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  • 1.
    Nyberg, Sten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Public order and private payments: Evidence from the Swedish soccer leauge2017In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 153, p. 1-8Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Should organizers of events share the associated costs of maintaining public order? We address this question by using unique data from the Swedish soccer league where co-payment for police were introduced for some clubs only. The difference-in-differences analysis shows that co-payments increased private guards by 40% and suggests a reduction of unruly behavior by 20%. The results are consistent with our model, where co-payments alleviate under-provision in efforts by organizers to combat problems such as hooliganism due to externalities and free-riding on police services. The model also sheds light on the critique that co-payments could lead financially constrained organizers to provide less security.

  • 2.
    Pettersson-Lidbom, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Behavior under social pressure: Empty Italian stadiums and referee bias2010In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 108, no 2, p. 212-214Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Due to tightened safety regulation, some Italian soccer teams had to temporarily play home matches in empty stadiums in 2007. We exploit this event and find that referees exhibited home bias caused by social pressure when spectators were present.

  • 3. Poutvaara, Panu
    et al.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity Backfire?2011In: Economics of Governance, ISSN 1435-6104, E-ISSN 1435-8131, Vol. 12, p. 259-273Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we study how unemployment affects gang crime. We examine a model of criminal gangs and suggest that a substitution effect between petty crime and severe crime is at work. In the model, non-monetary valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus, the leaders face a trade-off between less crime per member in large gangs and more crime per member in small gangs. A decrease in unemployment may result in a switch from a large gang that requires petty crime to a small gang that requires severe crime.

  • 4.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Competition among officials and the abuse of power2012In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 150, no 3-4, p. 425-438Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption. However, empirical evidence does not yet support this view. In this paper, I show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself. While competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government, corruption at the higher level of government is increased. To avoid widespread theft from the central authority, competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist. Hence, even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus, it may reduce welfare.

  • 5.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Do Surveillance Cameras Affect Unruly Behavior? A Close Look at Grandstands2014In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 116, no 4, p. 1160-1179Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How do surveillance cameras affect unruly spectator behavior? I examine this question using a natural experiment from the Swedish soccer league. Stadiums in Sweden introduced surveillance cameras at different points in time during the years 2000 and 2001. I exploit the exogenous variation that occurred because of differences across stadiums in the processing time taken to obtain permits for cameras as well as delays in the supply of equipment. Conditioning on stadium fixed effects, unruly behavior was found to be approximately 65 percent lower in stadiums with cameras compared to stadiums without cameras. The identification strategy provides a unique possibility to address problems regarding endogeneity, simultaneous policy interventions, and displacement effects.

  • 6.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Does Frustration Lead to Violence? Evidence from the Swedish Hooligan Scene2010In: Kyklos (Basel), ISSN 0023-5962, E-ISSN 1467-6435, Vol. 63, no 3, p. 450-460Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Sport-related violence is widespread. Yet, there is a poor understanding of what factors trigger hooligans to become unruly. In this paper I test the so called frustration-aggression hypothesis, which holds that thwarted expectations from a reference point tend to lead to violent behavior. I use unique data on hooligan violence in Sweden. I find that frustration, generated by a team's bad performance, indeed leads to unruly supporter behavior. A one-position drop in the soccer league leads to approximately 5 percent more unruly behavior by the team's supporters. The analysis helps policy makers in their endeavors to reduce group-related violence.

  • 7.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Firm competition and incentive pay: Rent seeking at work2011In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 113, no 2, p. 154-156Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Empirical evidence shows that competition among firms generates steep incentives inside firms. Incentive pay stimulates productive investments but may generate inefficient rent-seeking investments. I show that competition reduces firms' profits and thereby the inefficient investments, which makes steep incentives attractive.

  • 8.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies2011In: Economics of Governance, ISSN 1435-6104, E-ISSN 1435-8131, Vol. 12, no 1, p. 75-88Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]
    • References (39)
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    • About

    Abstract

    Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption.

  • 9.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    The Effects of Surveillance Cameras on Crime: Evidence from the Stockholm Subway2015In: Economic Journal, ISSN 0013-0133, E-ISSN 1468-0297, Vol. 125, no 588, p. F289-F305Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I study the effects of surveillance cameras on crime in the Stockholm subway system. Beginning in 2006, surveillance cameras were installed in subway stations at different points in time. Difference-in-difference analysis reveals that introduction of the cameras reduced crime by approximately 25% at stations in the city centre. The types of crimes deterred by cameras are planned crime, that is, pickpocketing and robbery. It is also shown that some of the crimes were displaced to surrounding areas. The cost of preventing one crime by the use of surveillance cameras is approximately US$ 2,000.

  • 10.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Verhaltensanreize in einer Gesellschaft mit sich auflösender Privatsphäre2013In: Die Zukunft der Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft: Festschrift für Hans-Werner Sinn, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2013, p. 233-247Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 11.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    What Works in Reducing Hooliganism?2013In: Lessons from the economics of crime: what reduces offending / [ed] Philip J. Cook, Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013, p. 131-147Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Priks, Mikael
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Poutvaara, Panu
    Supporter Violence and Police Tactics2009In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN 1097-3923, E-ISSN 1467-9779, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 441-453Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we introduce a model of hooliganism to study how different types of policing can be expected to affect violence and the number of hooligans in violent supporter clubs. Hooligans differ in their preferred level of fighting, and obtain utility also from social identity that belonging to a supporter club gives. We find that an increase in discriminative policing, like intelligence units, always reduces violence. Indiscriminate policing, such as the use of teargas or random jailing of potential law breakers, may, however, backfire and result in smaller and more brutal groups.

  • 13.
    Priks, Mikael
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Poutvaara, Panu
    The Effect of Police Intelligence on Group Violence: Evidence from Reassignments in Sweden2009In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 93, no 3-4, p. 403-411Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper isolates the causal effect of policing on group violence, using unique panel data on

    self-reported crime by soccer and ice hockey hooligans. The problem of reverse causality from

    violence to policing is solved by two drastic reallocations of the Stockholm Sport Intelligence

    and Tactical Unit to other activities following the 9/11 terrorist attack in September 2001 and

    the Tsunami catastrophe in December 2004. Difference-in-difference analysis reveals that

    Stockholm-related hooligan violence increased dramatically during these periods.

1 - 13 of 13
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