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  • 1. Bjälkebring, Pär
    et al.
    Västfjäll, Daniel
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology.
    Slovic, Paul
    Regulation of Experienced and Anticipated Regret in Daily Decision Making2016In: Emotion, ISSN 1528-3542, E-ISSN 1931-1516, Vol. 16, no 3, p. 381-386Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Decisions were sampled from 108 participants during 8 days using a web-based diary method. Each day participants rated experienced regret for a decision made, as well as forecasted regret for a decision to be made. Participants also indicated to what extent they used different strategies to prevent or regulate regret. Participants regretted 30% of decisions and forecasted regret in 70% of future decisions, indicating both that regret is relatively prevalent in daily decisions but also that experienced regret was less frequent than forecasted regret. In addition, a number of decision-specific regulation and prevention strategies were successfully used by the participants to minimize regret and negative emotions in daily decision making. Overall, these results suggest that regulation and prevention of regret are important strategies in many of our daily decisions.

  • 2.
    Bäck, Emma A.
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindholm, Torun
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gilljam, Mikael
    Göteborgs universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen.
    Esaisson, Peter
    Göteborgs universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen.
    Post-decision consolidation in large group decision-making2011In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 52, no 4, p. 320-328Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Decision-makers tend to change the psychological attractiveness of decision alternatives in favour of their own preferred alternative after the decision is made. In two experiments, the present research examined whether such decision consolidation occurs also among individual group members in a large group decision-making situation. High-school students were presented with a decision scenario on an important issue in their school. The final decision was made by in-group authority, out-group authority or by majority after a ballot voting. Results showed that individual members of large groups changed the attractiveness of their preferred alternative from a pre- to a post decision phase, that these consolidation effects increased when decisions were made by in-group members and when participants identified strongly with their school. Implications of the findings for understanding of group behavior and subgroup relations are discussed.

  • 3.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, Linköping, Sweden.
    Patten, Christopher
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, USA.
    Eriksson, Lars
    Estimated Time of Arrival and Debiasing the Time Saving Bias2015In: Ergonomics, ISSN 0014-0139, E-ISSN 1366-5847, Vol. 58, no 12, p. 1939-1946Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The time saving bias predicts that the time saved when increasing speed from a high speed is overestimated, and underestimated when increasing speed from a slow speed. In a questionnaire, time saving judgements were investigated when information of estimated time to arrival was provided. In an active driving task, an alternative meter indicating the inverted speed was used to debias judgements. The simulated task was to first drive a distance at a given speed, and then drive the same distance again at the speed the driver judged was required to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first drive. A control group performed the same task with a speedometer and saved less than the targeted three minutes when increasing speed from a high speed, and more than three minutes when increasing from a low speed. Participants in the alternative meter condition were closer to the target. The two studies corroborate a time saving bias and show that biased intuitive judgements can be debiased by displaying the inverted speed.

  • 4.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Driving faster or slower? Biased judgments of fuel consumption at changing speeds2012In: Advances in human aspects of road and rail transportation / [ed] Neville Stanton, London: CRC Press, 2012, p. 293-297Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Driving Faster or Slower? Speed Changes and Judged Effects on Fuel ConsumptionArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector continue to increase. Lower speeds on roads would reduce fuel consumption and thereby emissions. Drivers choose the speed of their vehicles, but do they realize the full benefit of a reduced speed on fuel consumption? In a set of questionnaires, professional truck drivers and student groups were asked to judge fuel consumption at decreasing and increasing speeds. The truck drivers underestimated the amount of fuel saved by decreasing speed, but made more accurate judgments of fuel lost at increasing speeds. Student groups made better judgments of fuel saved at decreasing speeds than the truck drivers. It is important that drivers understand the full benefit of a reduced speed on fuel consumption. This may affect both preferred driving speed and attitudes towards lower speed limits. Some policy suggestions on how to promote environmentally efficient driving were discussed.

  • 6.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI), Sweden.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Eriksson, Lars
    The time-saving bias: Judgements, cognition and perception2013In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 492-497Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Biases in people's judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity have been studied mainly with hypothetical scenarios (Svenson, 2008). The present study asked whether the classic time-saving bias persists as a perceptual bias when we control the speed of an activity and assess the perceived time elapsed at different speeds. Specifically, we investigated the time-saving bias in a driving simulator. Each participant was asked to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed she or he judged necessary to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first trip. We found that that the time-saving bias applies to active driving and that it affects the choice of driving speed. The drivers' time-saving judgements show that the perception of the time elapsed while driving does not eliminate the time-saving bias.

  • 7.
    Gonzalez, Nichel
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Oregon, USA.
    Growth and decline of assets: On biased judgments of asset accumulation and investment decisions2014In: Polish Psychological Bulletin, ISSN 0079-2993, E-ISSN 1641-7844, Vol. 45, no 1, p. 29-35Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Previous research showed that accumulations of capital following stationary interest rates are underestimated byhuman judges. Hyperbolic discounting was suggested as a descriptive and explanatory model for this phenomenon. First,we investigated judged accumulated capital after a period of annual growth and decline. The degree of underestimationincreased with accumulated growth and the results supported hyperbolic discounting as a descriptive model on the grouplevel. However, the hyperbolic model did not apply to the data for one third of the participants. Second, we investigatedhow investment decisions were related to capital accumulation before the investments and to judgments of the possibleoutcomes of the future investments. To our surprise, the participants’ judgments of expected future accumulated capitaldid not add predictive power to predictions based on whether there was growth or decline before the investment decision.Unfortunately this strategy leads to suboptimal investment decisions.

  • 8.
    Jakobsson, Marianne
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Upphandling inom kärnkraftsindustrin, kvalitet, säkerhet och beslutsfattande2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The major purpose of the present study is partly to map and partly to make an analysis of the decision processes in the procurement routines in the nuclear industry in order to provide a basis for:

    1. further development of safety inspections about procurements for Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

    2. improvements of safety management in connection with procure- ment within a nuclear-power plant,

    3. improvements of procurement routines in general in a nuclear power plant.

    The procurement processes at a nuclear power plant were analyzed from a decision theoretic perspective. Key staff at the plant was interviewed and written instructions as well as digitalized processes were used in the analysis.

    The results illustrate the most important moments during the procure- ment process with descriptions from interviews and documents. The staff at the nuclear power plant used a multi-attribute utility decision theory MAUT-inspired model in evaluation of alternatives and both compensatory (in which negative aspects can be compensated by posi- tive aspects) and non-compensatory (in which certain “pass” levels of attributes have to be exceeded for a choice) decision rules were used in the procurement process. Not surprising, nuclear safety was evalu- ated in a non-compensatory manner following regulatory criteria while costs were evaluated in trade-off compensatory rules, which means that a weakness in one consideration might be compensated by strength in another consideration. Thus, nuclear safety above the regulator’s and law requirements are not integrated in a compensatory manner when procurement alternatives are evaluated. The nuclear plant assessed an organization’s safety culture at an early stage of the purchasing process. A successful and a less successful procurement case were reported with the lessons learned from them.

    We find that the existing written instructions for purchase were well elaborated and adequate. There is a lack of personal resources when procurement teams are formed. This means that external personal sometimes has to be engaged in such a team and therefore the emphasis on safety has to be communicated effectively to those joining the team from outside the plant. From a competition point of view, the number of potential suppliers is often too small. There is a feedback system of experience from previous contracts, but this information is of little use since it is not documented so that it is possible to conduct a quick and efficient information search, which would be a weakness when safety and quality information is needed quickly in a procurement process.

  • 9.
    Lindholm, Torun
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Personality, Social and Developmental Psychology.
    Memon, Amina
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology.
    Social influences on dissonance reduction in medical decision making2016In: Book of abstracts, 2016, p. 28-28Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Two studies investigated social influences on dissonance reduction in medical decision making. Study 1 compared decision-consistent biases when individuals freely made-, or when another person made the decision. Participants read a scenario in which one of two patients should be prioritized for surgery. Facts about the patients were given on counter-balanced scales. Participants decided themselves whom to prioritize, or were told that a physician made the decision, and then reproduced the facts from memory. When choosing freely, participants distorted memories of facts to become more supportive of the choice. This effect was evident, albeit reduced, when the decision was made by a physician.

    Study 2 investigated majority/minority feedback effects on dissonance reduction for decisions concerning ingroup or outgroup members. Swedish participants decided whether a physician should comply or not to the request of a terminally ill patient, with a Swedish or a Turkish name, who asked for help to commit suicide. After making their decision, participants were informed that a majority or a minority had chosen the same alternative. Decisions about an in-group member were consolidated more if participants received minority, than majority feedback. This reversed for decisions on out-group member. Results suggest important social moderators of dissonance reduction strategies.

  • 10.
    Lindholm, Torun
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Personality, Social and Developmental Psychology.
    Memon, Amina
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology.
    We Distort Memories of Other’s Decisions, and Other’s Decisions Distort Memories of What We Decided2017Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Research shows that after making a decision, people often distort the memory of the decision alternatives towards greater coherence with the chosen alternative. Given the pivotal role of sharing cognitive representations of reality with others, it seems reasonable that such decision consolidation may extend beyond decisions made by the individual him-/herself. The current research explores how people consolidate their own and another person’s decisions. Moreover, we examine how information about another person’s decisions affects an individual’s memory of his/her own decision. In Study 1 we presented participants with a medical case scenario in which one of two patients should be prioritized for surgery. They were given facts about the patients (e.g., probability of surviving surgery), and either decided themselves whom to prioritize, or were told that a physician made the decision. When later reproducing the facts from memory, participants distorted memories of facts to become more supportive both of their own and of the doctor’s choice. Study 2 investigated how feedback of other’s decisions affect people’s memory for their own decisions. Participants decided whether a physician should comply or not to the request of a terminally ill patient who asked for help to committ suicide. After making their decision, participants were informed that a majority or a minority had chosen the same alternative. When the patient was an in-group member participants consolidated their own decision more when receiving minority, rather than majority feedback. This reversed for decisions on out-group member. Results suggest important social psychological motivations and moderators of decision consolidation strategies.

  • 11.
    Patten, Christopher J D
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Kircher, Albert
    Östlund, Joakim
    Nilsson, Lena
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Driver experience and cognitive workload in different traffic environments.2006In: Accident Analysis and Prevention, ISSN 0001-4575, Vol. 38, no 5, p. 887-894Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How do levels of cognitive workload differ between experienced and inexperienced drivers? In this study we explored cognitive workload and driver experience, using a secondary task method, the peripheral detection task (PDT) in a field study. The main results showed a large and statistically significant difference in cognitive workload levels between experienced and inexperienced drivers. Inexperienced, low mileage drivers had on average approximately 250 milliseconds (ms) longer reaction times to a peripheral stimulus, than the experienced drivers. It would, therefore, appear that drivers with better training and experience were able to automate the driving task more effectively than their less experienced counterparts in accordance with theoretical psychological models. It has been suggested that increased training and experience may provide attention resource savings that can benefit the driver in handling new or unexpected traffic situations.

  • 12.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    A frame of reference for studies of safety management.2006In: Nordic perspectives on safety management in high reliability organizations: Theory and applications., Department of Psychology, Stockholm University, Stockholm , 2006, p. 1-7Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The chapter gives a theoretical framework for studies of safety management based on a system approach. Safety management is considered a process, in which, industries, societal representatives and the public interact in finding a balance between the benefits, costs and risks of products, activities and processes. The purpose of the chapter is to provide a framework based on a system perspective that is general enough for application in different approaches to safety management. A system theoretic perspective supports a safety manager in his/her analysis of and work in an organization.

  • 13.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Biased decisions concerning productivity increase options2011In: Journal of Economic Psychology, ISSN 0167-4870, E-ISSN 1872-7719, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 440-445Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When people judge the time that can be saved by increasing speed they make systematic errors. This was called the time-saving bias by Svenson (2008) which describes that time savings following speed increases of high speeds are overestimated relative to time savings following increases of low speeds. The present contribution tested the hypothesis that the time-saving bias would predict unaided decisions about productivity. The results showed that the predicted bias distorted decisions both when productivity increase of a factory was measured in units produced per hour and when it was measured in number of units produced per man-year. When productivity was increased from an initial low production speed, the relative gain (e.g., in number of less workers needed for the same production) was underestimated in comparison with gains obtained when productivity was increased from an initial high productivity.

  • 14.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Decisions among time saving options: When intuition is strong and wrong2007In: Acta PsychologicaArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When people judge the time that can be saved by increasing the speed of doing something, they are often victims of a time saving bias. That is, they overestimate the time that can be saved by increasing the speed. Judgments of time savings following speed increase when driving follow the Proportion heuristic (Svenson, 1970). In a choice between time saving options, this heuristic simplifies to the Ratio rule. The first study shows that the Ratio rule predicts incorrect decisions in road traffic planning to save traveling time. The second study shows that the time saving bias is also present in planning of health care; to specify, in decisions about which one of two clinics to reorganize to save more of the doctors' time for personal contacts with patients. To further test the Ratio rule, Study 3 used a matching procedure in which two decision alternatives were made equal by the participants. The results supported the Ratio rule. Practical implications of the results are discussed including the Planning fallacy. In conclusion, the present set of studies have illustrated a time saving bias and provided evidence explaining why people make systematic errors when judging and deciding about time saved following a speed increase.

    Keywords: Time saving bias, Planning fallacy, Proportion heuristic, Ratio rule, time saving, driving.

  • 15.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Decisions among time saving options: When intuition is strong and wrong2008In: Acta Psychologica, ISSN 0001-6918, Vol. 127, no 2, p. 501-509Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When people judge the time that can be saved by increasing the speed of doing something, they are often victims of a time saving bias. That is, they overestimate the time that can be saved by increasing the speed. Judgments of time savings following speed increase when driving follow the Proportion heuristic (Svenson, 1970). In a choice between time saving options, this heuristic simplifies to the Ratio rule. The first study shows that the Ratio rule predicts incorrect decisions in road traffic planning to save traveling time. The second study shows that the time saving bias is also present in planning of health care; to specify, in decisions about which one of two clinics to reorganize to save more of the doctors' time for personal contacts with patients. To further test the Ratio rule, Study 3 used a matching procedure in which two decision alternatives were made equal by the participants. The results supported the Ratio rule. Practical implications of the results are discussed including the Planning fallacy. In conclusion, the present set of studies have illustrated a time saving bias and provided evidence explaining why people make systematic errors when judging and deciding about time saved following a speed increase.

  • 16.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Driving speed changes and subjective estimates of time savings, accident risks and braking2009In: Applied Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 0888-4080, E-ISSN 1099-0720, Vol. 23, no 4, p. 543-560Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Participants made decisions between two road improvements to increase mean speed. Time saved when speed increased from a higher driving speed was overestimated in relation to time saved from increases from lower speeds. In Study 2, participants matched pairs of speed increases so that they would give the same time saving and repeated the bias. The increase in risk of an accident with person injury was underestimated and the increase in risk of a fatal accident grossly underestimated when speed increased. The increase of stopping distance when speed increased was systematically underestimated. In Study 3, the tasks and results of Study 2 were repeated with engineering students. When forming opinions about speed limits and traffic planning, drivers, the public, politicians and others who do not collect the proper facts are liable to the same biases as those demonstrated in the present study.

  • 17.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Motivation, decision theory and human decision making2012In: Cognition and motivation: forging an interdisciplinary perspective / [ed] Shulamith Kreitler, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 307-320Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There are two main approaches to study human decision making. Process approaches focus on the decision process, how the information is interpreted and reinterpreted, what decision rules are used to reach a decision etc. Structural approaches do not follow the intervening decision process, but attempt to predict choices based on parameters of the decision problems.

    In this chapter, what is here called, fundamental motivation (the result of thirst, need for social closeness, competition etc) motivates a particular choice. Process and representation motivation as used in this chapter covers how a decision maker is motivated to process the available information to reach a decision (how to ignore, reinterpret information, what decision rules to apply to reach and represent a final decision that is satisfactory with respect to both process and representation motivation and fundamental motivation etc). Since the 1950ies process approaches of decision research have been quite explicit about process and representation motivation. Standard structural approaches were silent about motivation for along time until the 1990ies, when an interest in emotion and decision making and individual differences, at least implicitly, brought different fundamental motivations into the field. However, motivation has been neglected in most decision research, and in particular in mainstream structural approaches.

  • 18.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    On event reporting in the Swedish health care and civil aviation systems.2006In: Nordic perspectives on safety management in high reliability organizations: Theory and applications., Department of Psychology, Stockholm University, Stockholm , 2006, p. 67-72Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter describes the safety feedback from event reporting systems. The companies who were investigated in more detail (SAS and Danderyd Hospital Company) and also the corresponding safety regulation authorities were quite open about their own internal reporting systems and provided valuable information. The present chapter covers company internal event reporting systems and external reporting systems to the societal authorities.

  • 19.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Kognitionsavdelningen.
    Pre- and post-decision construction of preferences: Differentiation and Consolidation2006In: The construction of preference, Cambridge, New York , 2006, p. 356-371Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This contribution starts with a brief description of decision research during the last five decades as an evolution towards an understanding of decision making as a process in which a decision maker’s decision rules and problem representations interact in the creation of a final choice. The Differentiation and Consolidation (Diff Con) Theory (Svenson, 1992; 2003) describes pre- and post-decision processes in constructions and reconstructions of preferences and provides a framework for a presentation of process studies and regularities in human decision processes. The fundamentals of Diff Con theory are presented in the chapter. Some contemporary findings about pre- and post decision processes from both Diff Con studies and studies founded on other theoretical perspectives follow and conclude the chapter.

  • 20.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology.
    Preface2017In: Large risks with low probabilities: Perceptions and willingness to take preventive measures against flooding / [ed] Tadeusz Tyzska, Piotr Zielonka, London: IWA Publishing, 2017, p. xi-xiiiChapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This volume describes the interactions between humans and their natural environment. Specifically it concerns low probability risks with major negative consequences and focuses on environmental risks that people can control, manage or eliminate. The scientific perspective is fundamental and an applied perspective is added with analyses of data from field investigations. The contribution summarizes the material in the book from a psychological perspective.

  • 21.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    The time saving bias and related human judgmental shortcomings2011In: Perspectives on thinking, judging and decision making / [ed] W. Brun,, G. Keren, G. Kirkeböen, & H. Montgomery, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2011, p. 120-132Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In general, people tend to overestimate the time that can be saved by speeding up from a high speed and underestimate the time that can be saved by increasing a slow speed. This was called the time-saving bias by Svenson (2008). The bias was first found in a car driving context. However, corresponding biases can be found in solutions of other problems with the same normative mathematical function but in different contexts, such as, fuel saving, resource saving, health care and industrial planning decisions. In the traffic domain, the time saving bias can be linked to judgments of other variables related to driving speed and to speed perception. To exemplify, biases in speed and average speed judgments can be predicted by inferences from the time-saving bias. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the applied applications of this research and possible psychological processes generating the the time-saving bias.

  • 22.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology. Decision Research, USA.
    Towards a framework for human judgements of quantitative information: the numerical judgement process, NJP model2016In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology, ISSN 2044-5911, E-ISSN 2044-592X, Vol. 28, no 7, p. 884-898Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This contribution presents a review and a theoretical process framework for human intuitive numerical judgments based on numerical information, The NJP model. The model is descriptive and includes one or several of the following stages, each consisting of information processing and solution strategies (1) problem readings (2) recognitions, (3) associations, (4) similarity assessments, (5) problem interpretations, (6) computations, (7) marker nominations, (8) start value selections and (9) adjustments. three main types of strategies are used separately, in sequence or simultaneously with others in and across stages: (i) Associative strategies, e.g., an answer is retrieved immediately, (ii) Computational strategies, different algorithms are applied to the information and (iii) Analogue strategies, visual analogue representations, e.g., anchoring and adjustment. The paper concludes that a generic model of intuitive judgments will inspire further studies of the psychological processes activated when a judge makes an intuitive numerical judgment.

  • 23.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology. Decision Research, USA.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Institute, Sweden.
    Mental models of driving and speed: biases, choices and reality2017In: Transport reviews, ISSN 0144-1647, E-ISSN 1464-5327, Vol. 37, no 5, p. 653-666Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides a review of research performed by Svenson with colleagues and others work on mental models and their practical implications. Mental models describe how people perceive and think about the world including covariances and relationships between different variables, such as driving speed and time. Research on mental models has detected the time-saving bias [Svenson, O. (1970). A functional measurement approach to intuitive estimation as exemplified by estimated time savings. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 204-210]. It means that drivers relatively overestimate the time that can be saved by increasing speed from an already high speed, for example, 90-130km/h, and underestimate the time that can be saved by increasing speed from a low speed, for example, 30-45km/h. In congruence with this finding, mean speed judgments and perceptions of mean speeds are also biased and higher speeds given too much weight and low speeds too little weight in comparison with objective reality. Replacing or adding a new speedometer in the car showing min per km eliminated or weakened the time-saving bias. Information about braking distances at different speeds did not improve overoptimistic judgments of braking capacity, but information about collision speed with an object suddenly appearing on the road did improve judgments of braking capacity. This is relevant to drivers, politicians and traffic regulators.

  • 24.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Oregon, USA.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Gonzalez, Nichel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Braking from different speeds: Judgments of collision speed if a car does not stop in time2012In: Accident Analysis and Prevention, ISSN 0001-4575, E-ISSN 1879-2057, Vol. 45, p. 487-492Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of speed limits is to keep driving speed low enough for drivers to be able to pay attention to relevant information and timely execute maneuvers so that the car can be driven in a safe way and stopped in time. If a driver violates a speed limit or drives too fast she or he will not be able to stop as quickly as from a slower speed. We asked participants to imagine that they themselves had driven a car outside a school at a speed of 30 km/h when a child suddenly had rushed into the street. From this speed it was possible to stop the car just in front of the child after braking as quickly and forcefully as possible. We then asked the participants to imagine that they drove the same street at a higher speed of 50 km/h and the child appeared at the same place as before. At what speed would the car hit the child after braking in the same way as before? This kind of problems were presented in three studies and the results showed that the judged speeds of collision were always underestimated in different hypothetical driving context scenarios by judges differing in numerical skills. This indicates an overly optimistic view on the possibilities to reduce speed quickly if the driving speed is too fast, which is an important component of attitudes towards speed limits, their legitimacy and recommended driving speeds. Further implications of the results were discussed last.

  • 25.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, OR 97 401, USA.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute, Linköping, Department of Behavioural Sciences, Linköping University.
    Mertz, C. K.
    Department of Behavioural Sciences, Linköping University.
    Debiasing overoptimistic beliefs about braking capacity2013In: Accident Analysis and Prevention, ISSN 0001-4575, E-ISSN 1879-2057, Vol. 58, p. 75-80Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigated, using questionnaires, different strategies for removing drivers’ overoptimism (Svenson et al., 2012a) about how fast their speed could be decreased when they were speeding compared with braking at the speed limit speed. Three different learning groups and a control group made collision speed judgments. The first learning group had the distance a car travels during a driver's reaction time for each problem. The second group had this information and also feedback after each judgment (correct speed). The third group judged collision speed but also braking distance and received correct facts after each problem. The control group had no information at all about reaction time and the distance traveled during that time. The results suggested the following rank order from poor to improved performance: control, group 1, group 3 and group 2 indicating that information about distance driven during a driver's reaction time improved collision speed judgments and that adding stopping distance information did not add to this improvement.

  • 26.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI), Sweden.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Peters, Ellen
    Judgments of mean speed and predictions of route choice2011In: Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, ISSN 1369-8478, E-ISSN 1873-5517, Vol. 14, no 6, p. 504-511Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    How are driving speeds integrated when speeds vary along a route? In a first study, we examined heuristic processes used in judgments of mean speed when the mean speeds on parts of the trip varied. The judgments deviated systematically from objective mean speeds because the distances driven at different speeds were given more weight than travel time spent on the different distances. The second study showed that when there was a 10-15 min pause during a travel the effect on the mean speed decrease was underestimated for driving speeds of 90 km/h and higher. In the third study, the objective mean speeds and the subjective biased mean speed judgments were used to predict choices between routes with different speed limits. The results showed that subjective judgments predicted decisions to maximize mean speed significantly better than objective mean speeds. Finally, some applied and basic research implications of the results were discussed.

  • 27.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Slovic, Paul
    Mertz, C. K.
    Fuglestad, Tina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Effects of main actor, outcome and affect on biased braking speedjudgments2012In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 7, no 3, p. 235-243Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Subjects who judged speed in a driving scenario overestimated how fast they could decelerate when speeding comparedto when keeping within the speed limit (Svenson, 2009). The purpose of the present studies were to replicatestudies conducted in Europe with subjects in the U.S., to study the influence of speed unit (kph vs. mph), affectivereactions to outcome (collision) and identity of main actor (driver) on braking speed judgments. The results replicatedthe European findings and the outcome affective factor (passing a line/killing a child) and the actor factor (subject/driverin general) had significant effects on judgments of braking speed. The results were related to psychological theory andapplied implications were discussed.

  • 28.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Erixon, Anna-Lena
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Om myndighets- och industriperspektiv på rapportervärda omständigheter, "kategori 2 händelser" - RO-rapporter.2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet för detta arbete är att ge en bild av hur man inom SKI och inom kärnkraftsindustrin ser på händelserapportering till SKI enligt "kategori 2", så kallad RO-rapportering. Tanken är inte att i första hand reflektera officiella skrivna dokument, som behandlar och reglerar RO-rapporteringen. I stället är målet att återspegla något av den mångfald av omdömen om rappporteringen som finns inom de olika organisationerna. Därför redovosas resultaten i form av olika bedömningar av RO-rapporteringen i stället för en integrerad sammanfattning. Genom att låta dessa olika bedömningar bli grunden för en analys av RO-rapporteringen inom SKI och industrin (där två kärnkraftverk bidragit med information), kan olika argument för och emot förändring av rutinerna. genomgående för befattningshavarna inom de olika organisationerna är att de anser RO-rapporteringen vara ett bra instrument för att säkerställa en hög grad av säkerhet.

    En rad synpunkter som varierar mellan verk och SKI, framförallt också är kopplat till dessa framförs en rad förslag om förbättringar som en enhetligare rapportering, att blanketterna för rapportering inte ändras i onödan, att datorsystem utvecklas med efter behov, att rapporteringen fokuseras på verkligt viktiga händelser. För en utförligare beskrivning av de olika synpunkterna hänvisas läsaren till resultatredovisningen.

  • 29.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Oregon, USA.
    Gonzalez, Nichel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Eriksson, Gabriella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Swedish National Road and Transport Institute, Sweden.
    Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments2014In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 9, no 5, p. 465-478Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Svenson (2011) showed that choices of one of two alternative productivity increases to save production resources (e.g., man-months) were biased. Judgments of resource savings following a speed increase from a low production speed linewere underestimated and following an increase of a high production speed line overestimated. The objective formula for computing savings includes differences between inverse speeds and this is intuitively very problematic for most people.The purpose of the present studies was to explore ways of ameliorating or eliminating the bias. Study 1 was a control study asking participants to increase the production speed of one production line to save the same amount of production resources(man-months) as was saved by a speed increase in a reference line. The increases judged to match the reference alternatives showed the same bias as in the earlier research on choices. In Study 2 the same task and problems were used as in Study 1,but the participants were asked first to judge the resource saving of the reference alternative in a pair of alternatives before they proceeded to the matching task. This weakened the average bias only slightly. In Study 3, the participants were askedto judge the resources saved from each of two successive increases of the same single production line (other than those of the matching task) before they continued to the matching problems. In this way a participant could realize that a secondproduction speed increase from a higher speed (e.g., from 40 to 60 items /man-month) gives less resource savings than the same speed increase from a first lower speed (e.g., from 20 to 40 items/man-month. Following this, the judgments of thesame problems as in the other studies improved and the bias decreased significantly but it did not disappear. To be able to make optimal decisions about productivity increases, people need information about the bias and/or reformulations of the problems.

  • 30.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA.
    Gonzalez, Nichel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology.
    Memon, Amina
    Lindholm, Torun
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Personality, Social and Developmental Psychology.
    Information about expert decision and post-decision distortion of facts of own decision2018In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 59, no 2, p. 127-134Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her- or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post-decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post-decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.

  • 31.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Jakobsson, Marianne
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Creating coherence in real-life decision processes: Reasons, differentiation and consolidation2010In: Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, ISSN 0036-5564, E-ISSN 1467-9450, Vol. 51, no 2, p. 93-102Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Differentiation and Consolidation Theory describes human decision making as a process in which attractiveness values are restructured in order to reach a decision and support the decision made. Here, the theory was developed to include reasons pro and con alternatives and tested on students making decisions between two university psychotherapy training programs (cognitive-behavioral and psychodynamic therapy). Before and also after the decision, the attractiveness of the chosen alternative was upgraded and the non-chosen alternative downgraded. Different measures of evaluations of an alternative, such as ""best"" or ""worse"" converged over time until shortly after the decision. The number of reasons pro and con alternatives give a more complete picture than attractiveness and increased from the first to the last session. The reasons supporting the chosen alternative increased in strength, but reasons against the non-chosen alternative decreased. In informal comments participants reported that the study also served as a decision aid.

  • 32.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Patten, Christopher J D
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Mobile phones and driving: A review of contemporary research2005In: Cognition, Technology & Work, ISSN 1435-5558, Vol. 7, no 3, p. 182-197Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study reviews research on the effects of using a mobile phone when driving. First, it is should be pointed out that the availability of a mobile phone in a car is of great value, for example, in emergencies and accidents. However, the results from the research covered in this review show that using a mobile phone in a car while driving impairs driving performance significantly. To exemplify, a drivers attention to traffic and traffic information is impaired and the control of the car becomes less precise and smooth when talking over a phone. The conversation in itself impairs attention and manoeuvring performance as well as the motor activities needed for phoning. Based on the research available, the present review gives numerical estimates of the disturbing effects of different aspects of mobile phoning on driving performance. Contrary to what people assume, hand-held phones have not been shown to impair driving quality more than hands free phones. Instead, in contrast to public opinion, the content of a conversation is most important in determining the degree of distraction; complex conversations disturb driving much more than simple conversations. Analyses of accidents have shown that the impairment of driving while phoning leads to an increased risk of having an accident for both hand-held and hands free mobile telephones.

  • 33.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Effects of speed limit variation on judged mean speed of a trip2010In: Accident Analysis and Prevention, ISSN 0001-4575, E-ISSN 1879-2057, Vol. 42, no 2, p. 704-708Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Three experiments were set up to study how drivers estimate mean travel speeds on trips with different speed limits. To specify, participants judged mean speeds of trips with speed limits on different distances of the trip. Study I showed that the mean speed on a road with a temporary 30km/h speed limit was overestimated if the speeds were greater than 80km/h on the rest of the trip. Study 2 replicated and extended the results to problems with more speed combinations. In Study 3 the distances of the speed limits were varied and the results showed that a temporary 30km/h speed restriction gave overestimations of the mean speeds of a trip for all combinations of original and temporary speed limits over all distances. Finally, some psychological issues and applied implications for speed regulation policies were discussed.

  • 34.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Psykologi.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Mental representations of important real-life decisions2007In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 177, p. 1353-1362Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Three studies investigated decision makers' memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7 - 10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory like consequences, values and likelihood had high ratings of applicability. Affect/feeling was also rated high, but there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterized by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate. A comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher. Action-oriented participants were predicted to score higher on activity than state-oriented participants, but this prediction was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was argued that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The decision processes that we want to model, understand and predict take place in the psychological representations of individual decision makers. The method used in this contribution stresses the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.

    Decision making, memory, mental representations

  • 35.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon, USA.
    Salo, Ilkka
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Department of Psychology, Lund University, Sweden.
    Lindholm, Torun
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Post decision consolidation and distortion of facts2009In: Judgment and decision making, ISSN 1930-2975, E-ISSN 1930-2975, Vol. 4, no 5, p. 397-407Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Participants decided whom of two patients to prioritize for surgery in three studies. The factual quantitative information about the patients (e.g., probability of surviving surgery) was given in vignette form with case descriptions on Visual Analogue Scales — VAS’s. Differentiation and Consolidation theory predicts that not only the attractiveness of facts but also the mental representations of objective facts themselves will be restructured in post-decision processes in support of a decision (Svenson, 2003). After the decision, participants were asked to reproduce the objective facts about the patients. The results showed that distortions of objective facts were used to consolidate a prior decision. The consolidation process relied on facts initially favoring the non-chosen alternative and on facts rated as less, rather than more important.

  • 36.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Cognitive psychology. Decision Research, USA.
    Treurniet, Daniëlle
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology. Decision Research, USA; Leiden University, The Netherlands.
    Speed reductions and judgments of travel time loss: Biases and debiasing2017In: Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, ISSN 1369-8478, E-ISSN 1873-5517, Vol. 51, p. 145-153Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Priority decisions concerning maintenance or reconstruction of roads are made with the aim of road improvements with as little traffic disturbance and time loss as possible. However, it cannot be avoided that speed will be reduced and travel time increased during the time of construction. The present study shows how intuitive judgments of travel time losses are biased in a way similar to the times saving bias (Svenson, 2008), but not perfectly corresponding to that bias. This means that when speed is decreased from a slow speed <50 km/h, the time loss is underestimated and when speed is decreased from a high speed >80 km/h it is overestimated. Also, drivers, politicians and policy makers who do not make exact calculations are likely victims of the time loss bias. The time loss bias was weakened but not eliminated by a debiasing instruction including mathematical computations of travel times. When driving speed restrictions are implemented, in particular on fast motorways, it is necessary to consider and counteract the time loss bias and inform the public. This can be done, for example, in communications about travel time facts, by information in driver training and by mounting temporary road signs informing about the average travel time prolongation due to a road work.

  • 37.
    Svenson, Ola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Tyszka, Tadeusz
    Psychological processes in decision making: probabilities, risk and chance2014In: Polish Psychological Bulletin, ISSN 0079-2993, E-ISSN 1641-7844, Vol. 45, no 1, p. 1-2Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Even though, we all want to use the information that is available to us in an optimal way when we make decisions, we are not always able to do so. This is particularly true for intuitive unaided decisions and therefore the set of six papers in this special issue section investigate some of these shortcomings and gives us some hints as how to overcome them. Decisions concern the future but in many contexts what will happen in the future is not certain and different outcomes could follow a decision. Hence, many decisions have to be taken under risk and uncertainty, which is the main theme of the papers of this section. Because, the uncertainty of the future is often described by probabilities of different outcomes and consequences of a decision, the papers in this section have studied different aspects of probability from a psychological process perspective. The section covers the following. (1) A critical realist perspective on decisions involving risk and uncertainty, (2) format dependent probabilities and additivity neglect,(3) information acquisition patterns in risky choice framing, (4) biased judgments of asset cumulation and investment decisions, (5) the confidence-frequency effect: a heuristic explanation, and (6) belief in others' trustworthiness and trusting behavior.

  • 38.
    Yourstone, Jenny
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Lindholm, Torun
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Grann, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Svenson, Ola
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Evidence of gender bias in legal insanity evaluations: A case vignette study of clinicians, judges, and students2008In: Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, ISSN 0803-9488, E-ISSN 1502-4725, Vol. 62, no 4, p. 273-278Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Forensic psychiatric decision-making plays a key role in the legal process of homicide cases. Research show that women defendants have a higher likelihood of being declared legally insane and being diverted to hospital. This study attempted to explore if this gender difference is explained by biases in the forensic psychiatric assessments. Participants were 45 practicing forensic psychiatric clinicians, 46 chief judges and 80 psychology students. Participants received a written vignette describing a homicide case, with either a female or a male perpetrator. The results suggested strong gender effects on legal insanity judgements. Forensic psychiatric clinicians and psychology students assessed the case information as more indicative of legal insanity if the perpetrator was a woman than a man. Judges assessed offenders of their own gender, as they were more likely to be declared legally insane than a perpetrator of the opposite gender. Implications of and possible ways to minimize such gender biases in forensic psychiatric evaluations need to be thoroughly considered by the legal system.

1 - 38 of 38
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