal conceptions of power are unable to account for the view that voting rights confer power to either individuals or collectives. In particular, the theory according to which the powers conferred by the vote equal the probability of being decisive or “pivotal” in elections does not justify the ascription of power to voters. It does not because the probability of being influential is not a valid interpretation of power as the capacity to mobilize sufficient causal effect to determine an outcome. In addition, causal conceptions of power are unable to recognize the people as the unique owner of political power. The powers exercised by the members of the electorate appear to be just one among several causes that contribute to determine electoral outcomes. In the end, the legal analysis of power proves superior. Power in a democracy is placed with the people as a legal category vested with the legal capacity to revise the legal relationship between individuals and the state.

  • 35.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Must democratic rights serve the rights-bearer? The right to vote of people with severe cognitive impairments2014In: The Aporia of Rights: explorations in citizenship in the era of human rights / [ed] Anna Yeatman and Peg Birmingham, London: Continuum, 2014, p. 93-114Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 36.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Personhood and legal status: Reflections on the democratic rights of corporations2018In: Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, ISSN 2213-0713, Vol. 47, no 1, p. 13-28Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 37.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Political equality and the disenfranchisement of people with intellectual impairments2007In: Social Policy and Society, Vol. 6, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 38.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Political Representation of Future Generations and Collective Responsibility2015In: Jurisprudence, ISSN 2040-3313, E-ISSN 2040-3321, Vol. 6, no 3, p. 516-534Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The political representation of future generations would change the relationship between public decisions and the members of democratic political systems. In this paper we examine the implication of these changes on the responsibility of the living members for the future effects of current polices with special reference to climate change. The claim defended is that the collective responsibility of the living members for future outcomes diminishes when public decisions are made less responsive to them. In order to explain why this is the case a ‘participatory account' of collective responsibility is developed according to which collective responsibility is premised on the extent to which public decisions depend on their members. The paper concludes with a discussion on the grounds for valuing collective outcome responsibility and why the conflict between this norm and the claim that future generations should be granted political representation poses fundamental questions about the value of democracy.

  • 39.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Popular sovereignty facing the deep state. The rule of recognition and the powers of the people2019In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, ISSN 1369-8230, E-ISSN 1743-8772Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates the relationship between the idea of popular sovereignty and the conditions for legal validity and argue that the latter imposes definitive limits to the former. Popular sovereignty has been defined as the condition when the will of the people is the "supreme authority in the state". Following this conception, there is no authority above the people and this is traditionally understood to mean that the authority of the people is above the constitution. Legal validity, though admittedly still debated, is here understood along Hart's "rule of recognition" According to which the validity of norms ultimately depends on the social practices of public officials. Though presumably uncontroversial that democratic peoples are entitled to remake the constitution, the powers of the people with respect to the substance of the law are nevertheless limited with respect to decisions of legal validity. The most basic rules in a legal system are not found in the constitution as they are the rules deciding what is to count as a legal norm within that system. They are more fundamental than the constitution because they also define what norms is the constitution legally speaking.

  • 40.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Power and future people’s freedom: intergenerational domination, climate change, and constitutionalism2016In: Journal of Political Power, ISSN 2158-379X, E-ISSN 2158-3803, Vol. 9, no 2, p. 289-307Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Intergenerational domination is the idea that future people’s freedom is violated insofar as they are vulnerable to the capacity of the people living before them to interfere. This paper explores the extent to which intergenerational domination applies to two familiar phenomena: climate change and constitutionalism. The first part of the paper argues that the emission of greenhouse gases does not amount to intergenerational domination. Being hurt by climate change does not equal subjection to the capacity of previous generations to interfere. The second part argues that intergenerational domination is under certain conditions applicable to the relationship exemplified by political constitutionalism. Hence, this study shows that constitutional provisions introduced in order to protect future generations from climate change is more likely to contribute to rather than to protect them from intergenerational domination.

  • 41.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Public Justifiability and Children2008In: The International Journal of Children's Rights, Vol. 16, no 1, p. 141-152Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 42.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Rösträttsåldern och demokratinsavgränsningsproblem2018In: Demokratins framtid / [ed] Katarina Barrling; Sören Holmberg, stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag , 2018, p. 81-110Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 43.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Självcensur,yttrandejämlikhet och yttrandefrihet2016Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 44.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Skyddet för den genetiska integriteten2004In: Genetikens möjligheter och problem / [ed] Tommy Möller, Stockholm: Pensionsforum , 2004Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 45.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Uppsala universitet.
    Staten måste agera på etikens slagfält2002In: Från stoicism till konsumkapitalism: teman ur tidskriften Axess år 2002, Stockholm: Axel och Margaret Ax:son Johnsons stift. för allmännyttiga ändamål i samarbete med Bonnier fakta , 2002, p. 159-171Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 46.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Accuracy of Electoral Regulations: The Case of theRight to Vote by People with Cognitive Impairments2014In: Social Policy and Society, ISSN 1474-7464, E-ISSN 1475-3073, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 221-233Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    People with cognitive impairments are regularly denied access to the vote in democraticnations. At the same time, the accuracy of legal regulations is uncertain due to thevariety of legal classifications and the vague administrative procedures envisaged for theirimplementation. This article offers an extensive analysis of the accuracy of legal restrictionson the vote for people with cognitive impairments in all electoral democracies. The articleargues that the prospect of ever regulating the vote accurately, in the sense of avoidingboth misclassifications and arbitrary administration of restrictions, is difficult to envisage.In the face of the regulatory problems associated with the attempt to restrict the votefor people with cognitive impairment, it is concluded that enfranchisement of all adultcitizens would constitute an improvement.

  • 47.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Competent Cabinet? Ministers in Sweden and the Problem of Competence and Democracy2006In: Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 29, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 48.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Frontiers of Democracy: The Right to Vote and its Limits2009Book (Other academic)
  • 49.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The professionalization of politics reconsidered. A study of the Swedish Cabinet 1917-20042007In: Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 60, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 50.
    Beckman, Ludvig
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Right to Democracy and the Human Right to Vote: The Instrumental Argument Rejected2014In: Journal of Human Rights, ISSN 1475-4835, E-ISSN 1475-4843, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 381-394Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The human right to democracy is often justified instrumentally: Democratic rights are human rights because they contribute to the preservation of basic human rights. In this article, this approach is put to test with regard to the right to vote, which is fundamental to democracy and is recognized by human rights law. The question is whether there is evidence to conclude that the right to vote serves the required instrumental purposes? The answer will depend on how the human right to vote is understood, which in turn depends on how it is interpreted by the relevant human rights bodies. The answer also depends on the empirical evidence available. This article shows that the human right to vote is not vindicated by instrumental considerations and explains why this follows from both empirical and conceptual reasons. The conclusion is that instrumental considerations are unable to fully account for the norms currently recognized by human rights law.

12 1 - 50 of 65
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