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  • 1.
    Ahlgren, Per
    et al.
    School of Education and Communication in Engineering Sciences (ECE), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden..
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Persson, Olle
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Sociologiska institutionen..
    Svedberg, Maria
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bibliometric analysis of two subdomains in philosophy: free will and sorites2015In: Scientometrics, ISSN 0138-9130, E-ISSN 1588-2861, Vol. 103, no 1, p. 47-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this study we tested the fruitfulness of advanced bibliometric methods for mapping subdomains in philosophy. The development of the number of publications on free will and sorites, the two subdomains treated in the study, over time was studied. We applied the cocitation approach to map the most cited publications, authors and journals, and we mapped frequently occurring terms, using a term co-occurrence approach. Both subdomains show a strong increase of publications in Web of Science. When we decomposed the publications by faculty, we could see an increase of free will publications also in social sciences, medicine and natural sciences. The multidisciplinary character of free will research was reflected in the cocitation analysis and in the term co-occurrence analysis: we found clusters/groups of cocited publications, authors and journals, and of co-occurring terms, representing philosophy as well as non-philosophical fields, such as neuroscience and physics. The corresponding analyses of sorites publications displayed a structure consisting of research themes rather than fields. All in all, both philosophers involved in this study acknowledge the validity of the various networks presented. Bibliometric mapping appears to provide an interesting tool for describing the cognitive orientation of a research field, not only in the natural and life sciences but also in philosophy, which this study shows.

  • 2.
    Alxatib, Sam
    et al.
    MIT, Dept Linguist & Philosophy, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sauerland, Uli
    Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissensch, D-10117 Berlin, Germany.
    Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.2013In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 619-634Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn't tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.

  • 3.
    Gluer Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    General Terms and Relational Modality*2012In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, no 1, p. 159-199Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Proper Names and Relational Modality2006In: Linguistics and Philosophy, ISSN 0165-0157, E-ISSN 1573-0549, Vol. 29, no 5, p. 507-535Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke’s own

  • 5.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reply to Forbes2012In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 72, no 2, p. 298-303Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics predicts readings for certain natural language sentences which these simply do not have. These sentences contain mixed contexts involving factive attitude verbs. We argue that the readings our semantics predicts do indeed exist, even if it might take a little work to bring them out. Moreover, denying their existence would have some rather unattractive consequences.

  • 6.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A Note on the Phenomenal Sorites2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 36, p. 519-524Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is observational indiscriminability non-transitive? This was once an accepted truth, and it was used by philosophers like Armstrong and Dummett to argue against the existence of appearances (sense data, sensory items). It was objected, however, early on by Jackson and Pinkerton, and more recently by vagueness contextualists like Raffman and Fara, that the case for non-transitivity is flawed. The reason is the context dependence of appearance. I argue here that if we take context dependence properly into account, we still have (a modified version of) non-transitivity, and that therefore we still face the problem of appearances.

  • 7.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Assertion2007Other (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Assertion, inference, and consequence2012In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 187, no 3, p. 869-885Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper the informativeness account of assertion (Pagin in Assertion. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) is extended to account for inference. I characterize the conclusion of an inference as asserted conditionally on the assertion of the premises. This gives a notion of conditional assertion (distinct from the standard notion related to the affirmation of conditionals). Validity and logical validity of an inference is characterized in terms of the application of method that preserves informativeness, and contrasted with consequence and logical consequence, that is defined in terms of truth preservation. The proposed account is compared with that of Prawitz (Logica yearbook 2008. pp. 175-192. College Publications, London, 2009).

  • 9.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Assertion Not Possibly Social2009In: Journal of Pragmatics, ISSN 0378-2166, E-ISSN 1879-1387, Vol. 41, p. 2563-2567Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his paper ‘Why assertion may yet be social’ (Pegan, this issue), Philip Pegan directs two main criticisms against my earlier paper ‘Is assertion social?’ (Pagin, 2004). I argued that what I called ‘‘social theories’’, are inadequate, and I suggested a method for generating counterexamples to them: types of utterance which are not assertions by intuitive standards, but which are assertion by the standards of those theories. Pegan’s first criticism is that I haven’t given an acceptable characterization of the class of social theories. His second criticism is that I have overlooked some alternatives, and that there are social theories that are not affected by my argument. In Section 1 I discuss the first, and in Section 2 the second.

  • 10.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Communication and the Complexity of Semantics2012In: Oxford Handbook of Compositionality / [ed] Wolfram Hinzen, Eduoard Machery, and Marcus Werning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 1, p. 510-529Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I first argue that we have reason to look to the computational needs of communication for justifying the claim that natural language semantics is compositional. I then turn to discussing appropriate measures of computa- tional complexity. For the measure chosen I present arguments that maxi- mally efficient computational systems have a certain form. I argue that se- mantic functions of a certain more specific compositional kind can be com- puted by systems of that form. In this sense, they have minimal complexity. I finally discuss the converse question about the extent to which maximal efficiency mandates compositionality, and conclude that although it is not strictly required, there is reason to think that natural language semantics at least approximates a kind of semantics that is in one respect more specific than, and in another respect a generalization of, standard compositionality.

  • 11.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality, Understanding, and Proofs2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 118, no 471, p. 713-737Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The principle of semantic compositionality, as Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore have emphasized, imposes constraints on theories of meaning that it is hard to meet with psychological or epistemic accounts. Here, I argue that this general tendency is exemplified in Michael Dummett’s account of meaning. On that account, the so-called manifestability requirement has the effect that the speaker who under- stands a sentence s must be able to tell whether or not s satisfies central semantic conditions. This requirement is not met by truth-conditional accounts of meaning. On Dummett’s view, it is met by a proof conditional account: understanding amounts to knowledge of what counts as a proof of a sentence. A speaker is supposed always to be capable of deciding whether or not a given object is a proof of a given sentence she understands. This requirement comes into conflict with composition- ality. If meaning is compositionally determined, then all you need for understand- ing a sentence is what you get from combining your understanding of the parts according to the mode of composition. But that knowledge is not always sufficient for recognizing any proof at all of a given sentence. Dummett’s proof-theoretic argument to the contrary is mistaken.

  • 12.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality, Complexity, and Evolution2013In: Proceedings: Symposium on Language Acquisition and Language Evolution / [ed] Francisco Lacerda, Stockholm: Department of Linguistics, Stockholm University , 2013, 1, p. 51-62Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Is there a reason to believe that the evolution of language leads to compositional semantics? A proposal from Henry Brighton is presented and criticized. As an alternative, the role of compositionality for the complexity of semantic interpretation is emphasized.

  • 13.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constructing the World and Locating Oneself2017In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 827-852Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Robert Stalnaker describes two opposed perspectives on the relation between the internal and the external. According to one, the internal world is taken as given and the external world as problematic, and according to the other, the external world is taken as given and the internal world as problematic. Analytic philosophy moved from the former to the latter, from problems of world-construction to problems of self-locating beliefs. I argue in this paper that these problems are equivalent: both arise because experience and objective, external facts jointly underdetermine their relation. Both can be seen as a problem of expressive completeness; of the internal language in the former case, and of the non-indexical language in the second.

  • 14.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    De Se Communication: Centered or Uncentered?2016In: About oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 272-306Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It was pointed out, first by Robert Stalnaker, then also by Andy Egan, that David Lewis’s model of centered-worlds contents has undesired consequences for communication of de se contents. The recent years have seen a number of attempts to save the model by amending it to handle de se communication. Proposals include the appeal to sequences of individuals in the centers, to ersatz classical propositions, and to operations of “re-centering”. The authors are Dilip Ninan and Stephan Torre (sequences), Sarah Moss and Max Kölbel (ersatz), and Alan Gibbard and Clas Weber (re-centering). The present paper discusses these attempts. The conclusion is that they fail.

  • 15.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fusing Quantifiers and Connectives: is Intuitionistic Logic Different?2015In: Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning / [ed] Heinrich Wansing, Cham: Springer, 2015, p. 259-280Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A paper by Dag Westerstahl and myself twenty years ago introduced operators that are both connectives and quantifiers. We introduced two binary operators that are classically interdefinable: one that fuses conjunction and existential quantification and one that fuses implication and universal quantification. We called the system PFO. A complete Gentzen-Prawitz style Natural Deduction axiomatization of classical PL was provided. For intuitionistic PL, however, it seemed that existential quantification should be fused with disjunction rather than with conjunction. Whether this was true, and if so why, were questions not answered at the time. Also, it seemed that there is no uniform definition of such a disjunctive-existential operator in classical PFO. This, too, remained a conjecture. In this paper, I return to these previously unresolved questions, and resolve them.

  • 16.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Indeterminacy and the analytic/synthetic distinctions: a survey2008In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 164, p. 1-18Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by Quine, and the varieties of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reveals that the two claims are mutually independent. Neither does the claim that the distinction is unsound follow from the indeterminacy thesis, nor that thesis from unsoundness claim, under any of the common interpretations of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

  • 17.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Indeterminacy of Translation2014In: A Companion to W.V.O. Quine / [ed] Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, 1, p. 236-262Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Information and Assertoric Force2011In: Assertion: New Philosophical Essays / [ed] Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 1, p. 97-136Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Informativeness and Moore's Paradox2008In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 68, no 1, p. 46-57Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that a) non-intentional systems can exhibit what is intuitively reconizable as Moorean absurdity; b) that main-stream accounts of Moore's paradox cannot explain this; c) that an alternative account focused on informativeness (or information-giving) can explain it; d) that an account of assertoric force as prima facie informativeness is plausible; e) that the informativeness account of Moorean absurdity can explain standard examples of Moore's paradox in virtue of this theory of assertion.

  • 20.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intending to be misinterpreted2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 5-18Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his paper 'Two Notions of Utterance Meaning', Petr Kot'atko criticises Davidson's conception of the relation between meaning and intention. He ascribes the following view (D) to Davidson: If S makes an utterance in order to perform a certain speech act, he intends and expects that act to be assigned to the utterance in A's interpretation. Kot'atko's objection to (D) is that a speaker can intend to be misinterpreted. The present paper discusses this objection. It is argued that Kot'atko's main example of such an intention fails. It is also argued that although there can be cases that would be adequately described as examples of intending to be misinterpreted, they are not of the kind needed for an objection against (D).

  • 21.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intersubjective intentional identity2014In: Empty representations: reference and non-existence / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Genoveva Martí, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1, p. 91-113Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Geach’s basic idea of intentional identity is reconsidered and the idea of a common focus is elaborated in possible-worlds terms. A distinction betweeen internalism and externalism about common focus is made; internalism is characterized by the idea that mental anaphora always succeeds in establishing common focus. It is then argued that internalism makes intersubjective intentional identity, as expressed in Geach sentences, impossible. Finally, a semantic account of Geach sentences is proposed, which can make them true on certain realist assumptions about possible worlds and possible objects.

  • 22.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intuitionism and the anti-justification of bivalence2008In: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism — What has Become of Them?, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands , 2008, p. 221-236Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Dag Prawitz has argued (Prawitz 1998) that it is possible intuitionist- ically to prove the validity of ‘A → there is a proof of [A]’ by induction over formula complexity, provided we observe an ob ject language/meta- language distinction. In the present paper I mainly argue that if the ob ject language with its axioms and rules can be represented as a formal system, then the proof fails. I also argue that if this restriction is lifted, at each level of the language hierarchy, then the proof can go through, but at the expense of virtually reducing the concept of a proof to that of truth in a non-constructive sense.

  • 23.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kepa Korta and John Perry, Critical Pragmatics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20112014In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 123, no 3, p. 371-374Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy of Language, by Scott Soames2013In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 122, no 486, p. 589-593Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Review of Philosophy of Language, by Scott Soames.

  • 25.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Pragmatic Composition?2007In: The World of Language and the World beyond Language: A Festschrift for Pavel Cmorej, Slovak Academy of Science , 2007, p. 11-26Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pragmatic Enrichment as Coherence Raising2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 168, no 1, p. 59-100Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the phenomenon of pragmatic enrichment, and has a proposal for predicting the occurrence of such enrichments. The idea is that an enrichment of an expressed content c occurs as a means of strengthening the coherence between c and a salient given content c’ of the context, whether c’ is given in discourse, as sentence parts, or through perception. After enrichment, a stronger coherence relation is instantiated than before enrichment. An idea of a strength scale of types of coherence relations is proposed and applied.

  • 27.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Problems with norms of assertion2016In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 93, no 1, p. 178-207Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.

  • 28.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation and Pragmatic Enrichment2017In: Argumenta, ISSN 2465-2334, Vol. 3, no 1, p. 87-107Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the principle of charity. If a speaker X in a context c manifests the attitude of holding a sentence s true, this might be because of believing, not the content of s in c, but what results from a pragmatic enrichment of that content. In this case, the connection between the holding-true attitude and the meaning of s might be too loose for charity to confirm the correct interpretation hypothesis. To solve this problem, I apply the coherence raising account of pragmatic enrichment developed in Pagin 2014. The result is that in upward entailing linguistic contexts, the enriched content entails the prior content, and so charity prevails: the speaker also believes the prior content. In downward entailing contexts this would not hold, but I argue that enrichments tend not to occur in downward entailing contexts.

  • 29.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity2013In: A Companion to Donald Davidson / [ed] Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 1, p. 225-246Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Handbook article about Radical interpretation and the principle of charity in Donald Davidson's philosophy.

  • 30.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of Mark Jary: Assertion2011In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538 - 1617Article, review/survey (Refereed)
  • 31.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sentential semantics2016In: Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics / [ed] Maria Aloni, Paul Dekker, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 65-105Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Sentences and sentence meaning

    There are three basic conceptions of a sentence: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic (Stainton, 2000). According to the syntactic conception, a sentence is an expression with certain grammatical properties, as specified in a grammar. According to the semantic conception, a sentence is an expression with a certain type of meaning, for instance a sentence expressing a proposition, something that is true or false (with respect to the actual world). According to the pragmatic conception, a sentence is an expression with a certain kind of use, typically that of making a speech act.

    These three conceptions are naturally enough pretty well correlated. Speakers of natural languages typically use sentences in the grammatical sense for making speech acts and expressing propositional thoughts by means of the sentence meaning. Nevertheless, in many cases they come apart. On the one hand, speakers often use sub-sentential expressions, such as ‘Reserved for tonight’, pointing to a chair (Stainton, 2000, p. 446), for making a speech act.

    On the other hand, very often, what is a grammatical sentence does not have a meaning that is simply a propositional content in an ordinary sense. This can happen for a variety of reasons, such as indexicality, presupposition, conventional implicature, discourse phenomena, interrogative mood.

    In this chapter, we shall be concerned with sentences in the syntactic sense, and we shall look at how semantic theories of various types model sentence meaning. In some cases we will also consider their philosophical motivations. The topic will be delimited in certain ways. We shall only discuss declarative sentences (see Dekker et al., Chapter 19, and Portner, Chapter 20 for chapters on non-declaratives). We shall also not cover dynamic phenomena in discourse semantics (see Asher, Chapter 4). We are also not going to discuss presupposition and similar phenomena in the semantic/pragmatics interface (see Schlenker, Chapter 22). We shall be concerned with semantic context dependence and related phenomena.

    One of the key features of the syntactic conception of a sentence is that sentences are syntactically (or morphosyntactically) complex. Since they result from combining linguistic elements, there is a question of how the meaning of the sentence is related to the meanings of its parts and the way they are combined.

  • 32.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Cognitive Significance of Mental Files2013In: Disputatio, ISSN 0873-626X, Vol. 5, no 36, p. 133-145Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper concerns Francois Recanatis Book Mental Files. It presents the main features of the mental files theory, and draws attention to some problematic features of the account of cognitive significance within the theory.

  • 33.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tolerance and higher-order vagueness2017In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 194, no 10, p. 3727-3760Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea of higher-order vagueness is usually associated with conceptions of vagueness that focus on the existence of borderline cases. What sense can be made of it within a conception of vagueness that focuses on tolerance instead? A proposal is offered here. It involves understanding 'definitely' not as a sentence operator but as a predicate modifier, and more precisely as an intensifier, that is, an operator that shifts the predicate extension along a scale. This idea is combined with the author's earlier approach to the semantics of vague expressions, which builds on the idea of a central gap associated with a predicate. The central gap approach is generalized to handle arbitrarily many iterations of 'definitely'.

    The full text will be freely available from 2018-11-30 13:00
  • 34.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Truth Theories, Competence, and Semantic Computation2012In: Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental / [ed] Gerhard Preyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 1, p. 49-75Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper discusses the question whether T-theories explain how it is possible to understand new sentences, or learn an infinite language, as Davidson claimed. I argue against some commentators that for explanatory power we need not require that T-theories are implicitly known or mirror cognitive structures. I note contra Davidson that the recursive nature of T-theories is not sufficient for explanatory power, since humans can work out only what is computationally tractable, and recursiveness by itself allows for intractable computational complexity. I finally consider the complexity of T-theories, transformed into term rewriting systems, and find that the complexity of such systems is indeed tractable. Therefore Davidson's claim stands, even though a further condition had to be met.

  • 35.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vagueness and central gaps2010In: Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature and Its Logic / [ed] Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2010, p. 254-272Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Ordinary intuitions that vague predicates are tolerant, or cannot have sharp boundaries, can be formalized in first-order logic in at least two non-equivalent ways, a stronger and a weaker. The stronger turns out to be false in domains that have a significant central gap for the predicate in question, i.e. where a sufficiently large middle segment of the ordering relation (such as taller for ‘tall’) is uninstantiated. The weaker principle is true in such domains, but does not in those domains induce the sorites conclusion.

    This fact can be used for interpreting ordinary uses of vague expres- sions by means of a new kind of contextual quantifier domain restriction. A central segment is cut from the domain, if consistent with speaker in- tentions. As long as this is possible, tolerance, bivalence and consistency can all be retained.

    This paper focuses on the basic semantic properties in a model- theoretic setting. The natural language application is sketched and the nature of the approach briefly discussed.

  • 36.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vagueness and Domain Restriction2011In: Vagueness and Language Use / [ed] Paul Egré and Nathan Klinedinst, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 283-307Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops an idea of saving ordinary uses of vague predicates from the Sorites by means of domain restriction. A tolerance level for a pred- icate, along a dimension, is a difference with respect to which the predicate is semantically insensitive. A central gap for the predicate+dimension in a domain is a segment of an associated scale, larger than this difference, where no object in the domain has a measure, and such that the extension of the predicate has measures on one side of the gap and the anti-extension on the other. The domain restriction imposes a central gap.

  • 37.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What is communicative success?2008In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 38, no 1, p. 85-115Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The author presents a classical view of communicative success and defends it against modern views that compel a requirement of knowledge or reliability. He believes that there is no well-defined pre-theoretic concept of communicative success that is present as object of conceptual analysis. Moreover, he offers a theoretical argument for taking agreement in the mental context to be more basic than agreement in linguistic meaning. Lastly, he claims that non-compositional theories would be chosen by the charity principle because one can select more freely what meaning to assign to his sentences.

  • 38.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Relational modality2008In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information, ISSN 0925-8531, E-ISSN 1572-9583, Vol. 17, p. 307-322Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordi- nary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If we, like Kripke, account for this difference by means of the intensions of names and descriptions, we have to conclude that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, the difference in scope behavior between names and description can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their (standard) intension. The relational modality account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentences (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Given an alternative definition of consequence for relational modality, and a restriction to models with reflexive accessibility relations and non-empty world-bound domains, relational modality also turns out to be model theoretically equivalent with rigidity semantics with respect to logical consequence. Here we introduce the semantics, give the truth definition for relational modality models, and prove the equivalence results.

  • 39.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vulcan might have existed, and Neptune not: On the Semantics of Empty Names2014In: Empty Representation: Reference and Non-Existence / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero and Genoveva Martí, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1, p. 117-141Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Empty names such as ‘Vulcan’ or ‘Sherlock Holmes’ have intrigued philosophers of language at least since Frege. They are clearly problematic for Millian accounts of the semantics of proper names, but also for certain recent versions of descriptivism trying to accommodate Kripkean intuitions regarding proper names. In ‘Proper Names and Relational Modality’ (2006), we suggest an alternative to such semantics: introducing the technique of semantic evaluation switching, we develop a semantics allowing (non-empty) proper names to have descriptive contents while accommodating Kripkean modal intuitions. This chapter extends the switcher semantics to empty names.

  • 40.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity, Modality and General Terms2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Lund , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    ABSTRACT: In his recent paper ‘Analyticity: An Unfinished Business in

    Possible-World Semantics’ (Rabinowicz 2006), Wlodek Rabinowicz takes on the task of providing a satisfactory definition of analyticity in the framework of possible-worlds semantics. As usual, what Wlodek proposes is technically well-motivated and very elegant. Moreover, his proposal does deliver an interesting analytic/synthetic distinction when applied to sentences with natural kind terms. However, the longer we thought and talked about it, the more questions we had, questions of both philosophical and technical nature. Hence the idea of this little paper – for how better to honor a philosopher than by trying very hard to criticize him? After quickly running over some background in possible worlds semantics and setting out Wlodek's proposal against that background, we shall bring up and discuss our questions in sections 3 – 5. In the final section, we shall also make a stab at a different solution to the problem, making use of our own earlier idea of relational modality.

  • 41.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Pelletier, Francis Jeffry
    Context, Content, and Composition2007In: Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, Oxford , 2007, p. 25-62Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 42.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    van Rooij, Robert
    Department of Philosophy of the University of Amsterdam.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy of language and mind2013In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 190, no 10, p. 1731-1733Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 43.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality2011In: Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning / [ed] Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn, Paul Portner, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2011, 2, p. 96-123Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article is concerned with the principle of compositionality, i.e. the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and its mode of composition. After a brief historical background, a formal algebraic framework for syntax and semantics is presented. In this framework, both syntactic operations and semantic functions are (normally) partial. Using 20 the framework, the basic idea of compositionality is given a precise statement, and several variants, both weaker and stronger, as well as related properties, are distinguished. Several arguments for compositionality are discussed, and the standard arguments are found inconclusive. Also, several arguments against compositionality, and for the claim that it is a trivial property, are discussed, 25 and are found to be flawed. Finally, a number of real or apparent problems for compositionality are considered, and some solutions are proposed.

  • 44.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Göteborgs universitet, Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori.
    Compositionality I: Definitions and variants2010In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 250-264Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This is the first part of a two-part article on semantic compositionality, i.e. the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. Here we provide a brief historical background, a formal framework for syntax and semantics, precise definitions, and a survey of variants of compositionality. Stronger and weaker forms are distinguished, as well as generalized forms that cover extra-linguistic context dependence as well as linguistic context dependence. In the second article we survey arguments for and arguments against the claim that natural languages are compositional, and consider some problem cases. It will be referred to as Part II.

  • 45.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Göteborgs universitet, Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori.
    Compositionality II: Arguments and problems2010In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 265-282Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This is the second part of a two-part article on compositionality, i.e. the principle that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. In the first, Pagin and Westerståhl (2010), we provide a general historical background, a formal framework, definitions, and a survey of variants of compositionality. It will be referred to as Part I. Here we discuss arguments for and against the claim that natural languages have a compositional semantics. We also discuss some problem cases, including belief reports, quotation, idioms, and ambiguity.

  • 46.
    Pagin, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pure Quotation and General Compositionality2010In: Linguistics and Philosophy, ISSN 0165-0157, E-ISSN 1573-0549, Vol. 33, no 5, p. 381-415Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Starting from the familiar observation that no straightforward treatment of pure quotation can be compositional in the standard (homomorphism) sense, we introduce general compositionality, which can be described as compositionality that takes linguistic context into account. A formal notion of linguistic context type is developed, allowing the context type of a complex expression to be distinct from those of its constituents. We formulate natural conditions under which an ordinary meaning assignment can be non-trivially extended to one that is sensitive to context types and satisfies general compositionality. As our main example we work out a Fregean treatment of pure quotation, but we also indicate that the method applies to other kinds of context, e.g. intensional contexts.

1 - 46 of 46
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