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  • 1.
    Allander, Erik
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Why is Prevention So Difficult and Slow?1997Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Social Medicine, Vol. 25, nr 3, s. 145-148Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    The abundance of perceived 'possibilities' for prevention contrasts sharply with the difficulties that face preventive programmes. We argue that this situation has emerged from an incomplete understanding of the process of prevention, involving a mixture of biological factors, human decision making and time perspectives. Based on examples, an analysis of the factors in the prevention process is presented.

  • 2.
    Baltscheffsky, H.
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Naturvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för biokemi och biofysik.
    Blomberg, C.
    Kungl. Tekniska högskolan.
    Liljenström, H.
    Kungl. Tekniska högskolan.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, P.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    On the Origin and Evolution of Life: An Introduction1997Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 187, s. 453-459Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 3.
    Blomberg, C.
    et al.
    Kungl. Tekniska högskolan.
    Liljenström, H.
    Kungl. Tekniska högskolan.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, P.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Mind and Matter: Essays from Biology, Physics and Philosophy: An Introduction1994Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 171, s. 1-5Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 4.
    Butler, Ann B.
    et al.
    Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study.
    Manger, Paul R.
    University of the Witwatersrand.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, Peter
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird–Mammal Comparison2005Ingår i: Bioessays, ISSN 0265-9247, E-ISSN 1521-1878, Vol. 27, s. 923-936Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness–brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both complex cognition and consciousness. The general conclusion is that most of the consciousness–brain theories appear to be valid for the avian brain. Even though some specific homologies are unresolved, most of the critical structures presumed necessary for consciousness in mammalian brains have clear homologues in avian brains. Furthermore, considering the fact that the reptile–bird brain transition shows more structural continuity than the stem amniote–mammalian transition, the line drawn at the origin of mammals for consciousness by several of the theorists seems questionable. An equally important point is that consciousness cannot be ruled out in the absence of complex cognition; it may in fact be the case that consciousness is a necessary prerequisite for complex cognition.

  • 5.
    Hill, Russell
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Århem, Peter
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Origin of Life1994Ingår i: Nature, ISSN 0028-0836, E-ISSN 1476-4687, Vol. 371, s. 646-Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 6.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Consciousness and Biological Evolution1997Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 187, s. 613-629Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been suggested that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological evolution is a result of natural selection, it is plausible that consciousness not only has been influenced by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this, if it had also been efficacious. This argument for mind–brain interaction is examined, both as the argument has been developed by William James and Karl Popper and as it has been discussed by C. D. Broad. The problem of identifying mental phenomena with certain neural phenomena is also addressed. The main conclusion of the analysis is that an explanation of the evolution of consciousness in Darwinian terms of natural selection does not rule out that consciousness may have evolved as a mere causally inert effect of the evolution of the nervous system, or that mental phenomena are identical with certain neural phenomena. However, the interactionistic theory still seems, more plausible and more fruitful for other reasons brought up in the discussion.

  • 7.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Consciousness, Behavioural Patterns and the Direction of Biological Evolution: Implications for the Mind-Brain Problem2001Ingår i: Dimensions of Conscious Experience / [ed] Paavo Pylkkänen, Tere Vadén, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001, s. 73-99Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 8.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Health and Evolution2000Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, ISSN 1403-4948, E-ISSN 1651-1905, Vol. 28, s. 309-311Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Darwinian medicine may shed new light on the notion of health and many current health problems. In this paper, health, as an ability to realize one’s own welfare, is compared with health as an ability — either being developed or actually present — to perform a reproductive function of one’s species. It is argued that knowledge about the conditions for health in the latter sense may enhance our efforts to promote health in the former sense.

  • 9.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Medical Ethics, History of Europe: Contemporary Period: VII. Nordic Countries2004Ingår i: Encyclopedia of bioethics. Vol. 3, I - M / [ed] Stephen G. Post, New York: Macmillan Reference USA , 2004, 3. uppl., s. 1639-1644Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 10.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Medical Ethics, History of: IV. Europe. D. Contemporary Period. 7. Nordic Countries1995Ingår i: Encyclopedia of bioethics. Vol. 3 / [ed] Warren Thomas Reich, New York: Macmillan , 1995, 2. uppl., s. 1589-1595Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 11.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Elzinga, Aant
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Welljams-Dorof, Alfred
    The Scientist, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
    Credit for Discoveries: Citation Data as a Basis for History of Science Analysis1998Ingår i: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, ISSN 1386-7415, E-ISSN 1573-0980, Vol. 19, s. 609-620Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Citation data have become an increasingly significant source of information for historians, sociologists, and other researchers studying the evolution of science. In the past few decades elaborate methodologies have been developed for the use of citation data in the study of the modern history of science. This article focuses on how citation indexes make it possible to trace the background and development of discoveries as well as to assess the credit that publishing scientists assign to particular discoverers. Kuhn’s notion of discovery is discussed. The priority dispute over the discovery of the AIDS virus is used as an example.

  • 12.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Johansson, Lars Age
    Statistics Sweden.
    Multiple Cause-of-Death Data as a Tool for Detecting Artificial Trends in the Underlying Cause Statistics: A Methodological Study1994Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, ISSN 1403-4948, E-ISSN 1651-1905, Vol. 22, nr 2, s. 145-158Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The aims of the study were: (i) to identify trends in the underlying cause-of-death statistics that are due to changes in the coders’ selection and coding of causes, and (ii) to identify changes in the coders’ documented registration principles that can explain the observed trends in the statistics.

    31 Basic Tabulation List categories from the Swedish national cause-of-death register for 1970-1988 were studied. The coders’ tendency to register a condition as the underlying cause of death (the underlying cause ratio) was estimated by dividing the occurrence of the condition as underlying cause (the underlying cause rate) with the total registration of the condition (the multiple cause rate). When the development of the underlying cause rate series followed more closely the underlying cause ratio series than the multiple cause rate series, and a corresponding change in the registration rules could be found, rhe underlying cause rate trend was concluded to be due to changes in the coders’ tendency to register the condition.

    For thirteen categories (fourteen trends), the trends could be explained by changes in the coders’ interpretation practice: five upward, four insignificant, and five downward trends. In addition, for three categories the trends could be explained by new explicit ICD-9 rules.

  • 13.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, P.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Mind as a Force Field: Comments on a New Interactionistic Hypothesis1994Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 171, s. 111-122Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The survival and development of consciousness in biological evolution call for an explanation. An interactionistic mind-brain theory seems to have the greatest explanatory value in this context.

    An interpretation of an interactionistic hypothesis, recently proposed by Karl Popper, is discussed both theoretically and based on recent experimental data. In the interpretation, the distinction between the conscious mind and the brain is seen as a division into what is subjective and what is objective, and not as an ontological distinction between something immaterial and something material. The interactionistic hypothesis is based on similarities between minds and physical forces. The conscious mind is understood to interact with randomly spontaneous spatio-temporal patterns of action potentials through an electromagnetic field. Consequences and suggestions for future studies are discussed.

  • 14.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, Peter
    Karolinska Institutet.
    The Mental Force Field Hypothesis: A Reply to Libet1996Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 178, s. 225-226Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 15.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, Peter
    Karolinska Institutet.
    The Relation Between the Conscious Mind and the Brain: A Reply to Beck1996Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 181, s. 95-96Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 16.
    Lindahl, B. Ingemar B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    On Causal Attribution2009Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    This dissertation treats of the problem of attributing the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause — a problem commonly understood either as a question of distinguishing the cause from the mere conditions or as a matter of singling out, from several causes, one cause, as the cause. The main purpose of the study is to clarify some basic concepts, and some criteria of ascertainment of the cause, that may be discerned in the literature on causal attribution. Special attention is devoted to how the adequacy of causal attributions depends on pragmatic factors. The study begins with an analysis of J. S. Mill’s distinction in A System of Logic between a scientific and a common-parlance approach to the problem of causal attribution. Mill’s assumption that causal attribution in science always requires a universal-law subsumption is then examined in the context of a general discussion of the range of applicability of the covering-law model of explanation. Mill’s scientific and common-parlance notions of cause are compared with R. G. Collingwood’s historical (sense-I) and scientific (sense-II and -III) notions of cause. It is argued that there are purposes of inquiry for which Mill’s common-parlance approach is more relevant to causal attribution in natural science than his scientific approach. And, more generally, it is argued that although law subsumptions are necessary for the ascertainment of the causes, more is often required for explaining the effect. Samuel Gorovitz’s differentiating-factor analysis is discussed, and limitations of the model are identified. The relevance of Morton White’s abnormalistic approach to historical research is also examined. Further, a number of objectivistic approaches are discussed, and it is argued that objectivity is not attainable in causal attributions in a sense in which it always implies an improvement of our ability to attribute the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause.

  • 17.
    Lindahl, B. Ingemar B.
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Århem, Peter
    Motor Control and the Causal Relevance of Conscious Will: Libet's Mind–Brain Theory2019Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical and Philosphical Psychology, ISSN 1068-8471, E-ISSN 2151-3341, Vol. 39, nr 1, s. 46-59Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article examines three aspects of the problem of understanding Benjamin Libet's idea of conscious will causally interacting with certain neural activities involved in generating overt bodily movements. The first is to grasp the notion of cause involved, and we suggest a definition. The second is to form an idea of by what neural structure(s) and mechanism(s) a conscious will may control the motor activation. We discuss the possibility that the acts of control have to do with levels of supplementary motor area activity and with the activation of populations of excitatory and inhibitory interneurons. The third aspect is to conceive of the main features of Libet's proposed conscious mental field (CMF). We consider both an ontological and an epistemological interpretation of the CMF being nonphysical. In an attempt to refute the idea that Libet's dualist mind–brain interactionism would violate the law of conservation of energy, we suggest that a CMF may alter the probability of the ion-channel gating by influencing structures of a size to which quantum mechanics needs to he applied. We argue that given the suggested definition of cause, and given the epistemological interpretation of the CMF being nonphysical, nothing would necessarily rule out that an element of a CMF, conscious will, may causally interact with neural activities in the brain. This defense of the idea of conscious will being causally efficacious has a hearing not only on the understanding of the mind–brain relation but also on the free will debate.

  • 18.
    Lindahl, Ingemar
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Science Has Partly Outgrown Nobel's Vision of the Prizes1995Ingår i: The Scientist (Philadelphia, Pa.), ISSN 0890-3670, E-ISSN 1945-5127Artikel i tidskrift (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 19. Nordenfelt, Lennart
    et al.
    Lindahl, B. Ingemar B.Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine1984Proceedings (redaktörskap) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 20.
    Århem, Peter
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    On Consciousness and Spontaneous Brain Activity1997Ingår i: Matter matters?: on the material basis of the cognitive activity of mind / [ed] Peter Århem, Hans Liljenström, Uno Svedin, Berlin: Springer, 1997, s. 235-253Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 21.
    Århem, Peter
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholms universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofiska institutionen.
    Manger, Paul R.
    University of the Witwatersrand.
    Butler, Ann B.
    The Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study.
    On the Origin of Consciousness: Some Amniote Scenarios2008Ingår i: Consciousness Transitions: Phylogenetic, Ontogenetic, and Physiological Aspects / [ed] Hans Liljenström, Peter Århem, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008, s. 77-96Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
1 - 21 av 21
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